A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent

6. [Exposition of the Opinion] - It is said here [by Henry, Quodlibet 6 q.11] that besides infused rectitude - if any there was - one must posit in the will a rectitude that is as a quality in a quantity, to which is opposed the naturally inflicted crookedness that the will incurs by sinning; and from this crookedness follows disobedience in the lower powers, because although a right will could of itself be master, yet not one that is thus crooked. An example is given of a rod that is straight and afterwards bent; its straightness is natural to the rod but not such as to belong to the essence of it.

7. This is made clear by the fact that it does not seem possible [otherwise] to save the contention that ‘sin wounds pure nature’: for if sin corrupted only some freely given gift, it would despoil only in things freely given; so in order to posit a wound in nature one must posit some rectitude that is taken away by sin. So if some supernatural gift is posited beside natural rectitude, one must say that natural justice includes both - because if one say that it includes the supernatural gift only, the result would be that, according to that gift, he who is in pure nature and he who is a sinner are equal, as one of the arguments on the opposite side said [n.4].a

a. a[Interpolation] the result would be that both were to be punished equally.

8. [Rejection of the opinion] - It is objected against this that, according to this position, it does not seem possible for the will to sin unless it has a natural rectitude that could be corrupted by sin. Let the will exist then in its essence alone without this addition [sc. without natural rectitude], and it will not be able to sin - which seems absurd, because it can be in agreement with justice, that is, be bound to will in agreement with the dictate of natural law; and the will need not necessarily so will, because it is free; therefore it can sin. Therefore one should not posit such a quality whose opposed crookedness is introduced because of sin.

9. Further, the rebellion of the powers does not seem to exist only by this crookedness, because the will seems to dominate the lower powers through its essential freedom more and better than through this accidental quality, because it is in its essence the supreme power; therefore the accidental quality will not be the whole reason for domination such that the will, if the quality is not present, will not dominate.

10. Further, this natural rectitude has been totally corrupted by mortal sin; therefore, since a second sin is as formally a sin as the first one, the second sin must corrupt natural rectitude in the way the first one did. But the second sin cannot corrupt this rectitude because the rectitude is no longer there; so neither does the first sin formally have its being a sin from its corrupting natural rectitude.

11. Further, one could then know by natural reason that this present state [sc. of corruption] is not natural, because it is manifest now that there is rebellion in the lower powers and, according to you, the rebellion cannot exist unless rectitude of the will is corrupted [n.6]; the consequent is unacceptable, because the most famous philosophers were unable to attain this knowledge.

12. Further, this rebellion seems to exist in man in his pure nature; therefore the rebellion does not exist because of a crookedness that the will incurs by sinning.

Proof of the antecedent:

It is natural for any appetite to be drawn toward its appetible object and, if it is not a free appetite, it is natural for it to be drawn supremely and as much as possible, because, just as such an appetite is ‘drawn’ [sc. and does not ‘draw’]- according to Damascene

Orthodox Faith ch.36 - and therefore its act is not in its power, so neither is the intensity of the act so in its power that it does not act as much as it can; therefore, since the sensitive appetite, existing in its pure nature, has a proper appetible and delightful object, it would have to tend supremely of itself to that object, and the tending would impede the act of reason, because the sensitive powers would still be existing then in the same essence as they are now - and because of this unity [sc. of essence] they will impede themselves mutually in the intensity of their acts, according to Avicenna On the Soul p.4 ch.2. Therefore reason would have to make an effort to impede this supreme delight of the sensitive part, and the inferior power could not be curbed without some sadness or difficulty existing in it, because just as it supremely inclines to delight so it struggles, on its own part, supremely against the opposite. There would then be a rebellion there, because there would be inclination of the inferior part toward enjoyment against the judgment of reason, and a difficulty in restraining this appetite.