A. The Opinion of Others

4. It is said here [from Aquinas] that the bad angel could not have desired that equality.

5. For this there seem to be four reasons:

First, because the bad angel did not sin from passion (as is plain), nor from ignorance (because punishment does not precede guilt) - therefore from choice; but “choice is not of things impossible” Ethics 3.4.1111b20-23; now for an angel to be equal to God is impossible - therefore he did not sin about this.

6. Second, because ‘for an angel to be equal with God’ involves a contradiction; therefore it does not involve any idea of being; therefore in no way is it included under the first object of the will - therefore it is not in any way willable.

7. Third. The will cannot will anything that is not understood first; therefore the angel’s being equal to God is understood first and shown first by the intellect; either then by an erring intellect, and then it is punishment and not guilt; or by a non-erring intellect - and this is impossible because a ‘non-erring’ intellect cannot show what involves a contradiction.

8. Fourth,abecause an angel’s being equal to God involves the non-being of the angel, for an angel cannot be an angel unless he is inferior to God; but no one can desire ‘that he not be’, from Augustine On Free Choice 6-8 nn.63-84; therefore no one inferior to God can desire equality with God.

a. a[Interpolation] and it seems to be Anselm’s reason, Fall of the Devil [however, no such reference can be found in Anselm, or Aquinas]