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All Collections > The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus > Ordinatio. Book 2. Distinctions 4 to 44. > book two. distinctions 4 - 44 > thirty fourth to thirty seventh distinctions > question five. whether the created will is the total and immediate cause with respect to its willing, such that god does not have, with respect to that willing, any immediate efficient causality but only a mediate one > δ. rejection of the opinion > b. to the fourth question > 1. the opinion of others
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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus
cover
Ordinatio. Book 2. Distinctions 4 to 44.
Book Two. Distinctions 4 - 44
Thirty Fourth to Thirty Seventh Distinctions
Question Five. Whether the Created Will is the Total and Immediate Cause with Respect to its Willing, such that God does not Have, with Respect to that Willing, any Immediate Efficient Causality but only a Mediate One
δ. Rejection of the Opinion
B. To the Fourth Question
1. The Opinion of Others

1. The Opinion of Others

130. Here it is said and held [Lombard 2 d.37 ch.2 n.4, and references] that the divine will cannot be the cause of sin.

131. For which three reasons of theirs can be set down.

The first is of the following sort - Augustine 83 Questions q.3, “A man becomes worse without any wise man being responsible; for this guilt in a man is so great that in no wise man may it happen; but God is more excelling than a wise man;” therefore a man becomes worse without God being responsible, as Augustine maintains in q.4.

132. Again in the same book q.21 Augustine says, “One who is for every being the cause that it exists, is not cause of not-being for anything to make it not exist, because what comes from him is, insofar as it is, good. Now God is cause of all good; God therefore is not cause of not-being for anything; therefore neither is he cause of sin for anything, because sin is formally not-being.”

133. The third reason is from Anselm On Free Choice ch.8, “Teacher: ‘[God] can reduce to nothing all the substance he has made from nothing - but he cannot separate rightness from a will that has rightness... Now no will is just save one that wills what God wills it to will. Therefore to keep rightness of will for the sake of rightness itself is - for anyone who keeps it - to will what God wills him to will. If God separates this rightness from anyone’s will, he does it either willingly or unwillingly.’ Student: ‘He cannot do it unwillingly.’ Teacher: ‘So if he takes the aforesaid rightness away from anyone’s will, he wills what he does.’ Student: ‘Without doubt he wills.’ Teacher: ‘Certainly, then, whosever will he wills to remove the same rightness from, he does not will him to keep rightness for the sake of rightness.’ Student: ‘It so follows.’ Teacher: ‘But it was already set down that to keep rightness of will in this way is - for anyone who keeps it - to will what God wills him to will. Therefore if God takes the oft stated rightness away from anyone, he does not will him to will what he wills him to will.’

Student: ‘Nothing is more logical, and nothing is more impossible.’ Teacher: ‘Therefore nothing is more impossible than for God to take away rightness of will.’”