The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus :: Ordinatio. Book 2. Distinctions 4 to 44. ::

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Ordinatio. Book 2. Distinctions 4 to 44.

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translator's preface

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book two. distinctions 4 - 44

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fourth and fifth distinctions

question one. whether between the creation and blessedness of the good angel there was any interval

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question two. whether the angel merited blessedness before receiving it

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I. to the second question

a. the opinion held by peter lombard

b. the common opinion and scotus’ opinion

C. to the principal arguments

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II. to the first question

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a. how many intervals must be posited for the angels

1. the possibility of several intervals

2. what should be thought

b. what these intervals were

C. to the principal arguments

D. to the reason for the opinion positing only two intervals

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sixth distinction

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question one. whether the bad angel could have desired equality with god

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I. to the question

a. the opinion of others

b. scotus’ own opinion

C. to the arguments for the opinion of others

II. to the principal argument

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question two. whether the first sin of the angel was formally pride

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I. to the question

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a. what the malice was in the first angel sinning

1. on ordered and disordered acts of the will

2. on the first disorder in the ‘willing of friendship’

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3. on the first disorder in the ‘willing of concupiscence’

a) on the concupiscence of blessedness

b) on the concupiscence of excellence

b. to what class of sin the malice in the first angel sinning belonged.

II. to the principal arguments

III. to the arguments for the opposite

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seventh distinction

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single question. whether the bad angel necessarily wills badly

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I. to the question

a. the opinions of others

b. rejection of the opinions together

C. rejection of the first opinion in particular

D. rejection of the second opinion in particular

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II. scotus’ own response

a. on the degrees of goodness and malice

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b. on goodness and malice in the bad angel

1. on goodness in genus

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2. on meritorious goodness

a) on real potency which is a principle

b) on real potency which is a difference of being

c) on logical potency

3. on goodness of virtue or of circumstances

III. to the principal arguments

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eighth distinction

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single question. whether an angel can assume a body in which he may exercise works of life

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I. to the question

a. what it is for an angel to assume a body

b. what sort of body an angel assumes

C. what works of life an angel can exercise in an assumed body

II. to the principal arguments

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ninth distinction

question one. whether a superior angel can illumine an inferior angel

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question two. whether one angel can intellectually speak to a second

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I. to the second question

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a. the opinion of henry of ghent

1. how the angel who speaks knows singulars

2. how knowledge of a singular escapes another angel

3. how knowledge of a singular is made clear to another angel

4. how one angel illumines another

b. rejection of the opinion

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C. scotus’ own response

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1. on an angel’s mode of speaking

a) first reason

b) second reason

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2. further clarification of the question

a) what is caused in the intellect of the hearing angel

b) how an angel speaks to one angel and not to another

II. to the first question

III. to the principal arguments of the first question

IV. to the principal arguments of the second question

V. to the arguments for henry’s opinion

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tenth distinction

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single question. whether all angels are sent

I. to the question

II. to the principal argument for each side

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eleventh distinction

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single question. whether a guardian angel can effectively cause something in the intellect of the man whose guardian he is

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I. to the question

a. the opinion of avicenna

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b. scotus’ own opinion

1. an angel cannot effectively cause anything in the intellect of the man whose guardian he is

2. what an angel can do in the intellect of the man whose guardian he is

II. to the principal arguments

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thirteenth distinction

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single question. whether light generates illuming as its proper sensible species a

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I. to the question

a. what light is

b. what illumining is

C. how illuming is generated by light

II. to the principal arguments

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fourteenth distinction

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question one. whether a celestial body is a simple essence

I. according to the philosophers

II. according to the theologians

III. scotus’ opinion

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question two. whether there is any movable heaven other than the starry heaven

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I. to the question

a. all astronomers agree that there are at least nine heavens

b. astronomers disagree whether there are more than nine heavens

II. to the principal arguments

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twenty sixth distinction

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single question. whether grace is in the essence or in a power of the soul

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I. to the question

a. the opinion of others

b. rejection of the opinion

C. scotus’ own opinion

II. to the principal arguments

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twenty seventh distinction

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single question. whether grace is a virtue

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I. to the question

a. first opinion

b. scotus’ own opinion, already proposed by others

II. to the principal argument

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twenty eighth distinction

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single question. whether man’s free choice without grace can guard against all mortal sin

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I. to the question

a. the opinion of others, proposed in two versions

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b. rejection of the opinion

1. against the conclusion in itself

2. against the two versions of the argument in particular

C. scotus’ own response

II. to the principal arguments

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twenty ninth distinction

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single question. whether original justice in adam must be set down as a supernatural gift

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I. to the question

a. the opinion of henry of ghent

b. scotus’ own opinion

II. to the principal arguments

III. to certain statements of henry of ghent

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thirtieth to thirty second distinctions

question one. whether anyone propagated according to the common law from adam contracts original sin

question two. whether original sin is lack of original justice

question three. whether the soul contracts original sin from infected flesh, sown in concupiscence

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question four. whether original sin is remitted in baptism

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I. to all the questions at once

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a. the opinion of others

1. exposition of the opinion

2. doubts against the opinion

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b. scotus’ own opinion, which is taken from anselm

1. what original sin is

2. whether original sin is in everyone propagated in the common way

3. how original sin is contracted

4. how original sin is remitted by baptism

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II. to the principal arguments

a. to the arguments of the first question

b. to the arguments on both sides of the second question

C. to the arguments on both sides of the third question

D. to the argument of the fourth question

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thirty third distinction

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single question. whether only the lack of the divine vision is due as punishment for original sin

