Second Distinction. First Part. On the Measure of the Duration of the Existence of Angels

Question One. Whether in the Actual Existence of an Angel there is any Succession Formally

1. About the second distinction, where the Master deals with the place of creation of angels and the time when they were created, I ask two questions: first about the measure of existence of angels, and second about the place of angels.

2. As to the first question I ask firstly whether in the actual existence of an angel there is any succession formally.

3. That there is not:

First, because quantity cannot be received by what lacks extension, or is a nonquantum; therefore succession - which is a quantity - cannot be received by the existence of an angel, which is indivisible.

4. A confirmation of the reason is that a permanent quantity cannot be received by something indivisible; therefore not a successive quantity either.

5. Second, as follows: before and after, in idea of number, can bring together the idea of time [time is ‘the number of motion with respect to before and after’ according to Aristotle]; wherever there is succession, there is before and after, and there the idea of number and of measure can be found; therefore, if succession were formally in the actual existence of an angel, that existence would be measured by time.

6. Third, relevant to this is Augustine 83 Questions q.72, “AeviternityScotus and Medieval theologians in general used the word ‘aevum’ for the eternal existence of angels and ‘aeternitas’ for the existence of God. Angels depend for existence on another (unlike God) but are immaterial and immortal (unlike men), and so exist, once they exist, without end (unless God un-creates or annihilates them). They are thus measured neither by God’s eternity nor by human or material time but by something in between, for which the Latin word ‘aevum’ was used. In English a term for the purpose has to be invented, and aeviternity is now by tradition that term. See the quotations from Henry of Ghent in the footnote to n.42 below. ¹⁰ is stable but time is changeable.”

7. Fourth, the same is argued by Dionysius Divine Names ch. 10 (these things that, when they are looked at there, are said to be there [“The property of aeviternity is something ancient and invariable, and the whole of it is measured as a whole^”]).

8. On the contrary:

When God creates one angel it is not necessary for him to create another; so some angel can exist when another does not exist, and this other can be created such that it exists while the former is still now existing. So the former, which existed when the latter did not exist and exists with it when it does now exist, seems to be prior to the latter, and its existence as ‘not being along with the latter’ seems to precede its existence as ‘being along with the latter’.

9. Second as follows: an angel, when time has been excluded, can be annihilated.

I ask then in what moment? Not in the ‘now’ of time because it does not exist; nor in the ‘now’ of eternity, formally; nor in the ‘now’ of aeviternity, because that ‘now’ remains one and the same. Therefore it will exist and will not exist in the same moment, which is contradictory.

10. Third as follows: an angel can exist now and afterwards be annihilated and again be restored; but his having been restored is not as one and the same with his having been created as it would have been had there been no interruption (otherwise something interrupted would be as one as something not-interrupted, which is false); therefore his having been restored will be in one ‘now’ and his having been created before in another ‘now’ - and if so, then, if he had persisted without interruption, he would have been then in a different ‘now’ than he is in at this moment. The proof of this consequence is that there is as much duration of him as at rest as there would be of him as moved; therefore, by similarity, there would have been as much duration of him as not-tending to not-being (although as able so to tend) as there is if he does actually so tend.

I. First Opinion as Reported and Held by Bonaventure

11. Here it is said that there is succession formally in the actual existence of an angel. See the opinion of Bonaventure and in his writings [Bonaventure, 2 d.2 p.1 a.1 q.3].

A. Arguments for the Opinion

12. And for this opinion there is argument in four ways:

First on the part of conservation. And the reason is founded on the authority of Augustine Literal Commentary on Genesis 8.12 n.26, where he maintains that “as air is not a having been made to be bright, but a continual being made bright, in respect of the sun (otherwise the air would remain bright in the absence of the sun), so is the creature disposed in respect of God;” and again (ibid. 4.12 n.22), Augustine maintains that God is not disposed in respect of the creature the way the builder is disposed in respect of the house.

13. And from this an argument is made as follows: if the creature in respect of God is not a having been made in its being by God but is as it were formally in a state of becoming, then it is always formally being posited in being by God - and so its creation in being is as continuously from God as it is continuous in persisting.

14. The point is confirmed, because ‘to conserve’ is not merely not to destroy but is some positive action of God’s (otherwise one who does not close a window would be said to be conserving light; similarly, ‘to annihilate’ would then be a positive act, which is false, because ‘to annihilate’ is ‘to non-act’); therefore to conserve is to act.

15. This is also plain from the following, that no creature is independent in its existence, because neither is any creature pure act; therefore a creature depends for existence continually on its cause, and not just on a cause that has given it being and is not giving it now, because then ‘to conserve’ would be nothing other than to have acted before and not to be destroying now.

16. If all these things be conceded, that God in conserving does something positive as regards the creature, yet not by any continuous action (because there is no form in him according to which continuation of action could be assigned), nor even by different actions one after the other, but always by the same action - then, on the contrary: by this causation there is not had formally and ultimately that which, when this causation is in place, can possibly not be had (my proof for this is that a cause causing by this causation is a cause that is ultimate and applied to producing an effect in existence; therefore if the non-existence of the effect can stand along with this cause, then existence does not seem to be had ultimately by this causation); but when this causation, by which an angel was produced in existence, is in place, the angel can possibly not have existence tomorrow; so he will not formally by this causation have existence tomorrow; and he does have existence; therefore by some other causation.

17. If you say that from the first causation he does not have existence along with coexistence in time tomorrow, but that for this there is required the ‘existence of the future’ (and so, when the future then exists, this ‘reason of the future’ is the reason of coexistence for the angel) - on the contrary: this is how it is in eternity, that eternity does not have coexistence with time insofar as coexistence is coexistence.a Likewise, not only can an angel, when ‘causation of the future is not in place’, not have existence with the future, but he can even not have the foundation of the coexistence, namely existence absolutely; therefore he does not have ‘existence absolutely’ from such coexistence.

a.a [Interpolation] but only when time coexists with it; and so, if this were the cause, aeviternity and eternity would not differ.

