II. To the Principal Arguments

74. To the principal arguments [nn.25-28].

To the first [n.25 - no response is given to the second part of the first argument ] I say that Augustine is speaking of the simply first sin, which was an inordinate willing of friendship - and that was presumption; and I concede that that presumption was the simply first sin, but not as it is the first species of pride, the way it is properly taken [n.69].

75. To the second, about the division from John (“Everything that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh and the concupiscence of the eyes and the pride of life” [n.26]), it is plain from what he first says “Everything that is in the world” that this is a bringing together of the men living in the world - such that the sins by which men commonly sin are contained under those three. But there is no need that the first sin of the angel, a spiritual one (whereby the angels originally sinned), be contained under this carnal sin; but their sin of concupiscence at the second stage [n.44], if it need to be reduced, should rather be reduced to the concupiscence of the eyes; for just as in us immoderate appetites for any beautiful visible thing have reference to the concupiscence of the eyes, so also in the angels the immoderate appetite for anything delightful should have reference to the concupiscence of the eyes.

76. As to the third [n.27], it is plain that that division by seven, about the seven capital sins, is not sufficient [n.73] - making comparison with the act of concupiscence -save by a sort of reduction; and in this way it can be conceded that the angels’ sin may be reduced to luxury as an inordinate appetite for the delightful, as delightful to the concupiscence, for example, of the eyes.

77. To the fourth [n.28] I say that there was not one single sin only, because there were many sins, as was said in d.4-5 n.45.

78. And when it is said that ‘the first sin of the angel was irremediable’ [n.28], I say that when he sinned with the second sin he was still on the way - and consequently, when he sinned with the second sin, he could have repented of the first sin and have, further, received pardon and mercy, and thus the first sin was not of itself irremediable; however, from the fact of the angel’s reaching the term while in that first sin, all his sins became irremediable; for any sin of any sinner, when it perdures to the term, is irremediable (and how that irremediability is only from the law of God, which has grace for no one when he is in the term, will be stated below in d.7 nn.51-54, 56, 60). I deny, therefore, what is assumed there [n.28], that there was only one sin; hence the malice of the demon began from immoderate love of himself, which was not the greatest sin - and it was consummated in hatred of God, which is the greatest sin, because from it followed that the angel could not have what he willed while God remains; and therefore from his inordinate appetite he first willed God not to be, and thus to hate him.a

a. a[Interpolation ] But there is here a doubt, namely whether anyone could desire God not to be -because, just as nothing can be the object of volition save under the idea of good, so neither of refusal save under the idea of bad; but in God there is no idea of bad apprehended by an angel. Nor can it be said that God could be hated because of justice, because no idea of bad is apprehended in his justice just as neither in himself; for although there appear in the effect of justice some idea of bad, yet not in itself; and if this is true, then one must say that the hatred is not with respect to God in himself, nor with respect to his justice, but as to the effect that is appropriated to the perfection of justice. And hereby one can say to the verse of the Psalm “the pride of those who hate you etc.” [n.28] that it is not directed to him in himself but is in their wanting his justice not to be avenging - and thus they refuse his justice as to its avenging effect. And if this is true, then one must say that their hatred of God is not the greatest sin [n.78], because it does not regard God in himself, but is against him in reference to his effect; likewise, it then follows that it would not have ‘loving God’ as the directly contrary act, but only the act contrary to the love of the effect.