A. Solution

12. The answer to the first question is plain from the first and last question of the first distinction. For in the last question [d.1 nn.211-220] it is said that the essence is not the formal idea of terminating the union, although it is the idea of effecting it; it was however able to be the formal idea of terminating, as was said in question two of the first distinction [d.1 nn.108-109].

13. So therefore, if the discussion is about the idea of causing the assumption, it is plain that the divine nature is the idea of causing it; but it is not in fact the idea of terminating it, though it could be that idea.

14. But if the question is asked about the assumer as term, one can say that if it is of the idea of the assumer that it have incommunicable subsistence and the essence by itself does not have incommunicability, then the essence cannot be the assumer as term. But if in the assumer, that is, in what terminates the union, a singular per se existence without incommunicability is sufficient, then, since ‘being per se and a this’ belongs to the divine nature, the divine nature would be able to do the assuming.