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Edition Information
Ordinatio. Prologue.
Ordinatio. Book 1. Distinctions 1 and 2.
Ordinatio. Book 1. Distinction 3.
Ordinatio. Book 1. Distinctions 4 to 10.
Ordinatio. Book 1. Distinctions 11 to 25.
Ordinatio. Book 1. Distinctions 26 to 48.
Ordinatio. Book 2. Distinctions 1 - 3.
Ordinatio. Book 2. Distinctions 4 to 44.
Ordinatio. Book 3. Distinctions 1 - 17.
Ordinatio. Book 3. Distinctions 26 - 40.
Ordinatio. Book 4. Distinctions 1 - 7
Ordinatio. Book 4. Distinctions 8 - 13.
Ordinatio. Book 4. Distinctions 14 - 42.
Ordinatio. Book 4. Distinctions 43 - 49.
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frontmatter
titlepage
translator's preface
contents
book four. distinctions 43 - 49
forty third distinction
question one. whether there will be a general resurrection of men
I. to the question
a. about the possibility of the resurrection
1. first opinion
a. exposition of the opinion
b. rejection of the opinion
2. second opinion
a. exposition of the opinion
b. rejection of the opinion
3. scotus’ own opinion
b. about the fact of the resurrection
II. to the initial arguments
question two whether it can be known by natural reason that there will be a general resurrection of men
I. to the question
a. about the three propositions for proving the resurrection of man
1. about the first proposition, that ‘the intellective soul is the form of man’
a. the opinion of others and the weighing and putting together of it
2. about the second proposition, that ‘the intellective soul is incorruptible or immortal’
a. proof through authorities of philosophers
b. proof through arguments of doctors [of theology]
3. about the third proposition, that ‘the specific form of man will not perpetually remain outside its whole’
b. recapitulation of the things said about the three propositions
II. to the initial arguments
question three. whether nature could be the active cause of resurrection
I. to the question
a. whether nature can universally bring back some corruptible thing the same in number
1. first opinion, which is that of the philosophers
a. exposition by augustine of the opinion
b. rejection of the opinion
2. second opinion
3. third opinion
4. scotus’ own judgment about these opinions
5. to the arguments for the second and third opinions
b. whether it is possible for nature to bring back the same mixed body
C. whether nature could reunite the intellective soul to the dissolved mixed body so that it be the same man
1. opinion of others and its refutation
II. to the initial arguments
question four. whether the resurrection is natural
I. to the question
a. about the meaning of the term ‘natural’
b. objection against what has been said and its solution
C. conclusion of what has been said
II. to the initial arguments
question five. whether the future resurrection will be instantaneous
I. to the question
a. about the collection of the parts of the body
b. about the inducing of the form of the body into the matter
C. about the union of the soul with the body
D. two small doubts
II. to the initial arguments
forty fourth distinction. first part. about the resurrection of the whole man in the truth of human nature
single question. whether, in the case of every man, the whole that belonged to the truth of human nature in him will rise again
I. to the question
a. about the manner of nutrition
1. first opinion
a. exposition of the opinion ‘
b. rejection of the opinion
2. second opinion
a. exposition of the opinion
b. rejection of the opinion
3. scotus’ own response
a. first conclusion
b. second conclusion
c. third conclusion
d. fourth conclusion
4. to the foundations of the second opinion
b. how in the resurrection the flesh returns the same
1. first conclusion
2. second conclusion
II. to the initial arguments
forty fourth distinction. second part. about the condition of malignant spirits and damned men in respect of infernal fire
question one. whether infernal fire will torment the malignant spirits
I. to the question
a. first opinion and its rejection
b. second opinion and its rejection
C. scotus’ own response to the question
1. about pain properly speaking
2. about sadness
a. about the disagreeable object or about the infernal fire definitively detaining a spirit
b. about the disagreeable object or about the infernal fire objectively affecting a spirit
c. objections against both ways
d. response to the objections
II. to the initial arguments
question two. whether damned men will be tormented by infernal fire after the judgment
I. to the question
a. about the action, real and intentional, of the infernal fire on the damned
b. about the sufficiency of the intentional action for causing pain in the damned
C. about the sufficiency of intentional change alone
D. about the more probable possibility of admitting real effect
e. objections to the third article
II. to the initial arguments
forty fifth distinction
question one. whether the separated soul can understand the quiddities habitually known to it before separation
I. to the question
a. opinions of others
b. scotus’ own response
C. doubts about scotus’ response
II. to the initial arguments
question two. whether the separated soul can acquire knowledge of something previously unknown
I. to the question
a. opinion of others
1. exposition of the opinion
2. rejection of the opinion
a. against the opinion in itself
b. against the reasons for the opinion
b. scotus’ own opinion
1. about abstractive knowledge
2. about intuitive knowledge
II. to the initial arguments
question three. whether the separated soul can remember past things it knew when conjoined
I. to the question
a. things needing to be noted beforehand about memory properly speaking
1. there exists in us an act of knowing the past as past.
