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II. To the Principal Arguments
52. To the arguments.
To the first [n.34] I say the inference ‘Socrates was made man, therefore he was made’ does not hold of Socrates due to his form, just as it does not hold thus of the matter at hand either; but it holds of Socrates only due to his matter, because ‘Socrates is a man’ states the being first and simply of Socrates; in the matter at hand it is not so.
53. To the second [n.35] the answer is plain from the solution to the question [n.46], because the claim ‘everything that is made to be of a certain sort must be changed in order to be of that sort’ does not hold, but only happens to be the case about things that were in potency beforehand to that as to which, by receiving the form, they are being made to be - and the Word is not made man in this way but only by personal union. However if some change were wanted, it could be posited to be in the human nature - not that the human nature was existing before it was united, but the change is between opposite terms, one of which terms precedes the other in duration.
54. To the third [n.36] I say that things that express the union of the nature to the person are excepted from the rule about the sharing of characteristics.78 And the reason is that the sharing of the aforesaid characteristics happens because of the union, and so it presupposes the union; the sharing does not happen then as regard things that express the union. And therefore God is not made, although he is made man.a
a.a [Interpolation] because these things express the union; and these things and the example given [n.36, he who kills the man kills God] are not alike.