18. Again, second: if an angel’s existence is simple, then just as God cannot make an angel not to have been, so neither can he make an angel not to be going to be.

19. There is a confirmation of the reason, that in eternity there are no true contradictories about the divine will, and neither is there divine volition in respect of contradictories as they are contradictories; but God could in eternity have willed to create some angel and to annihilate him; therefore he willed him to be and willed him not to be. Therefore some conditions on the part of being and not being must be found here so that they are not contradictories. But there seems to be nothing capable of being assigned to take away the contradiction save diverse ‘nows’ (namely, that God willed the angel to be at now a and not to be at now b); so it was incompossible for God to will to create an angel and to annihilate the same angel unless he willed the former and the latter to be at diverse ‘nows’; but God could have willed the former and the latter without any respect to time; therefore it must be possible to understand one now and another now on the part of the angel without any respect to time; this otherness can only be of the ‘nows’ of aeviternity; therefore etc.

20. The third way of argument is from infinity - because from the fact an angel will persist infinitely with the whole of future time, then, if he has now the whole duration that he will always have, he has now formally infinite duration.

21. There is confirmation of this in that the ‘now’ that is of itself such that it can coexist with the infinite is formally infinite - just as an angel, if he had in himself wherewith he was able to coexist with every place, would be infinite in place.

22. And if you say that this is not true unless the angel has of himself wherewith he can coexist - on the contrary: although he does not have of himself wherewith, as thus coexisting, he may possess infinity, yet, just as he formally has wherewith he does thus coexist, so he seems to be formally an infinite thing - just as if he had wherewith he might be present to every place (actual and potential), although he would have this from God effectively, yet he would be formally immense; and although his immensity would not be equal to the divine immensity in intensity, yet it would be equal to it in extension, such that God could be nowhere in his immensity save where the angel could be.

23. There is a confirmation for this reason too, that the negation of a negation is the assertion of the affirmation - therefore the negations of infinite negations assert infinite affirmations, or one infinite affirmation formally; but an angel, being possessed of this simple coexistence, has from it the negations of infinite negations (‘he does not exist with the infinite moments of time’); so he has from it infinite affirmations, or one infinite affirmation formally.

24. The fourth way is from the order of the things that come to be in aeviternity; for an angel could have been created not a sinner but innocent, and could afterwards have sinned or not sinned, with all time abstracted away; so this angel was innocent before he was a sinner; therefore there is in his existence ‘before’ and ‘after’.

25. Likewise, an angel could have been first created and afterwards at once annihilated, and another angel later created; the first angel never existed when the second existed, and so was not in the same ‘now’ as the second was; therefore the first was before and the second was afterwards (because if they existed, and not together, then one after the other). So if some other angel had existed along with both of them, there would have been ‘before’ and ‘after’ in his existence, just as the existence of one of them was before the existence of the other of them.

26. Authorities for this position [n.11] are:

Augustine Confessions 11.14 n.17, “The now of time, if it always stood and did not flow, would not be time but eternity;” and he seems there to be speaking of the true eternity of God, by expounding the verse of Psalm 101.28, “But you are yourself the same and your years, etc.”

27. Further, Literal Commentary on Genesis 4.12.n.23, “But as to his saying (John 5.17), ‘My Father works until now’, it signifies continuation of work;” and Augustine proves this by adding, “For he could be understood otherwise if he said ‘works now’ (where it would not be necessary for us to take it as continuation of work), but he compels us to understand it differently when he says ‘until now’, namely from then on -when he was making all things - he has been working.”

28. Further, Boethius On the Trinity ch.4 says that although, according to the philosophers, one could say of the heavenly bodies and spirits that they always are, yet there is a great difference; ‘being always’ in God is always present, not a running ultimately through eternity.

29. Further, Damascene Orthodox Faith ch.15, “The term ‘age [saeculum]’ means what is always being extended with eternal things, as space etc.”

30. Further, Gregory Morals 27.7 n.11 (on the remark in Job 36.26, ‘the number of his years is without reckoning’) says of the angels, “In them we discern a beginning when we turn our mind backwards etc.”

31. Further, Anselm Proslogion ch.20 speaking to God says, “You pass through all things, even eternal ones, because your eternity and theirs is all present to you, since they from their eternity do not have what is future as neither what is past.”

32. Further, Jerome To Marcella [rather Isidore Etymologies 7.1 n.12] , “Only God does not know ‘has been’ or ‘will be’.”

B. Arguments against the Opinion

33. Against this position [n.11] the argument is made that it involves a contradiction, because where succession is, there before and after are - and these are not together, but when what is after arrives, what was before falls away, and consequently what was before grows old and what comes after is new.

34. And if the succession is supposed to exist in the measure without newness coming to be in the measured - an argument against this is that, according to the Philosopher Physics 4.11.219a10-29, ‘before’ and ‘after’ in time are because of ‘before’ and ‘after’ in motion, such that if there were no different stages in motion there would not be ‘before’ and ‘after’ in time; therefore, by similarity, if there is no new existence in what is aeviternal (nor any newness in it), there will be no distinction between ‘before’ and ‘after’ in the measure of it.

35. This is confirmed by the Philosopher in Metaphysics 10.1.1053a18-27, because a measure should be of the same genus as the measured, such that, if the measure is divisible, so too is the measured; this is also proved by the fact that the indivisible (insofar as it is indivisible) cannot be measured by the divisible.

36. Further, if the ‘now’ of aeviternity passes away and does not always remain the same, this cannot be because of a defect in the subject, because the subject for you remains the same; nor can this be posited because of some corrupting cause, because it does not seem that any corrupting cause can be assigned. Therefore the ‘now’ does not pass away. It is otherwise with the ‘now’ of time, because its proximate subject (or the proximate measured thing) passes, namely change.

