2. An Objection, and Rejection of it

26. But an objection to this [n.25] is that supreme lordship is not immediately consequent to the divine nature, because, according to Augustine On the Trinity 5.16 n.17, God was Lord only in time, just as the creature was servant in time; therefore supreme lordship exists by reason of the creation, whereby the creature received its whole being from God. But as great a reason for lordship seems to belong to God because of the gift of redemption as because of the gift of creation; therefore the cult of divine worship is due to the Redeemer as Redeemer, and by reason of the redemption, in the same way as it is owed to the Creator by reason of creation.

27. This supposition about the equality of lordship in Creator and Redeemer with respect to the created and redeemed is proved in several ways:

First from the Apostle in Galatians 6 [I Corinthians 6.20], ‘For you were bought at a great price; so glorify etc.’ Therefore I am a servant for the reason that I am redeemed.a

a.a [Interpolation] The question is whether adoration is due to God because of something intrinsic to God in himself or because of a benefit conferred on us or an intrinsic good qua communicated to us. If the second, the question is whether the adoration due by reason of redemption is equally as great as the adoration due by reason of creation.

28. There is also this confirmation from Gregory in the canticle of blessing the paschal candle, ‘Had it not benefited us to be redeemed, it did not benefit to us to be born;’ as great a good, then, is conferred by redemption as by creation.

29. There is another confirmation, too, in that by redemption is conferred the gift of grace and glory, but by creation only the good of nature; therefore etc.

30. Herefrom the conclusion is drawn that, since Christ was redeemer as to his human nature, then the same adoration that is owed also to the Creator is owed to Christ according to his human nature, that is, according to the reason for adoring (not absolutely, but as it was the reason for redemption).

31. I reply that, although no one can be bound to something greater than what is greatest, yet he can, for some reason, be bound to the same thing for a more reasons. An example from a religious who vows chastity and afterwards receives sacred orders: he is bound to the same thing and not to a greater thing, but he is bound to it for a greater reason. In this way one can concede that to be the principle of redemption, or to perfect that very redemption - provided that it confers as great a good on us as creation - does, as a result, demand as much service from us by the work of redemption as by the work of creation. And then he who principally works redemption is, as to the reason itself for adoration, owed supreme adoration; but he is not owed a greater adoration than he is owed by reason of creation, because supreme adoration is owed to him by creation.

32. And this point is true: if some good conferred on a creature, and not the intrinsic good itself of the conferrer, is the reason for worshipping the conferrer as Lord (as, for example, if, per impossibile, there were several gods and one of them created us but not another, and if we were bound to adore the first and not the second) - then one could well say that, if as great a good is conferred on us by the working of redemption as by creation, then as much service is owed by reason of this redemption to the whole Trinity (which works the redemption) as is owed to the Trinity by reason of creation;a and it is plain that these reasons for owing adoration to the Trinity are distinct.

a.a [Interpolation] But if the intrinsic goodness of the conferrer is the only reason for such supreme adoration, then, since there is as much intrinsic goodness in one god as in the other, the first should be adored only as the other is.

33. But if the supreme intrinsic goodness of God is the reason for adoration then, since this goodness is not different according to the different goods conferred on creatures, there are not several reasons for adoring God -however many the benefits are that he confers on us.

34. So if this second position is maintained [n.33], then the argument applied to Christ as redeemer [n.30] does not hold, because the nature in which the work of redemption was carried out does not have infinite intrinsic goodness -however much it may be the reason or the principle of conferring on us a very great good.

35. But if the first position is maintained [n.32], namely that it is not just the intrinsic good or intrinsic goodness that is the reason for adoration, but rather this goodness as it communicates the greatest good to us (and this primarily and freely of itself and not because of some return of payment, according to Psalm 15.2, ‘Thou hast no need of my goods’) - then one can reply that, although Christ was Redeemer according to his human nature, yet he did not effect redemption principally according to that nature, but rather the whole Trinity did; and so Christ as man effected only by way of merit the salvation that has been conferred on us by redemption. But supreme reverence is not owed to one from whom we possess the supreme good, not principally, but secondarily.