B. Scotus’ own Opinion

9. Because, however, these reasons are not cogent, one can respond differently to the question [n.1], because the angel could have desired equality with God.

10. For this there is persuasive proof:

First as follows, that the will has a double act, an act of loving with love of friendship and an act of coveting something for what is loved - and according to each act the will has the whole of being for object, such that, just as someone can love any being whatever with love of friendship, so he can covet any being whatever for himself as loved; therefore an angel could have loved himself with love of friendship, and could also have coveted for himself any covetable good whatever - and so, since equality with God is a good covetable in itself, the angel could have coveted this good for himself.

11. Further, if equality with God were possible for an angel, the angel could covet it for himself (as is plain); but an impossibility of this sort does not prevent an angel from being able to will it, because “the will can be of things impossible” according to the Philosopher Ethics 3.4.1111b22-23 and Damascene Orthodox Faith 36.

12. There is also this proof, that the damned hate God (from Psalm 73.23, “the pride of those who hate you rises up always”); but he who hates wants the thing hated not to be, according to the Philosopher Rhetoric 2.4.1382a15; therefore they want God not to be. But this is in itself altogether impossible and incompossible; therefore this sort of impossibility does not prevent its being able to be desired by a sinning will.

13. There is also this confirmation, that a sinning will could have wanted God not to be and could also - along with this - have wanted the grade and eminence of God to be in another; therefore it could have wanted it to be in itself just as in another, and so it could have willed the eminence of God for itself.