37. Further, if there is here some newness and some remaining with respect to the same thing, then it properly changes, because it is disposed differently now than before; but the measure of change is the ‘now’ of time; therefore to the extent aeviternity is posited as being measured by the ‘now’ of aeviternity, it will be measured by the ‘now’ of time.

38. On behalf of this view are the authorities of Blessed Augustine City of God -look there.11.31, “The holy angels have an eternity of persistence...”, 12.15 n.2, “...the immortality of the angels does not pass in time, nor has it gone by (as if now it were not) nor is it in the future (as if it not yet were).” ¹¹

II. Second Opinion

39. By holding to this negative conclusion, then [sc. that there is no succession in the existence of an angel], a twofold difference of aeviternity from time and eternity is posited.

A. Thomas Aquinas’ Way of Positing it

40. In one way as follows - look for the opinion elsewhere.Scotus Lectura 2 d.2 n.34, “So others say [namely Thomas] that eternity is the measure of stable existence. To the extent, therefore, that something departs from stable existence, to that extent it departs from eternity; now there is something that is in flux as to its whole existence (as a temporal thing), and there is something that, though it is not in itself in flux, yet has existence along with that in which there is flux (and in this way ‘aeviternal’ things exist along with flux) - and, when understanding things in this way, the heaven and angels exist along with flux, but yet their existence is stable in itself and their whole duration exists at once in itself.” ¹²

41. On the contrary - look for it.In Scotus’ Lectura 2 d.2 nn.35-36, “On the contrary: an angel is some being in itself, and so he has in himself his proper duration; therefore some duration must be assigned in itself to him. So he is not measured because of the fact that something else, possessed of duration, runs along with him; the point is plain in the heaven, which exists along with its own motion that is measured by time, and yet the heaven in itself has its proper measure... Besides he [Thomas] says elsewhere [ST la q.14 a.13] that ‘God knows future contingents because all things are present to the ‘now’ of eternity, which contains in itself the whole of time’; therefore, if the ‘now’ of aeviternity contain the whole of time, the consequence is that an angel knows all future things.” ¹³

B. Henry of Ghent’s Way of Positing it

42. In another way, [Henry] Quodlibet 5 q.13 - look for it.Henry ibid., “Now there is only a triple mode of existing in the universe of beings; for there is some being that exists in act altogether immutably, without any potency for change; and there is some being that exists in act altogether immutably, but is (as far as concerns itself) in potency for change if it were left to itself; and there is a third being existing altogether mutably in act and in potency. The measure of the quantity of existence (or of duration in existing) in the first way is called ‘eternity’ -and this, because of its ‘in every way immutable existence’, is necessarily a whole all at once, because as nothing is left to be acquired in its existence, so neither in its duration or eternity; and because of its lack of potency for change, it is of itself a fixed standing in the same way - for which reason the whole of eternity is nothing but a ‘now’ standing of itself immutably and indivisibly, not possessing parts., and it has, as far as concerns itself and the idea of its measurement, no idea of continuity, but only as to the consideration of our intellect in respect of and comparison with the succession of time. The measure of the quantity of existence (or of duration in existing) in the second way is called ‘aeviternity’ - which, because of its actual immutability, is necessarily a whole all at once, because nothing in the existence of what is aeviternal remains to be received; but because of the potency for change in what is aeviternal.it is not of itself a fixed standing, but is so only from another; not because it could be in the flux of a continuum, having of itself parts (as the ‘now’ of time can be), but because it can fall into, and it has a necessity of falling into, non-being unless it is conserved in being by another.; because of this, the whole duration of what is aeviternal is only a ‘now’ that stands, because of another, immutably and indivisibly, not possessed of parts.save by the extension of the intellect in respect of and by comparison with the parts of time. Now the measure of quantity (or of duration in existing) in the third way is called ‘time’ - which, because of the actual changing of the temporal thing (of which ‘time’ is the per se measure) is not a whole all at once but in succession, because in the being of a temporal thing (of which sort motion is) there properly remains always something to be received; and, because of the potency always mixed in with its act, it is always in flux (never a fixed standing), having parts that succeed to each other and never remain, in respect of which common difference eternity and aeviternity differ from time.” ¹⁴

43. Against this way of positing it I argue thus:

For he seems to contradict himself,Henry ibid., “Anselm [n.31] only says this in respect of the extension of time, namely because it is not true in their case that they should have in the following ‘now’ the being that they have in the present ‘now’, nor do they have now of themselves the being that they had before; rather, the being of a creature (as of an angel), as far as concerns itself, has to have a limit, but the being of God not at all. Hence the being of a creature is not had through continuous influx save by having a reference to the extension of time, as was said; also as concerns extension or process, eternity and aeviternity are differently disposed, because eternity is related to the whole of time as ‘not being at all able to fail’, but aeviternity can (as far as concerns itself) fail at any instant and be concluded under time - and thus, by reason of its potency for corruption, it has in some way the idea of what is temporal, which eternity has not at all.” ¹⁵ because if in aeviternity “it is not the case that an angel should have in the following ‘now’ the being he has in the present ‘now’ _ rather the being of an angel, as far as concerns itself, has to have a limit” (as Henry says expressly), and later he says that “aeviternity can, as far as concerns itself, fail at any instant” - then, if this ‘now’ of aeviternity have being formally along with the first ‘now’, whereby that being had to have a limit along with the first ‘now’ (according to Henry and his followers), then it must exist along with the second ‘now’ either by another being or by the same being posited again.

