II. To the Principal Arguments

52. To the arguments.

To the first [n.2] I say that a son is son by filiation as a father is father by paternity; but not for this reason does the multiplication of sons follow the multiplication of filiations, because concrete particulars are not multiplied unless both form and supposit are multiplied; the multiplication of the form alone does not suffice, especially when several forms - whether of the same idea or expressed by the same name (as in the present case) - can exist in the same thing, in the way that, as Damascene says [supra d.6 n.42], Christ is not a plural willer though he has more than one will; hence in the form of the argument ‘a son exists by filiation, so if another filiation then another son’ there is a fallacy in the inference by destruction of the antecedent [cf. Peter of Spain Tractatus tr.7 n.159].

53. To the second argument [n.3] I say that if the Father were incarnate there would be confusion, because temporal filiation would be said of the same person that had eternal paternity, and so the person could be called confusedly now Father and now son; but as it is there is no such confusion because, precisely, the same person is called Son by both filiations. Therefore when now ‘Son’ simply is said, it is clearly understood of the same person whichever filiation is being talked about; but if, in the other case, the Father were incarnate, then, when the word ‘son’ were said, a single person would not clearly be understood but now one and now another would confusedly be according as this or that filiation was the one being talked about. - The argument made for the opposite [n.8] is similar because the confusion that there is now in the case of the Father would only arise because the Father would be called the mother’s son by some filiation and not by his eternal relation; therefore now too the Son is called son by a filiation other than his eternal filiation.

54. The answer to the third [n.4] is plain from what was said in the solution of the doubt [n.47], that Christ after the resurrection is the Mother’s son by the same filiation as before, because filiation is not founded on the existence of the nature as received by an uninterrupted generation, but founded on it absolutely; and so, whenever the existence is the same and related to the same extreme, the filiation is the same and is so by the same action as that by which the foundation returns the same and the relation returns the same. And when the argument is made that Christ received existence in his resurrection by a different production [n.4], I say that the production does not take away the filiation that was founded on the same being that was received by generation, but there are only two relations consequent to two passive productions, and these were productions to the same existence; and one production was interrupted, as was also the being of the foundation, and the other of them was first then new.

55. To the next [n.5] I say that Christ is not said to be really and truly his Mother’s son only in the way that God is said to be really and truly Lord of creation, but that Christ received the really existing nature by a real passive generation; and for this reason it follows that he is son by a real filiation.

56. To the next argument too [n.6] I say that, although God is formally called creator by a relation of reason or by no relation but by a denomination that is reduced to the category of relation (namely insofar as he is the term of the relation in the creature, as was said in 1 d.30 nn.41-45), yet he does not create by a relation of reason - and I understand this not of what is formally implied by the term ‘creative’ but of the foundation (just as a thing is said to be ‘heative’ by heat as by the foundation of its heating power and not by a relation founded on heat). And the reason for this can be briefly stated, namely that no relation of reason can be the formal reason by which something can produce a real being, because a being of reason is not present in anything save only as it has being in the intellect as a known in a knower; and this being is a diminished being in comparison with the whole of real existence, and so a cause by this being of reason cannot be a cause of anything by that other being of real existence, because that other is more perfect being and is produced neither naturally nor artificially.

57. And when the proof is given [n.6] in the claim that God has power to create only as artisan, I reply that the knowledge of God, which is a certain absolute perfection in him, is in him from the nature of the thing, but it is only called ‘art’ by its relation to certain objects, or by the relation of certain objects to it; so although God produces creatures as artisan, this term ‘artisan’ is not founded on his knowledge as a relation of reason, and that this is the reason whereby he is able to produce, but is founded on it only as the absolute habit of knowledge, which is called ‘art’, exists in God himself; so there is a fallacy of the accident in the form of the argument ‘God produces as artisan, he is artisan by relation of reason, therefore he produces by relation of reason’; for the major is true to the extent the middle term is not taken for the relation itself which ‘artisan’ implies, but for the foundation of the relation; and the minor is true only as it is taken for the relation formally. An example: ‘the hot heats by its heating power, heating power is a relation, therefore heat heats by a relation’; the major is true as taken for what ‘heating power’ states and for the foundation of the relation, but not for the relation of powerfulness itself; and the minor is true of the powerfulness itself and of the relation in it that is implied by it, and not of the absolute reality on which it is founded. - But as to how God’s knowledge is absolute and as to how, as absolute, it can have adequately the full idea of art (to the extent that, as artisan, it is the term of the relations of all creatures), the answer was stated in the material about the ideas, 1 d.35 nn.38-52, d.36 nn.39-43 [cf. Rep. IA d.36 nn.132-138, 148-152, 112].

