2. What Should be Thought

30. Now, in order to inquire into these ways [nn.24-29], six probable propositions must be supposed.

The first of these is: ‘those who merit up to the now of reward, are rewarded in that now’. The proof of this is that in that ‘now’ they are not on the way, because that ‘now’ is the now of reward; therefore in that ‘now’ none of them can demerit because they cannot now be prevented from receiving the due reward for the merit for the whole duration of merit completed up to that ‘now’.

31. There is a confirmation. For a man, existing in merit for the whole of his life, cannot demerit in the instant of death nor interpose an obstacle to his being rewarded; for he has merited that then impeccability should be given him so that he not be able to interpose an obstacle. And therefore, about those who merit for the whole interval of the way, it cannot be said that this man interposed an obstacle in the instant of reward and that man did not; for this seems to posit that the instant of reward is not the term but that the man is then on the way (or at least that he is on the way who can interpose an obstacle), and it seems irrational to interpose an obstacle.

And by this, the first opinion is at once rejected - because there cannot be only two intervals posited as it posits [n.29].

32. The second proposition is this, that ‘merit precedes reward in time’; and this is proved from the proof of the preceding question [nn.12-20]. And by this is rejected the first way of positing three intervals [n.25].

33. The third proposition is this, that ‘the whole interval of the way prefixed for any angel whatever was equal’; for this is likely, because just as the whole interval prefixed for man is up to the instant of death, so also there was prefixed for these angels and those an equal interval of existing on the way.

34. And from these three follows a fourth, that ‘when the good finally merited, then in the same instant the bad demerited’; for if they did not demerit, either they then merited, and consequently they would have been rewarded along with the good, from the first proposition; or they would then have been in the term - against the second proposition, because then the good were on the way; or they would then have been in their pure natural state, and thus they would still have been on the way in the following interval (when however the good were in the term), which is against the third proposition.

35. The fifth proposition is that ‘all were created uniform’.

36. From these propositions it follows that one must posit at least three intervals: namely one in which all are in the term, and another in which the good finally merit and the bad demerit, and a third in which all are created uniform (from the fifth proposition); and then, if it is posited that all were created in grace, the last way of positing three intervals is held. There can also probably be posited four intervals, according to those who posit four intervals [nn.28-29, 40].

37. But for further inquiry into the disposition of the angels in these intervals, a sixth proposition seems probable, that ‘any angel whatever was at some time in grace’, whether in the instant of creation or afterwards; for although it is not necessary - as will perhaps be said elsewhere [Ord. 4 d.1 p.4 q.1 nn.4-5, d.16 q.2 n.4] - that in order for someone to sin he first had grace, yet it is congruous that the angels were not only not unjust (because they received the natural liberty whereby they could preserve natural justice), but that they received gratuitous justice, according to Anselm Fall of the Devil 14-16, 18.

38. Likewise, it seems that this sixth proposition is proved by another, a seventh, namely that ‘God does not make separation between these and those before they separate themselves by their acts’ - because, according to Augustine On Genesis 11.17 (look there; and it is put in 2 d.4 of the Sentences, ‘Why these were separated and not those”, look there): “For God is not an avenger before anyone is a sinner.” Therefore up to the instant of merit and demerit they were all uniform.

39. And if grace was then first applied to the good, it seems that it should also then have been applied to the others; for before that instant they did not demerit; so why should grace not have been applied to them as also to the others who merited? But if they had then demerited it, therefore they did so before they had it, because grace and guilt do not exist together.

40. So if this sixth proposition be conceded, that ‘any angel - one sinning - was at some time in grace’, it necessarily follows that the three intervals (if three are posited) will be these: that the first will be of all of them in grace, and the second will be of these (the good) in merit and of those (the bad) in demerit, and the third will be of these and those in the term. Or if it be said that they were at some time in their pure natural state, then one must posit four intervals - such that all in the first interval were in their pure natural state, in the second all were in grace and the good merited and the bad demerited, in the third the good persevered in good and the bad in bad, and in the fourth these and those were in the term. And this last way about four intervals keeps several states in them and saves several affirmative authorities - and if this plurality is not pleasing (because it does not have evident necessity), then it is probable to posit at least the three intervals before assigned [above here n.40].