44. Further, as to his sayingHenry ibid., “For eternity, as the exceeding measure, contains virtually in itself the whole course of time, just as a superior creature contains virtually and in a supereminent way whatever there is in an inferior creature; so that, by positing eternity or aeviternity to exist in reality, not only is it impossible to posit that time in itself cannot exist..., rather it is incompossible to posit this once eternity or aeviternity have been posited to exist in reality. So the fact that from positing this impossibility, namely that time cannot be.(which is not only impossible in itself but incompossible with positing that eternity exists in God and aeviternity in an angel), the impossible conclusions [about aeviternity] in the four ultimate modes of unacceptability follow, is not surprising. However, they cannot follow from the fact that the ‘now’ of aeviternity is posited to be simple and indivisible, since this ‘now’ possesses virtually in itself its being extended, by intellect or imagination, to time.; but they all follow from the aforesaid not only impossible but also incompossible thing - by the opposite of which, once posited as necessary, namely ‘there is time’. the contraries of all those conclusions are very easily understood.” ¹⁶ that ‘there are impossible inferences which follow, and they do not follow from positing aeviternity as indivisible but from the denial of time, which denial is incompossible with the positing of aeviternity, and it is because of this incompossibility that the impossible conclusion about aeviternity follows’: this does not seem reasonable, because, according to him,Henry ibid. 8 q.9, “For nothing belongs to anything prior in nature which is not of a nature to belong to the same thing - as far as concerns itself - prior in duration.” ¹⁷ whatever is, as far as concerns itself, prior in nature can, as far as concerns itself, be prior in duration. So there is no repugnance for it in its being able without contradiction, as far as concerns itself, to be ‘prior in duration’ to the posterior (with respect to which it is said to be ‘prior in nature’) - and, when it is posited and the posterior is not posited, there is no contradiction on the part of what is ‘naturally prior’, nor on the part of anything that pertains to it insofar as it is prior.a Therefore, from such an hypothesis, there follows no incompossibility on the part of what is aeviternal insofar as it is aeviternal.

a.a [Interpolation] but the aeviternal and its proper measure are in every respect prior in nature to time, as foundation is prior to relation.

45. An example of this: that although the subject is necessarily followed by its special property, yet, because the subject is prior in nature, there is no contradiction on the part of the subject that it should exist prior even in duration to its special property; and if this supposition is made, no incompossibility follows on the part of the subject in itself as to the way it is prior to its property. Therefore if any contradiction does follow, this is through some extrinsic fact, namely from the relation of the cause to the effect.

46. So, in this way, if there were some necessary comparison of aeviternity to time, as of what is prior in nature to what is posterior in nature, then no contradiction would follow, because of negation of the posterior and positing of the prior, on the part of the prior in itself, nor on the part of anything that belongs to the prior in itself; but those inferences [sc. of Henry], namely that an angel ‘cannot be prior to another angel’ or that ‘an angel cannot be after its non-being’, are impossible per se on the part of the aeviternal as it is aeviternal; therefore etc.

47. Also, as to his proof of the necessity of the concomitance of time with aeviternity on the basis of the order of the more perfect to the more imperfect, it does not seem to suffice. For the proof would not conclude this about a quasi-quantitative containing but about a quidditative one, in the way a superior quiddity contains the inferior one; but with such containing there stands the fact that the superior can be without the inferior and the fact that the being proper to the superior may belong to it in the absence of the inferior, or at least need not belong to it in respect of the inferior. One must speak, therefore, in the same way about the issue at hand, that nothing proper to aeviternity belongs to it precisely in respect of time.

III. In what Ways the First Opinion can be Sustained

A. The First Way, which is according to the Intention of Bonaventure

1. As to the Opinion itself

48. He who wishes to hold the first opinion [n.11] (which seems probable and has probable reasons on its behalf) can say - according to the intention of him who poses it [sc. Bonaventure] - that aeviternity is properly a quantity and consequently has proper divisibility; but not a permanent divisibility, therefore a successive one; such is an indivisible succeeding to an indivisible, and a different indivisible to a different indivisible.

49. And so the ‘now’ of aeviternity, as far as concerns itself, passes instantaneously - and aeviternal being, as it is posited in being in the ‘now’, has, from the force of this position, being precisely in the ‘now’ and then immediately non-being (when the ‘now’ has gone by), unless the same cause, by another causation, were to posit the same being in another ‘now’. And so the cause conserves it by positively causing, not another being (as is true in the case of something successive), but the same being over and over infinitely - such that the first causation is called ‘creation’, because it follows not-being immediately in the order of duration, but each following causation follows not-being mediately in the order of duration, and not-being immediately in the order of nature, namely because not-being would then be present unless the conserving cause were to bestow being. But the being posited secondly follows, in the order of duration, the being posited previously - and thus, in this way, there is conservation and continuation of the same being.

50. There is an example of this. If an angel has some virtual quantity by which he can be present at some place, then he is, by this virtual quantity, present at this place, because he cannot simultaneously be present at another place; and he can absolutely not be present at another place save by some change made with respect to the former place; either because the virtual quantity becomes formally greater, or because it is transferred from place to place, or because it is, by divine power, in another place without leaving the former place.

51. So it is in the issue at hand, that the being that the angel has by a single causation is limited to this ‘now’ - and, when nothing new is done with respect to the angel, he cannot, by force of this single causation, exist beyond this ‘now’; but God, by giving the angel perpetual, enduring quantity (and this by a single continuous causation or by infinite causations of the same being), gives it to him always uniformly, so that by it the angel is extended to the whole of time.

2. To the Arguments brought against the First Opinion

52. To the arguments against this position.

To the first [n.33], which proves that a contradiction follows from the position, I reply: in the duration or persistence of being which precisely is successive there is renewal (and one part of it goes away and another part succeeds, and in general one part succeeds to another), but there is not any renewal in the existence of that of which there is persistence; just as, if the same flesh were posited, not possessed of part after part in the same permanent quantity, there would be an otherness there of parts in the extension itself formally (which is a quantity), without any extension or diversity of parts in that to which such extension happens.

53. And when proof is given [n.34] that ‘there is no distinction in the measure (from the Philosopher Physics 4. 11.219a10-29) unless there was distinction in the measured’ - I say that the consequence is good that ‘if the parts of time are other, then the parts of motion are other’, as inference from effect to cause; but it is not necessary that in anything whatever the parts of duration are other, because there may be some ‘distinction of parts’ that are prior; the reason for this is that the distinction that is second to one thing can be first in another thing.

