B. Scotus’ own Response

43. As to this article then [n.36], it can be said that a reason for giving latria can be the intrinsic goodness of the one adored or this goodness as communicating itself to the one adoring (and its doing so first, freely and principally, and in accord with the greatest good of the one adoring). Likewise too a reason for the adoration of hyperdulia can be the intrinsic goodness of the one adored or this goodness as through it (as through a second cause) the greatest good is communicated to the one adoring.

44. If the first way is held then for neither cause is there due to Christ in his human nature an adoration because of his being redeemer greater than were he not redeemer; but, according to this opinion, neither is a greater latria, or a latria for an additional reason, due to God if he is Creator than would be due to him if he were not Creator.

45. But if the other opinion is held, then, it can be said of hyperdulia just as of latria in respect of God that a greater reverence is due to Christ because he is redeemer than would be due to him if he were not redeemer (and this if the reverence then due to him were not the greatest reverence) - or if the reverence were the greatest, the same reverence would be due to him now for an additional reason.

46. And this is what the arguments seem to prove [nn.38-42].

47. The fact is plain about the first argument [n.38] because it proceeds of Christ as he is mediator and meritorious cause of our salvation; and plain about the second one [n.39] because it proceeds of Christ as he is head of the Church.

48. The other two [nn.40-42] reasons, which proceed from authorities, need solving.

As to the third argument [n.40], about the perfect repair of man - it concludes by way of congruity that the person who redeemed and meritoriously saved was God, so that we owe the supreme hyperdulia that is owed by reason of meritorious redemption to the same person to whom we also owe, by reason of creation, the adoration of latria; but we would, for this reason, not have been less perfectly saved if we were obliged to show the reverence due a meritorious savior, as he is meritorious savior, to someone other than him to whom we owe latria; just as now we adore Mary with hyperdulia and all the other saints with dulia, and yet we are not lower down because of this adoration than if God alone were to be adored; we would however be very low down if we owed to someone else the adoration we owe to God, because then we would be wholly subject to that someone else, which would prove a great unhappiness and weakness for us. An example of this is that it is more fitting for my father to care for me than for someone else do so in such wise that I would owe him the same reverence that is owed to my father and carer; but if someone else were to be carer, I would owe one sort of reverence to my father and another sort to that someone else, and so I would in some way be subject to several persons, but not with an equal subjection.

49. To the other argument [n.41] I say that the created life of the man Christ was not an infinite good formally, nor was it something to be supremely loved - hence the Trinity wanted it not to die the death it wanted it to die; but, to turn away from God in one thing is graver than to turn away from him in some other thing, and the graver the more noble the turning toward him would be, other things being equal. Now by loving this human nature in Christ, which was the best creature as to fullness of grace, there could be the supreme turning toward God that happens by act of using a creature, because this creature was closest to the end and most able to be referred to the end; therefore a turning away from God with respect to this usable object, namely by hating the created life in him whom God wished to hate it, was the worst turning away - and thus the killing of the man Christ was the gravest sin as far as depends on the object taken as such.

50. And if you say that it was the gravest of all other possible sins not immediately committed against God, one can say that since these other sins are distinct in their gravity, and one of them does not intensify the other, the gravity of this one sin was greatest as to its intensity, but in the others it was greatest as to extent. However the created life of Christ was so good that its being taken way would suffice to destroy infinite evils (there will be discussion of this below in the topic of the satisfaction of Christ for our sins [Lectura 3 d.20 nn.24, 28]).