2. On Meritorious Goodness

42. But as to the other two modes of goodness, namely virtuous and meritorious, there is difficulty.

And first one must see about meritorious goodness.

Here I say that a bad angel cannot have a volition good in this way, understanding this in the composite sense, because that he is bad and that he has a volition good in this way do not stand together, just as neither can a white thing be black in the composite sense, because then the same thing would at the same time be white and black. But in the divided sense it can be denied of a bad angel either by logical potency or by real potency; if real, either the one which states the idea of principle or the one which is a difference of being and which states order to act [cf. Ord. 1 d.20 nn.11-12].

a) On Real Potency which is a Principle

43. About real potency then, one must see how a bad angel does not have ‘the potency which is a principle’ for willing thus.

This principle, first, is understood to be a passive one - and the bad angel has this, because his will is a thing receptive of some right volition; for what is of itself receptive of some right volition is, as long as it remains in itself, not non-receptive; but his will was at some time receptive of a good volition (because before damnation he was able to have merited and been blessed), and he has not lost his natural powers now; therefore now his will is a thing thus receptive.

As to, second, the active principle of right volition, we can speak either about the total principle of volition or about a partial principle. The will indeed is a partial active principle, as has been touched on [I d.17 nn.32, 151-153; Lectura 2 d.25 n.69]; and the bad angel has it complete (according to Dionysius, [n.4]) and the same as he had it in the state of innocence; and consequently it is not true to deny the potency of him, that is, the partial active principle of meritorious volition. But this is not the total principle, because the will alone does not suffice for meritorious willing, but grace is required as a cooperating principle; nor is his will a ‘partial principle’ that is principal or sufficient for putting another partial principle in being; for although a will using the grace already possessed is principal agent as regard the act, however, when grace is not possessed, the will is not sufficient for putting grace into existence, because grace cannot be put into existence save by God alone creating it.

45. And thus a bad angel does not have the total active principle for acting, nor is he a partial active principle in whose power it is to produce in being the remaining partial active principle and to remove the impediments to the use of himself and of his principle for eliciting the act and effect that is common to them. An example of this would be if someone possessed of sight were in darkness; although he would then have a partial principle for an act of seeing (and a principal principle for seeing when light and the visual power come together), yet he does not then have the total principle nor the principal principle sufficient for putting into existence what is required for the effect of these two partial principles, nor even would he be able to remove impediments; and therefore although he has the visual power (inasmuch as he has a principle diminished with respect to vision), yet it would not be in his power to see. Thus I say that it would not be in the power of a bad angel to will meritoriously, because it is not in his power to have grace nor - by consequence - to use grace, nor even to use his will along with the grace for eliciting his act; but all these negative statements are true because it is not in his power to have the form which he is to use, or to remove impediments.

46. But there is here a doubt, because although what has been said about the active principle is true in comparison with the principal effect (which is to act meritoriously from the grace by which one meritoriously wills), yet it remains doubtful about the dispositive principle - or the principle active for disposition - with respect to the principal agent; namely whether he who has the will as principal active principle can dispose himself for grace.

And if so, then it is in a bad angel’s power to will well, just as this is in the power of a wayfaring sinner; for the bad wayfaring sinner cannot do more than dispose himself, and then grace is given him by God whereby he afterwards acts well.

47. Now whether the wayfarer can have some motion of attrition from his pure natural powers, under the existence of general influence, or whether some special operation is required will be discussed later [Ord. 4 d.14 q.2 n.4]; but on the supposition that he can, someone might deny this dispositive power of a damned angel and assert that it can belong to a wayfaring sinner.

But there is an obstacle to this from the authority of Augustine [Fulgentius] On the Faith to Peter [n.12], which more concedes to a fallen angel the power for returning to good from his pure natural powers than to a fallen man; therefore if a man wayfarer can from his pure natural powers have this dispositive power, much more so can an angel.

48. According to this, then, as to all the members about potency as it is a principle [nn.43-45], it does not seem one should deny of the bad angels that they can will meritoriously, save that they do not have the total principle of meriting, nor the principal partial principle, either with respect to good volition or with respect to the special grace which is required for good volition; and yet neither can a bad angel will well in the same way that a wayfaring sinner can, as will be said later [nn.54-56].

b) On Real Potency which is a Difference of Being

49. If the understanding is about the potency that is a difference of being, namely what is ordered to act - then it can be conceded [sc. that a bad angel can have a meritoriously good will] as to remote potency, namely the potency that follows the idea of passive and active potency (although secondarily and in diminished fashion); but it cannot be conceded as to proximate potency, because it only issues in act when all impediments are removed, such that what has it can at once issue in act; and this sort of potency does not come from the passive potency that a [bad] angel has, nor from the partial cause that the will is; for one of the partial causes needed for acting [sc. grace] is lacking

c) On Logical Potency

50. But if it is understood of logical potency, which states the manner of composition formed by the intellect, then in this way the impossibility can be in the composition either because of the intrinsic repugnance of the terms to each other or because of an extrinsic repugnance to what is required for the extremes to be united. An example of the first is ‘man is irrational’. An example of the second is if the eye were in darkness and it were impossible for the opaque obstacle causing the darkness to be removed, then it would be impossible to see; not to be sure because of the intrinsic repugnance of the terms (which terms are ‘eye’ and ‘to see’) but from the repugnance to one or other term of something extrinsic, namely the repugnance of the opaque obstacle to the term ‘to see’.

51. Applying this then to the issue at hand, I say that there is not here [sc. in a bad angel] an impossibility from an intrinsic repugnance of the terms or extremes; on the contrary there is no repugnance to the predicate in the subject. If there is any impossibility, then, it will be from the repugnance of something extrinsic to the union of the extremes; but this extrinsic thing can only be the active cause that is required for the extremes to be united; such a cause, with respect to the union of grace with some subject, is not of a nature to be any other cause than God; therefore, it will only be impossible for the bad angels to will well or to have grace because it is impossible for God to give them grace.