54. There is an example of this: fire heats and dries, because of distinct ordered accidents in fire, such that the distinction of actions there is second, presupposing another prior distinction, namely the distinction of active accidents [sc. of hot and dry in fire]; but it does not follow from this that, wherever there is a distinction of actions, this distinction is second - because if these distinct accidents of fire were virtually contained in the sun, then the first distinction there would be of actions, which distinction was second with respect to fire. So must one say in the issue at hand.

55. To the other argument [n.36] I say that the ‘now’ can fail, because of itself it has only instantaneous being - although its subject remains the same, and no agent corrupts it. And as to the fact that ‘the now of time fails when its own proper subject fails’ [n.36], it is accidental to a ‘now’ that its proximate subject fails - because if the subject were to remain the same (as in the case of something at rest), then one could say that the same subject, acting through what is another ‘now’ succeeding to the prior ‘now’, does, by producing another ‘now’ incompossible with the prior ‘now’, destroy the prior ‘now’, not first of itself but by way of consequence.

56. And if you ask what the prior ‘now’ fails in, whether in itself or in another (as Aristotle argues in Physics 4.10.218a8-21) - I say that ‘to fail’ (as also ‘to cease’) can be understood in two ways: in one way by positing a present and denying a future, and in another way by positing a past and denying a present. The first way must be understood in the case of indivisibles and things that have the ultimate of their being; for they do not have a first stage in their not-being, and they then cease to be when they are - and in this way the ‘now’ ceases to be in itself, because then it is and after this it will not be; and if you ask for the first stage in its not-being, there is none, as neither in the case of anything that has the ultimate of its being.Tr. The point here seems to be something as follows. The ‘now’ of time comes and goes with the process of change in temporal things, as these come to be and cease to be. Angels do not undergo change but simply are or are not without any process (they have, or do not have, the fullness of their being all at once). The ‘now’ of angels comes and goes, then, not because angels are subjects of change, but simply because of itself, because it is an indivisible that immediately is and immediately is not. ¹⁸

B. Second Way, which is tangential to the Intention of Bonaventure

57. The conclusion [sc. that there is succession formally in the existence of an angel, n.1] can be sustained in another way (although not according to the intention of him who posits this principal position [n.11]), because the total existence of an angel persists according as it is absolute, but it has new respects, one after the other, to the cause - such that this total existence as it is under one respect to its causing cause succeeds to itself as it is under another respect to its conserving cause.William of Ware Sentences 2 d.2 q.2, “The whole of aeviternity, taken under one real respect to an angel, succeeds to itself under another real respect to an angel, succeeding to itself; likewise the creature, as it now coexists with God, has a different respect from when, in another ‘now’, it coexists with itself, without any absolute newness. Hence the whole succeeds to itself in both measured and measure, as the measure succeeds to itself the way the measured whole, in every respect of proportion, succeeds to itself; nor can there be concluded from this any succession in parts succeeding to themselves. Hence the first succession of whole to whole exists in aeviternity without absolute newness, but not without respective newness, because it receives different real respects.” ¹⁹

And this way would perhaps be easier for maintaining succession than the previous one (which posits quantity [n.48]), although, on the other side, there would be much difficulty in sustaining how there would be there a succession precisely of respects without any distinction in what is absolute in any way, whether in the foundation or in the term.

IV. Against the Conclusion of the First Opinion in itself

58. But against the conclusion of the said opinion in itself [n.11], whether it is sustained in the first way or the second, I argue as follows:

The ‘now’ of aeviternity - which is posited as one absolute after another according to the first way of sustaining the opinion [nn.48-51] - is either the same as actual existence or different from it. If the same, then it is plain that as actual existence remains the same so also does the ‘now’ of aeviternity. If different -to the contrary, for then, just as existence can be posited in being an infinite number of times, so it seems the same absolute ‘now’ of aeviternity (different from the being of existence) can be posited frequently in being, and so the same ‘now’ of aeviternity can be conserved just as the same existence can.

59. If it be said that ‘if it is posited frequently in being, then it is posited in diverse nows’ - on the contrary, if the absolute ‘now’, different from the being of existence, can be posited frequently in being and in different nows, there will still be the same reason for its being able to be conserved in each of those ‘nows’; and then there will be a process to infinity or a stand will be made in this, that just as existence is conserved the same, so any absolute in an angel will be able to be conserved the same.

60. Likewise, in the following question [nn.122-123] it will be proved that there is no other absolute in an angel besides his existence, and so there cannot be identity in existence and succession in some other absolute; and, whether it is this way or that, a new respect does not seem able to exist without newness in the foundation or the term, for a respect consequent to extremes - such that, when either is posited, the respect follows from the nature of the extremes - cannot be new (as it seems) without newness in one or other extreme; but, for you, there is nothing new in the foundation of this respect - nor in the term, as is plain.

61. Likewise, this respect is the same as the foundation, as is plain from the preceding distinction [2 d.1 n.260]; therefore this respect cannot be other while the foundation exists the same.

V. Scotus’ own Response to the Question

62. Therefore, one can say that there is no necessity of positing anything new or any succession in any angel (which, namely, would be formally ‘new’ in it); rather ‘whatever is there’ can remain the same (as the existence remains the same) and consequently so can any respect consequent to the absolute.

