C. Scotus’ own Response

21. In response to the question it can be said, speaking of a sin of commission, that sin can be taken in one way for the elicited act of deformity itself, and in another way for the stain of sin (or for the abiding guilt) that remains after the elicited act until the sin has been destroyed by penance [cf. above d.7 n.84].

22. I say that in the second way free choice cannot of itself guard against all mortal sin in this present state, because a soul without grace is stained by some sin (whether original or actual), from which it is not freed save by grace.

23. But if the question is asked whether this is because of an immediate opposition between guilt and grace, I say no, because guilt and grace were not immediate opposites in the state of innocence (for at that time someone could have been in a purely natural state, being both without grace and without guilt; so these are in no way immediate opposites) - nor even are they immediate opposites by comparison to the power of the maker, because God can restore the will, after it has sinned, to the kind he could have made it to be. Rather, the fact that the will is only freed from sin by grace [n.22] is because of the universal law that now [in this present state] no one’s enmity is remitted unless he becomes not merely a non-enemy but also a friend,“A sinner is a non-enemy by remission of guilt, but a friend by infusion of grace” 4 d.16 q.2 n.2. God so acts now by his ordained power, but he could by his absolute power [d.7 nn.52-56, 1 d.17 n.164] act in the other two ways listed here in n.23. ³⁶ made acceptable to God by sanctifying grace.

24. If an objection be raised about how God could remit guilt without giving grace (for if a change is not posited in the person justified, there seems to be a change in God), the response is twofold.The responses are not given, but see n.23 again. The Vatican editors also refer, among other places, to 4 d.16 q.2 n.11, “The divine will can will affirmatively for this man at moment a and negatively for him at moment b without any change in the divine will.” ³⁷

25. As to the first way [n.21] see Henry Quodlibet 5 q.20.The relevant passage from Henry is given by Scotus in the Lectura 2 d.28 n.21. The Vatican editors give it as follows: “Therefore one must say that man’s free choice, even while he is in mortal sin, can be considered in two ways: in one way on the part of his freedom in itself, in another way as he is exposed to the temptations that come to him. I say that in the first way he can simply guard against falling into another mortal sin, in the sense that he falls by no necessity into it; but if he does fall, he falls voluntarily such that, if he did not fall voluntarily and he did fall, then by falling he did not sin. I say in the second way that he cannot guard himself for long without it being necessary either that he fall soon enough into mortal sin or that he receive grace from God by which to be able perfectly to guard himself and be liberated from mortal sin. But whichever of these happens to him, it happens to him only by consent of his will. For whoever is in mortal sin, whether one or many...is, after he is in sin, either well disposed, as far as concerns himself, with respect to the sins he has committed...by detesting them to the extent he can in his present state, or not well disposed. If he is well disposed, it cannot be that he should for long be thus well disposed about his moral acts without God moving his free choice by some motion of prevenient grace [gratia gratis data] to assenting simply to the good. And if he does not resist, God at once confers sanctifying grace freeing him from all sin; but if he resists, he at once sins mortally by contempt and ingratitude for the divine call. And as I said about someone in mortal sin, so I say about someone only in original sin, supposing however it is possible for him to sin venially before he sins mortally.” ³⁸

26. And this opinion can be confirmed by the fact that the precept ‘Thou shalt love the Lord they God etc.’ is the first, on which hang all the law and the prophets [Matthew 22.37-40, Deuteronomy 6.5]. The will then is bound to sometimes eliciting an act of this percept, so that there cannot always be omission of the act of this precept without mortal sin; but whenever the will executes an act of this precept (even in an unformed way) it disposes itself by congruity to sanctifying grace; and it will either resist this grace when offered and sin mortally, or consent to it and be justified.Henry Quodlibet 8 q.5, “Now about the process of grace in an adult before baptism, or after baptism in a state of actual mortal sin, one must hold that God anticipates the sinner with prevenient grace [gratia datis grata] as soon as he comes to a use of free choice such that he is able, by deliberation, to do something. And if through his free choice he disposes himself well to prevenient grace, he disposes himself by congruity to God’s bestowing on him justifying grace... If he thrusts this prevenient grace from him, he makes himself unworthy to be further helped, but to be justly more hardened thereby in his sin. If however he accepts it, he disposes himself by justice of congruity to sanctifying grace, which God then and there confers on him, and by which he is cleansed from sin.” ³⁹ This opinion, therefore, gives a negative answer to the question [n.1], not because of an absolute impotency in free choice [nn.5-7], but insofar as the impotency is compared to God who freely offers grace to a free will that is in some way well disposed.