I. to the question

II. to the principal arguments

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thirty fourth to thirty seventh distinctions

question one. whether sin comes from good as from a cause

question two. whether sin is per se a corruption of good

question three. whether sin is a punishment for sin

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question four. whether sin can be from god

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I. to the second question

a. sin is formally the privation of good

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b. of which good sin is formally the privation

1. opinions of others

2. rejection of the opinions

3. scotus’ own solution

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4. four queries about sin and their solution

a. to the first query

b. to the second query

c. to the third query

d. to the fourth query

C. to the principal arguments

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II. to the first and fourth questions

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a. to the first question

1. sin is from good

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2. how sin is from good as from its cause

a. opinions of others

b. possible solution

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question five. whether the created will is the total and immediate cause with respect to its willing, such that god does not have, with respect to that willing, any immediate efficient causality but only a mediate one

α. opinion of others

β. the response to the fourth question that falls out from the aforesaid opinion of others

γ. instances against the opinion of others and solutions to them

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δ. rejection of the opinion

3. how sin is from the created will

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b. to the fourth question

1. the opinion of others

2. objections to the reasons for the opinion of others

3. scotus’ own opinion and solution of the objections

C. to the principal arguments of the first question

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D. to the principal arguments of the fourth question

1. to the arguments of the first part

2. to the arguments of the second part

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III. to the third question

b. to the principal arguments

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thirty eighth distinction

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single question. whether intention is an act of will only

I. to the question

II. to the principal arguments

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thirty ninth distinction

question one. whether synderesis is in the will

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question two. whether conscience is in the will

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I. to both questions

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a. opinion of henry of ghent

1. statement of the opinion

2. rejection of the opinion

b. scotus’ own response

II. to the principal arguments of the first question

III. to the principal arguments of the second question

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fortieth distinction

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single question. whether every act gets goodness from the end

I. to the question

II. to the principal arguments

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forty first distinction

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single question. whether any act of ours can be indifferent

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I. to the question

a. opinion of others

II. scotus’ own opinion

II. to the principal arguments

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forty second distinction

single question. whether there is a distinction of sins into capital sins

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forty third distinction

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single question. whether a created will can sin from malice

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I. opinion of others

a. statement of the opinion

b. rejection of the opinion

II. scotus’ own opinion

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forty fourth distinction.

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single question. whether the power to sin is from god

I. to the question

II. to the principal argument

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appendix. [from antonius andreas, one of scotus’ most faithful students]. twelfth distinction

first question. whether there is in generable and corruptible things any positive substantial entity really distinct from the form

second question. whether matter can, by any power, exist without form

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[appendix] fifteenth distinction

single question. whether the elements remain in a mixed body in their substance

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[appendix] sixteenth distinction

single question. whether the image of the trinity consists in three powers of the rational soul really distinct

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[appendix] seventeenth distinction

first question. whether adam’s soul was created in the body

second question. whether paradise is a suitable place for human habitation

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[appendix] eighteenth distinction

single question. whether there are seminal reasons in matter

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[appendix] nineteenth distinction

single question. whether in the state of innocence we would have had immortal bodies

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[appendix] twentieth distinction

question one. whether in the state of innocence procreated sons would at once have been confirmed in justice

question two. whether in the state of innocence only those would have been born who are now the elect.

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[appendix] twenty first distinction

single question. whether adam’s sin was the gravest sin

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[appendix] twenty second distinction

single question. whether the sin of the first man came from ignorance

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[appendix] twenty third distinction

single question. whether god could make the will of a rational creature to be naturally incapable of sin

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[appendix] twenty fourth distinction

single question. whether the higher part of the intellect is a power distinct from the inferior power

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[appendix] twenty fifth distinction

single question. whether anything other than the will is the effective cause of an act of willing in the will

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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus

Ordinatio. Book 2. Distinctions 4 to 44.

Book Two. Distinctions 4 - 44

Forty Third Distinction

Single Question. Whether a Created will can Sin from Malice

II. Scotus’ own Opinion

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II. Scotus’ own Opinion

5. If the affirmative answer is held on this question [n.1], it is easy to distinguish the sin against the Holy Spirit from other sins. For because the will is conjoined to the sensitive appetite, it is of a nature to delight along with it, and so, by sinning under the effect of the sensitive appetite’s inclination toward what pleases it, it sins from passion, and this is called sinning from infirmity or impotence and is appropriately against the Father, to whom power is appropriated. The will also acts through intellectual knowledge and so, when reason is erring, it does not will rightly and its sin from an error of reason is called sinning from ignorance, and is against the Son, to whom wisdom is appropriated. The third sin would belong to the will according to itself, being from its own freedom and not from taking delight along with the sensitive appetite or from an error of reason; and this would be sinning from malice and is appropriately against the Holy Spirit, to whom goodness is appropriated.⁵⁸

6. Nevertheless, even if a created will is not posited as being able to will evil under the idea of evil, a sin from fixed malice can still be assigned, namely when the will sins from its own liberty, without passion in the sensitive appetite or error in reason; for the most complete idea of sin exists there, because nothing other than the will is enticing the will to evil; and this sin will so far be from malice that the will, without any extrinsic occasion, is choosing from its full liberty to will evil for itself (but not so from malice that the sinning will is tending toward evil insofar as it is evil).

II. Scotus’ own Opinion