VI. To the Arguments for the First Opinion

63. To the arguments for the first opinion [nn.12-25].

To the first [n.12] I say that both ways [nn.11, 33] save the saying of Augustine. For as the first way says that ‘the creature always essentially depends equally on God’, so that the conservation of a thing is as it were one continuous causation (or there are infinite causations), and thereby it always actually causes the thing in the way it caused it in the first instant (although the causation, as it is in the first instant, be called creation and in the other moments conservation) - so the second position [n.33], not seeing a reason for continuation in this causation (because not seeing any continued form), nor seeing so much reason for a distinction (because not seeing that distinction either in the causer or in the caused, as far as concerns the formal term) [n.16], says that one action ‘persisting always in respect of the creature’ is creation insofar as it is understood to coexist with the first ‘now’ of time, which ‘now’ of time was immediately preceded by the non-being of the caused thing; and that the same action persisting is called

‘conservation’ insofar as it coexists with the other parts of time, parts not immediately following not-being but following the pre-had being along with the parts of time - and so the action is a sort of continuation of what was pre-had, without comparing it to not-being (where there is no before and after), but comparing it to the parts of time with which it coexists.Henry of Ghent Quodlibet 5 q.11, “But different are the things on which caused things depend not only as to their coming to be but also as to their being, as the creature universally depends on God and light in the air on a luminous body. In the case of such things the caused altogether does not persist in the absence of the truth of its cause; not because the agent by a different action in reality gives being and conserves it once given (as the opinion already stated maintains [sc. the opinion of Bonaventure]), but because the action does not have any co-agent for the coming to be of its being..., such that, as the acting virtue itself...remains the same in number, so its action about the caused thing is the same, remaining one and the same in number; and likewise, the caused thing itself.is first said ‘to be a caused thing coming to be’ and next there is conservation of it. Yet the agent has not done by the first causing of coming to be anything other than it is doing now by the causing of being conserved (nor conversely), such that, as on the part of the agent ‘to make’ and ‘to conserve’ are the same in reality, so on the part of the caused ‘to come to be’ and ‘to be conserved’ are the same in reality and different only in reason. Rather (as it seems) ‘coming to be’ and ‘making’ should not be spoken of save as regards the first instant, wherein the caused leaps into being at the presence of its cause - but afterwards, as regards the whole succession of time, ‘conservation’ of the persisting thing should be spoken of, without any making.” “And as to what Augustine said...about ‘always coming to be’, he did not understand the ‘coming to be’ of the thing itself considered in itself and absolutely, but according to a certain respect to time, where there is before and after.” ²⁰

64. But, apart from the intention of Blessed Augustine, the reason there adduced [n.16] seems to have the difficulty that, namely, the thing has being by one causation with one ‘now’ and by another causation with another ‘now’, because ‘being is not had in its completion by any causation, the opposite of which seems to stand when such causation is posited’ [n.16].

I reply. This proposition [sc. ‘being is not had.. .such causation is posited’] is to be distinguished as to composition and division; and in the sense of composition it is true, because ‘it is not had in its completion by any causation the opposite of which stands when such causation stands, such that these are simultaneous’; but in the sense of division it is false, because even the conservation itself is able not to be, although the causation, by which the thing has its being to the ultimate, has been posited - and so, although the causation of an angel has been posited, yet the non-existence of the angel can stand with this causation (when it has been posited) in the sense of division, but not in the sense of composition.

65. And hereby is plain the response to the like argument, that ‘an angel’s being created and being annihilated cannot stand together, therefore being created and being conserved are not the same thing - because when an angel is being conserved it can be annihilated, but not when it is being created.’

I reply. Just as an angel’s being created and being annihilated do not stand together in the sense of composition, so neither does an angel’s being conserved and being annihilated stand together in the sense of composition; but in the sense of division it does stand that, as concerns an angel, creation or conservation at some point are and yet that they can at some point not be (and thus annihilation can be) - just as was said in the matter of God’s predestination and foreknowledge, that in the sense of division there is potency for one opposite when the other opposite persists, yet not that there is potency for the opposite when the other opposite persists at the same time [1 d.40 nn.4-7, or Lectura 1 d.40 nn.4-8 and d.39 nn.53-54 - there being no d.39 in the Ordinatio].

66. To the second argument [n.18] I say that, on the part of an angel, there is no difference between its being, its having been, and its going to be, yet these indicate a different relation of the angel to time - because, just as was said in 1 d.9 n.17 and d.40 n.9, about being generated and having been generated, that these co-signify the ‘now’ of eternity insofar as it coexists with the diverse parts of time, so too they would state of the ‘now’ of aeviternity that the same ‘now’ can be and coexist with all the parts of time.Henry of Ghent Quodlibet 5 q.13, “Hence the fact that the [angelic] creature has, in the said way, its whole being at once does not in any respect derogate from the simplicity of the being of God. Hence it is false to say that the being of the creature yesterday and tomorrow is not the same and simultaneous; for it is simultaneous as far as concerns itself and on the part of aeviternity. But if it is understood not to be simultaneous, this is according to the mode of our understanding, extending aeviternity to the parts of time; for the intellect seems to exist with the continuous and with time in such a way that it cannot understand things, which are in themselves fixed according to the whole of time, without understanding their being to be extended according to the differences of time - and in this regard our intellect is altogether defective... In that which has being at once and from itself, there is no difference at all between ‘to be’ and ‘to have been’ and ‘to be going to be’ - but these differ in anything that has being at once but from another, so that, when it has been according to the extension of past time, it is thereafter impossible for it not to have been according to that past; simply however it is impossible for it not to be going to be, on the supposition that there was no extension made.” ²¹

67. And when in the argument it is said that ‘God cannot make an angel not to have been’ [n.18], this is denied as it is said of the thing signified by the ‘have been’ -because the thing signified by the ‘have been’ is the same being as what the angel has.

68. And if it be said that ‘the past cannot not have been’, the minor that would be co-assumed [sc. ‘an angel has been’] is denied, because it is not past in itself.

An example of this would be if the Son of God, along with his being generated in eternity, were to receive, per impossibile, another nature in accord with which he would depend on the Father - then the ‘being generated’ and the ‘having been generated’ would state the same in him, and this being of the Son could absolutely not be; and insofar as this being would as it were follow its not-being, it would be called ‘being generated’, and insofar as it would as it were mediately follow its not-being, as coexisting with the other parts of time, it would be called ‘having been generated’. And so conservation and production (or creation) differ only by the action of the intellect; and the ‘having been conserved’ is able not to be when this being is being conserved, and when it is being produced, in the sense of division.