52. Now the impossibility on the part of God is assigned in two ways: on the part of absolute power and on the part of ordained power [Ord. 1 d.44 nn.3-11].

Absolute power is in respect of anything that does not include a contradiction. And it is plain that it is not impossible in this way for God to give grace to that nature; for since that nature is capable of grace (as touched on when discussing passive potency [n.43]), the consequence is that there is no contradiction in the proposition ‘grace actually informs that nature’.

53. The ordained power of God, as was touched on earlier, is that which is conform in its acting to the rules predetermined by divine wisdom (or rather, by divine will [1 d.44 nn.3, 6-7, 1 d.3 n.187]) - and, as to beatifying or punishing the rational creature, the rules are those of ordained justice. These rules are collected from the Scriptures, among which is the authority of Ecclesiastes 11.13, “Wherever the wood falls, there will it be” (that is, in the love of whatever thing the rational creature will have remained, in that it will continue to remain).

54. And Augustine concludes, City of God 21.23, from such rules of Scripture (for example Isaiah 66.24, “their fire will not be extinguished, and their worm will not die,” and Matthew 25.46, “these will go into eternal punishment, but the just into eternal life”), that it is certain God will never give them grace. According to this then it would be impossible for the bad angels to will well, because it is impossible by God’s ordained power to give them grace.

55. But against this it is argued that then there seems to be an impossibility in the same way about the wayfaring sinner who, however, will not in the end repent - for God has pre-ordained not to give him grace; and if the impossibility is only on this side, because of this sort of order, then it does not seem more impossible for a demon to repent than for such a sinner to repent.

I reply that the ordained power of God does not regard particular divine acts (about which there are not universal laws), but regards the universal laws or rules of doable things; of such sort is the law about the damned - and there is no such law about the bad while they are on the way, even if they remain finally bad. An example of this: if someone had laid down that every murderer should be killed, it would not be possible by ordained power - according to the order already in place - to save this particular murderer; if however he could kill a murderer but not because of some such universal law, he could also save him (or not kill him) even by ordained power. Thus a wayfarer who will not be saved can be saved, because there is no universal law laid down already against this as there is against the salvation of the damned.

56. If it be objected against this that ‘as law is about the universal so is judgment according to law about the universal, and the judgment follows from the law (therefore the reason there can be no going against the law is equally a reason there can be no going against judgment following the law); but this wayfarer, if he will be damned, will be so according to a judgment consonant to the law; therefore etc.’ - I reply that the law is about him who is bad in the term, and therefore when the law is applied to some particular individual (that is, to this or that already judged individual, because he is in the term), the judgment is no more revoked than is the law; but about this bad individual still present on the way there is no judgment by any law, just as the general law itself does not extend itself to the wayfarer.

57. There is another doubt: is this obstinacy of a bad will from God or from the bad will itself? For if it is from the will, it seems that the will could spring back itself from the obstinacy, just as it could of itself have willed the bad; for the power by which it moves itself to something is the same as that by which it rests in it, and it can withdraw itself from it and move to something else that more inclines it, of which sort is the object of it. But if the obstinacy is in place from God, then the malice will be from God, and thus God is cause of sin, which seems unacceptable.

58. On this point.

Although Augustine [Fulgentius] may seem to say, On the Faith to Peter ch.34 that God has ordained the turning away of the will to evil to abide perpetually, and obstinacy is sign of a bad will - yet because the act, while it exists, has as it were a cause continually (because its being is as it were in a state of continually being caused), then just as God cannot be the cause of bad ‘qua bad’ in the first act of eliciting it so neither is he in its continued being, which is its ‘being continually elicited’; therefore the will alone will be the cause, but from God is the punishment of fire, which is what punishes evil. Also, this obstinacy, as it states the malice of sin in the will, can be said to be from God, not indeed as positively willing it, but as abandoning and refusing to give grace; for just as God graces him whom he disposes to give grace to, so he does not grace him whom he forsakes (that is, with respect to the gracing that he has a refusing of).

59. When, therefore, it is argued that if the obstinacy is from the will alone then the will alone can spring back to the opposite (namely back from the object toward which it inordinately inclined itself) - I reply and say that for springing back meritoriously there is required a principle other than the will, namely grace, which a bad angel cannot have of himself - and God, according to his desertion of him, has disposed not to give him grace. But if you argue that a bad angel can at least have a ‘circumstanced willing’ as to what he inordinately willed, although that willing would not be meritorious for him -then this belongs to the following point, namely about moral goodness [nn.75, 28, 30, 39].

60. From what has been said, then, it seems there is no denial of power, that is, of power as active principle, unless ‘active principle’ is taken to be the total or principal principle [n.44]. Nor is there denial of the power which is order to act, save of proximate power [n.49]. Nor denial of logical power save extrinsically [n.51], on which side there is no impossibility of uniting the extreme terms when speaking of God’s absolute power [n.52], but there is when speaking of his ordained power, as collected from Scripture (as was said before from Augustine [n.54]), because God has not disposed to unite those extreme terms, and because there is no other cause of the permanence of the bad in bad than divine abandonment [n.58] - or the fact God has disposed not to give them grace, since they are in the term [n.59], and that he has not made this disposition about bad wayfarers [nn.55-56].

61. It seems too that this is proved by the authorities of the saints - first from Damascene ch.18, “What the fall is for the angels, this death is for men;” second from Augustine City of God 21.11, 23, “There is nothing more certain in Scripture than the judgment [sc. about the saved and the damned] of Scripture.”