A. Opinion of Others

1. Exposition of the Opinion

11. And answer is made that there is not [Aquinas, Godfrey of Fontaines], because if ‘this nature’ existed in its own supposit there would be the same existence for the nature as for the person; therefore now too, if ‘this person’ supplies the nature’s proper personhood as to the existing of the person, then it does so also as to the existing of the nature.

12. I reply that it does the supplying by terminating the dependence of the nature on the supposit, but it does not do so by positing that identity between them. Likewise, the existing of the nature and of the person, when the nature exists in its own supposit, are the same for the reason that person only states a double negation by reason of the nature [d.1 nn.44-47 supra]; therefore, however much person is taken away, the existing of nature is not taken away.

13. Again, if a part were to come newly to a whole that possesses perfect existence, the whole would not possess any of the whole’s existence from the part but would only have a new relation to the part, and the part would exist through the existence of the whole, as would be the case with a hand newly created for pre-existing Socrates. But human nature comes to Christ engrafted as it were into a pre-existing supposit; therefore it does not give the supposit any existence but only receives existence from it, and the supposit has only a new relation to it.

14. Further, an accident does not give any existence to the subject, because then there would be as many existences in Peter as accidents; human nature comes as it were accidentally to the Word because coming to what pre-exists in itself actually.

15. This position is made clear in another way, that just as quantity is compared to quality and to substance, and each of the latter is quantified by the same quantity (the subject formally because it receives it, and the quality as it were by accident because the quality is received in a quantified thing), so the Word and human nature exist with the same existence; and this existence is the same in supposit, and it gives as it were existence formally to the Word and per accidens to the nature united to the existing supposit, because the nature is received in the existence which the assumed nature participates; and so there is no need for there to be several existences there.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

16. [Against the conclusion in itself] - Against the conclusion of this opinion there are multiple arguments.

First as follows: the term of generation is the being of existence or something having such being, Physics 5.1.225a12-16; the Son of God was truly generated from

Mary in time, according to Damascene ch.51, and the term of this generation is something as it has the being of existence; but not uncreated existing (for that existing was not effected by temporal generation); therefore some other existing.

17. Further, On the Soul 2.4.415b13, “For living things to exist is to live;” in Christ there was a life other than uncreated life, otherwise he would not truly have died, because death is the privation of true life; uncreated life too he could not have been deprived of; and so there was in him another ‘living’, and consequently another ‘existing’.

18. Further, his soul was created; creation terminates at something actually existing; therefore there was some actual existence of his soul insofar as this existence terminated the action of creation; it was not uncreated existence, because nothing creates itself; therefore it was created existence.

19. Again, the whole Trinity under the idea of efficient cause produced and conserved the nature that the Word was the person of; the causality of the efficient and conserving cause terminated only at some ‘existing’, and so the nature had the being of existence; not uncreated existence, because nothing is efficient cause of itself; therefore etc.

20. Further, if this nature were to be let go by the Word, a new existence through generation or creation would not have to be acquired by it, because it was already in existence; for even if it were let go, yet it would not, by the fact of being let go, be annihilated or a being in potency (as is the soul of Antichrist before its creation); therefore it would have some actual existing; and not a new one because not by any positive change; therefore the same existing as it has now; therefore etc.

21 To the first, second, third, and fourth of these arguments [nn.16-19] it might be said [Aquinas] that uncreated essence is the term as it belongs to this nature.

22. On the contrary: the existing of uncreated essence states only a relation of reason as it belongs to this nature; therefore etc.Text cancelled by Scotus: “Further, the nature of an angel could be assumed by the Word, and it cannot remain the same, according to them [Aquinas], unless it remains with its own same existence; therefore neither could human nature now remain the same in Christ unless it remained with its own existence. The consequence is manifest, because its own existence is as intrinsic to one nature as to the other; therefore etc.” ⁵²

23. Further, the foundation of a relation naturally precedes the relation [d.2 n.114 supra], and precedes, in actual existing, the idea of actual relation; this union was an actual relation; therefore its foundation naturally preceded it in actual existing. The foundation was the total [human] nature itself; therefore etc.

24. There is a confirmation, because the soul naturally perfects the body first before the whole nature would be naturally fit to be assumed; in that prior stage the form was the act of the matter and was, as a consequence, giving it existence, and this existence was not corrupted by union [sc. with the Word].

25. [Against the reasons for the opinion] - Against the reasons for this opinion.

Against the first [n.13] I argue as follows:

If the Word only has a new relation to the nature, and if it will be a relation of reason (the point was plain above, n.13), then, since a subject is not said to be formally anything by a relation of reason, the Word - as he is man - will not be formally anything. The consequent is contrary to the Decretal On Heretics [1177 AD, Gregory IX, Decretals 5 tit.7 ch.7], “Since Christ is perfect God and perfect man, it is remarkable by what temerity anyone dares to say that Christ is not anything according as he is man... As for the rest, no one is to dare to say that Christ is not anything according as he is man.”

26. Further, a part that comes to a whole does not give existence to the whole but receives it, for the reason that it is perfected by the form of the whole; because if it remained distinct like before, it would not receive the existence of the whole but would have either its own existence or none; but human nature united to the Word does not receive the form of the Word but remains simply distinct; therefore either it has no existence or it has some existence of its own.

27. Against the next argument, about accident [n.14], I argue as follows:

An accident has its own being of actual existence, because it can per se exist and because it has its own essence; therefore etc.

28. Again, an accident is the term of generation in a certain respect [sc. alteration]; therefore etc.

29. Further, when bread becomes by transubstantiation the body of Christ, the quantity is actually existent there, and it acquires no existence through the transubstantiation of the subject, because not through any positive change (to wit generation or creation); therefore it had actual existence before in its subject, and had the same existence (as is plain); therefore etc.

30. Against the third piece of reasoning, about quantity [n.15] - if it were valid it would prove that the human nature was formally existent with an uncreated form; for if human nature in Socrates is formally a quantity by the same quantity that Socrates is a quantity by, and if human nature in the Word is formally a quantity by the same virtual quantity that the Word is a virtual quantity by, then the nature would be formally good and infinitely lovable by uncreated goodness (and so on about truth and the rest).