58. To the last one [n.7] I concede that the son is really equal to the mother in human nature, or is in this respect more excellent. And so when the argument about the union is made [n.7], I prove that the proposition taken, namely that ‘equality is founded on the unity of union’, is false, because union is a relation. For union cannot be understood as a relation of union to itself. I ask then what relation it is. Either the same as equality, and then the same thing will be founded on itself, because this union, according to them [sc. Henry of Ghent and his followersHenry of Ghent Summa a.55 q.6, “When it is said that in divine reality ‘the Father is equal to the Son’ the relation on both sides is according to reason... So when greatness is said to be the equality of the persons, it must, in its understanding, be taken twice: once as it is has being in one person and once as it has being in another, or taken thrice if equality of the three persons in greatness is taken;” a.65 q.1, “From ‘one’ understood from unity, or from the property of unity, every common relation in divine reality is caused. But from ‘one’ understood from union, or from the property of union, every relation of equality.in creatures is caused;” ad 1, “I say that the fact that on ‘one’ something follows, namely common relation, can be understood in two ways: in one way when ‘one’ is taken once and formally; in another when ‘one’ is taken several times and is multiplied materially as it were, either in reality or in reason.now when ‘one’ is taken in the second way, there follow on it all the common relations of equality, identity, and likeness.” ⁸⁸], is founded on equality and is the same as itself; so the same thing will be founded on itself. Or it is a different relation; and if it is, it will be founded on ‘one’, and I ask what the unity is. If it is founded on a unity and not the unity of union, the same can be said about equality; and if on the unity of union there will be an infinite regress.

59. And if you say that this union is not union of matter with form, nor of any of the many other manifest unions [n.7], but is the unity of likeness - then this seems to expound one term by another term of the same meaning; for equality and this unity of likeness are the same; so to deny that equality in divinity is real because there is no unity of equality there (in the way the understanding of the antecedent can probably be taken), is to deny the same thing because of the same thing (as that equality is not a real relation because it is not equality).

60. And as to what is added for the question [n.58 footnote], that equality of union must be taken twice but that it is not taken twice save as it has the unity of union - it is refuted by the fact that essence founds the relations of origin, and these are real and nevertheless not taken from the nature of the thing.

61. But if it is said that equality in generation is taken twice, in the producer and in the produced - on the contrary: I ask what from the nature of the thing is taken twice? Either that from the absolute nature of the thing the nature has things that are distinct in some way, and this is false in the matter at issue; or that from the nature of the thing it only has distinct relations, and then to say that from the nature of the thing the essence founds distinct relations of origin (because it is from the nature of the thing taken twice) is to say that it founds real relations of origin, because it founds two real relations - which is nothing.

62. I say, therefore, to the argument [n.7] that the equality is founded on the unity of non-union, but that non-unity in creatures is non-unity of singular being and not non-unity of nature (this double unity was sufficiently dealt with in the question on individuation, 2 d.3 nn.76, 169-188); thus, in the matter at hand, the unity that founds equality is the unity not of person but of nature; nor does this unity need to be distinguished or taken twice in order for the relation to be real, but it is enough that - when the relation is the same - the extremes are really distinct, as they are also in the case of relations of origin. And then to the matter at hand I say that in the human nature in Christ there is some real unity less than numerical unity, and that likewise there is some numerical unity in Mary; and this unity and that unity are the foundation of the mutual equality of Christ and Mary, if they are posited as having been equal in human nature.