69. And if it be thus argued that ‘the past is able not to have coexisted with it, therefore it is able not to have been’ - this seems to be the fallacy of figure of speech, by changing ‘when’ into ‘what’.Tr. The sense seems to be that since an angel, or anything aeviternal, is (according to this opinion) only said ‘to have been’ relative to the parts of time, if there was no time, or no past time, then the angel would not have the ‘when’ of past time. Yet he would still have the ‘what’ of his existence. So the angel would still exist in the way he was said to have been, though there would no longer be a ‘when’ relative to which his ‘have been’ could be said. So there is a fallacy of figure of speech in inferring absence of the ‘what’ from the absence of the ‘when’. ²²

70. As to the confirmation of this second reason, about contradictory things willed in eternity [n.19] - one can say that although God willed me to sit at moment a and not to sit at moment b, yet the objects willed by him are naturally prior to the things that measure the ‘now’, and one must look in the prior stage for the non-contradiction of the things willed; otherwise a contradiction of this sort does not seem it could be taken away by the adding on of those posterior ‘nows’. Although therefore God might will an angel to be for this ‘now’ and not to be for that ‘now’, one must look first for the possibility of how he might will an angel to be and not to be.

71. I say then that if the ‘now’ is posited in any even aeviternal thing as proper to it, God wills it to be in that ‘now’ positively - and he wills it not to be negatively by willing that ‘now’ not to be; and then if there is another aeviternal thing in whose ‘now’ both of the former come to be, this is accidental to those ‘nows’, for the ‘now’ of that aeviternal thing is not the proper measure of them - just as neither is eternity a measure, in which there can be contradictories that succeed to each other in the case of every measure.

72. Or if there is not posited in any aeviternal thing some ‘now’ different from the actual existence of the thing (as will be said in the following question [nn.122-123]), then God wills it to be along with eternity and wills it not to be along with eternity. He does not however will it to be along with the whole of eternity ‘according to all the being present of eternity’, nor not to be along with the whole of eternity in this way, because then there would be a contradiction; but there is no contradiction when comparing these to eternity ‘not in accord with the whole idea of eternity’s infinite present’.

73. To the third [n.20] I say that in order to be obliged to infer, from the coexistence of some virtual quantity with some quantity properly - namely some quantity of bulk -, to the infinity of the virtual quantity [n.21], the virtual quantity must necessarily coexist with all the parts of the other quantity. The proof is that ‘the other quantity’ [sc. the quantity of bulk] would not be infinite unless it had all the parts possible to it (just as time, if it were simultaneous, would not be actually infinite unless it had all the parts possible to it); therefore nothing is deduced to be infinite virtually from the coexistence of it with the whole of time unless it necessarily coexist with all the parts of time. But aeviternity is not such. I say then that although aeviternity has wherewith it can coexist with the infinite parts of time, there is no need - for this reason - that it be in itself infinite, because it does not have formally wherewith it necessarily thus coexists.

74. And as to the likeness about immensity [n.22], I say that there is no likeness -because, in the case of immensity, that which could be present to every place would exist in every place at once, and not through any conservation by an extrinsic cause. In the issue at hand, however, an aeviternal thing does not have wherewith it may coexist with all the parts of time save through conservation by an extrinsic cause; and it would have nothing through which it might coexist unless it were caused to be quasi-continuously the same by the extrinsic cause, although not by a different causation; so there would be more a likeness of this [sc. aeviternity] with that [sc. immensity] if the coexistence of the latter with different places - if this were possible - were caused by the same causation. However, in order to coexist simultaneously, it would never have infinite presence to place, and so it would never be immense. So it is in the issue at hand.

75. On the contrary: a finite thing cannot coexist together with a total infinite thing, such that it have in itself wherewith it could coexist with it; therefore because it does coexist it is infinite. - I reply: the antecedent is denied of an infinite which is infinite by succession, and denied of a finite formally having what it has always by the same action, such that it does not have it without such action.

76. As to the fourth [nn.24-25], that one aeviternal thing succeeds to another is conceded, and that the existence of an aeviternal thing succeeds to its opposite (that is, one is after another) is conceded, but from this there is not deduced any succession in any single existence of some aeviternal thing.

77. And from this is plain the answer to all the arguments:

As to those two angels [n.25], about these a ‘before’ and ‘after’ are conceded (because one remains after the other); if however a third were to coexist with the two of them, there would be no ‘before’ and ‘after’ in the existence of that third - just as, though today and tomorrow coexist with eternity, not for this reason is there a ‘before’ and ‘after’ in eternity.

78. Likewise [n.24], it is conceded that the nature of an angel would be prior to his guilt, such that this existence (namely under innocence) would be with the opposite of that existence, and from the second existence would follow the opposite of the first; however the existence of the angel in its own nature would not have any succession, neither as it is existent under innocence nor as it is existent under guilt - but there would only be a succession in accidents (that is, that the existence of one act would be after the existence of the other), without however a diversity in the other in itself.

79. The authorities adduced for this opinion [nn.26-32] I concede, because no creature is independent of the first cause, but is always dependent on the cause - not however with a continuous dependence, nor with difference dependences, but with the same dependence; and, because of this same dependence, any creature can have being with one part of time and not with another part, and to this extent it can as it were fall under time, that is, so as to coexist with one part and not coexist with another, and in this way it may be said ‘to have been’ and ‘not to be going to be’, and thus not something eternal.

VII. To the Principal Arguments

80. To the principal arguments [nn.8-10].

As to the first [n.8], it is conceded that one angel is created before another, but it does not follow because of this that there is in the existence of the angel first created a ‘before’ and ‘after’.