2. four certainties consequent to memory, or to knowledge of a past act
3. three certainties consequent to knowledge of this sort of past act
b. first article: about the memory of the past in the sense part of the soul
1. whether the remembering power knows the act while it exists
2. it seems that no sense operation is to be posited in the sense part that cannot be conceded to a brute
3. the contrary position of aristotle, which is more probable
C. second article: about memory of the past in the intellective part
1. about the authorities of the ancients
2. scotus’ own explication
D. scotus’ own conclusion
II. to the initial arguments
a. to the first
b. to the second
C. to the third
question four. whether the blessed know the prayers we offer to them
I. to the question
a. whether the blessed know our prayers by natural cognition
b. whether the blessed know our prayers by supernatural cognition
C. whether, knowing our prayers, the blessed pray for us
II. to the initial arguments
forty sixth distinction
overview of questions
question one
I. to the question
a. first opinion about the definition of justice and its distinctions
b. scotus’ own response
1. about the justice that is in god
2. about justice in creatures
C. difficulties as to the definition of divine justice, and the solution of them
II. to the initial arguments
question two. whether in god there is mercy
I. to the question
II. to the initial arguments
question three. whether in god justice is distinguished from mercy
I. to the question
II. to the initial arguments
question four. whether, in the punishment of the bad, mercy goes along with justice on the part of god as punisher
I. to the question
a. the common response
1. exposition of it
2. weighing of it
b. scotus’ own response
1. what the punishment of the bad is
a. about the essence of punishment or about sadness
b. about the four forms of sadness
2. whether the punishment of the bad is from god, or about the four penalties
a. about the first and second penalty or punishment
b. about the third and fourth penalty or punishment
3. whether justice goes along with the aforesaid punishments or penalties of the bad
a. about god’s justice in the first penalty
b. about god’s justice in the second penalty
c. about god’s justice in the third penalty
d. about god’s justice in the fourth penalty
e. about god’s justice in the other four penalties
4. whether mercy goes along with the punishment of the bad
a. opinion of thomas aquinas
b. scotus’ own opinion
II. to the initial arguments
forty seventh distinction
question one. whether there is a future universal judgment
I. to the question
a. about the divisions of judgment
b. about the general judgment
C. about the acts of judgment to be passed that precede and complete it
D. doubts about the universal judgment
1. first doubt
2. second doubt
II. to the initial arguments
question two. whether the world is to be purged by fire
I. to the question
a. needed preliminaries
b. about the production of infernal fire
C. about the place of infernal fire
D. more probable solution
II. to the initial arguments
forty eighth distinction
question one. whether christ will judge in human form
I. to the question
a. opinion of thomas aquinas
1. exposition of the opinion
2. rejection of the opinion in itself
3. rejection of the conclusions of the opinion
b. scotus’ own response to the question
II. to the initial arguments
question two. whether in or after the judgment the motion of the heavenly bodies will cease
I. to the question
a. about the opinion of aristotle
b. about the opinion of the theologians
C. scotus’ own response
1. neither way or conclusion is proved necessarily
2. a more probable proof of both ways
3. objections against the second way
4. rejection of the aforesaid objections
II. to the initial arguments
III. to the reasons for aristotle’s opinion
forty ninth distinction. first part. about the natural quality of beatitude
question one. whether beatitude consists per se in operation
question two. whether beatitude perfects the essence of the blessed more immediately than the power
I. to the second question
a. opinion of henry of ghent
1. exposition of the opinion
a. about the opinion itself and the manner of positing it
b. reasons adduced for the opinion
2. rejection of the opinion
a. against the opinion in itself
b. against the reasons adduced for the opinion
b. scotus’ own response
1. a double understanding of the question is possible
2. what view should be held
C. to the initial arguments of the second question
1. response to the individual arguments
2. an objection to these responses and its solution
II. to the first question
a. about the thing of beatitude
1. first conclusion
2. second conclusion
3. third conclusion
b. about the name of beatitude
C. response to the question
D. to the initial arguments of the first question
1. to the first argument
2. to the second argument
3. to the third and fourth
4. to the fifth
question three. whether beatitude consists per se in several operations together
I. to the question
a. opinions of others
1. opinion of richard of middleton
2. opinion of thomas aquinas
b. scotus’ own response
C. to the arguments for the opinion of richard
D. to the reason for the opinion of thomas
II. to the initial arguments for each part
question four. whether beatitude consists per se in an act of intellect or of will
I. to the question
a. opinion of thomas aquinas
1. exposition of the opinion
2. rejection of the opinion
b. scotus’ own response to each part of the question
1. argumentation from the first middle term, namely from the object, and the weighing of it
2. argumentation from the second middle term, namely from the habit, and the weighing of it
3. argumentation from the third middle term, namely from the comparison of act with act, and the weighing of it
II. to the initial arguments
question five. whether beatitude simply consists in the act of will that is enjoyment
I. to the question
a. two possible conclusions
1. about the first conclusion
2. about the second conclusion
b. a difficulty
1. first solution
2. another solution
3. conclusion
II. to the initial arguments
question six. whether perpetual security of possession belongs to the essence of beatitude
I. to the question
a. about the perpetuity of beatitude
1. about the reality of such perpetuity
2. doubts about such perpetuity
a. three positions or opinions are set down about the first doubt
b. about the second doubt
c. about the third doubt
b. on the secure possession of the blessed
1. explication of possession, taken in four ways
II. to the initial arguments
notice from the editors
forty ninth distinction. second part. about the qualities of body of a blessed man
single question. whether the body of a blessed man will, after the resurrection, be impassible
I. to the question
a. a doubt about the cause of impassibility, and its rejection
1. scotus’ own explanation of the reasons about impassibility
a. about the first opinion of others
b. about the second opinion of others
c. about the third opinion of others
b. scotus’ own response
1. objections against scotus’ own response
2. confutation of the objections
a. to the first objection
b. to the second objection
c. to the third objection
3. scotus’ own response to others’ reasons
II. to the initial arguments
endmatter
footnotes
SUBSCRIBER:
past masters commons
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Ordinatio. Book 4. Distinctions 43 - 49.
The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus
Ordinatio. Book 4. Distinctions 43 - 49.
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