81. As to the second [n.9], it can likewise be said that an angel can be annihilated, and in the same ‘now’ negatively (if it has a ‘now’), that is, that its ‘now’ should cease along with it; but if its ‘now’ does not differ from its existence, then it can be annihilated with eternity and can exist with eternity, but not with the whole nature of the present-ness of eternity [nn.71-72].

82. To the last one [n.10] I say that the being of the [angel] restored follows the not-being of the [angel] annihilated, and that the not-being of the annihilated was preceded by the being of the created, and that the being of the created was preceded by the not-being of the creatable - and so the ‘being’ follows the same being, with the interrupting not-being in between. Nor does there follow from this any continuation in the being itself ‘if it had not been annihilated’ [n.10], because there is not now any succession in some one thing, but succession of one opposite to another [sc. not-being to being to not-being to being].Vatican Editors remark that Scotus means the identically same being is restored as was annihilated, not some other being, and that the not-being of annihilation was identically the same as the not-being prior to creation, not some other not-being. ²³

83. On the contrary: therefore in this way the interrupted existence is at one with itself restored, as if it was a non-interrupted existence.

I reply: if there was no succession there of opposite to opposite [sc. of being to not-being to being] (which opposite [not-being] mediates between this being [the being of the created] and itself [the being of the restored]), the consequence would be that there would be as much at-oneness as if the opposite did not intervene; but now the opposite mediates as it were between the created being and that very being repaired (and this ‘opposite’ is a mean, or has a certain relation to both extremes), and so these are not as at one as if not-being did not intervene. However, just as in this case the same repaired ‘now’ (or the same existence, if it requires no ‘now’ [n.72]) is the same, and there is ‘created existence and repaired existence’ in the same thing without any succession in it in itself (although, as posited in being, it succeeds itself as previously posited in being) -so it would have been in the same ‘now’ if it had not been interrupted, and without any succession, in either way.

Question Two. Whether in an Angel actually Existing there is Need to posit Something Measuring its Existence that is Other than that very Existence

84. Secondly I ask whether in an angel actually existing there is need to posit something measuring its existence (or the duration of its existence [n.1]) that is other than that existence itself.

85. That there is:

Time differs from motion by the fact that it measures motion (as the Philosopher proves in Physics 4.10.218b13-18 by the fact that ‘time is neither quick nor slow but motion is said to be quick or slow’, and by other reasons); therefore, by likeness, there is something other than the existence of the aeviternal that measures it.

86. Secondly as follows: permanent quantity and successive quantity belong to the same genus - therefore each is something other than its subject, especially if the subject belongs to the genus of substance; therefore just as permanent quantity is other than that of which it is the measure, so also is successive quantity [cf. nn.1-2].

87. On the contrary:

About this ‘other’ I ask by what it endures in being. If by itself then, by parity of reasoning, existence itself will be able to endure by itself formally, because this ‘other’ is not more perfect than that very actual existence, since it is as it were the property of it.

But if it endures in being by an absolute other than itself, there will be an infinite regress in measures and things measured.

I. To the Affirmative Side of the Question

A. The Opinion of Others

88. My response.

The first opinion in the preceding question [n.11] should concede the affirmative side, because aeviternity [according to this opinion] truly posits the idea of measure and quantity in its proper sense [n.48] - and so aeviternity differs from the existence of an angel, which existence is not in itself formally an extension, a quantum, but is indivisible.

89. Likewise, in that existence one ‘now’ of aeviternity succeeds to another; therefore both ‘nows’ differ from the existence of an angel as something absolute (according to this position [nn.19, 49-51, 58]), because they are quasi-indivisibles of the genus of quantity.

90. Likewise some - holding the second opinion in the preceding question (about the indivisibility of aeviternity [nn.39, 42, 33]) - say that aeviternity itself belongs to the genus of quantity, not as a divisible but as an indivisible in that genus; such that from many indivisibles of the same species, measuring namely the existences of several aeviternal things of the same species, a discrete quantity can be composed, which is the number and measure in aeviternal things, just as number in corporeal things is composed of the discrete unities in those things (for this they adduce reasons - look for them).Henry of Ghent Quodlibet 12 a.8, “But someone might ask in what category the measure of angels is. And I say that it is in the category of quantity as the principle of it, in the way that unity and point and instant are in the category of quantity. For just as from diverse indivisibles measuring the diverse thoughts of any angel there is constituted one discrete measure, which is called time, because it is constituted from transient things measuring the being of a transient thing, so from the diverse indivisibles of aeviternities measuring the substance and ‘the being as to substance’ of several angels, differing in number in one species of angels, there is constituted one discrete measure, which does not deserve to be called time, because it is not constituted from transient things measuring the being of a transient thing as it is transient, but rather is constituted from permanent things of a permanent being as it is permanent; and so it is not a species of time but rather of number - and this number is from discrete unities in spiritual things, just as the number that the philosophers posit is from discrete units in corporeal thing. But if it happen that there is only one angel in one species, yet because there can be several angels, as we made clear elsewhere (ibid. 9 q.1), this makes no difference as to positing that such a number is some species of quantity - just as if everything corporeal were one continuum, this would make no difference as to positing that natural number is a species of quantity, since the continuum can be divided (at least by the intellect) and from the continuum something discrete comes to be. So therefore the aeviternity in a species, containing in itself diverse aeviternities measuring the being of diverse angels of the same species, is a discrete quantity and divisible into indivisibles - which indivisibles are the aeviternities of individual angels and differ in number among themselves; and if from the aeviternities of diverse angels differing in species a mathematical abstraction could be made, just as it can be made from the numbers of diverse corporeal things differing in species - then perhaps, just as there is one number ten for ten men and for ten horses (although the tens are not the same), so there is the same aeviternity in species for all the angels diverse in species, although the aeviternals would not be the same in species.” ²⁴

B. Rejection of the Opinion

91. Against this [nn.88-90] there is, as was argued before in 2 d.1 n.262, an argument as follows:

That which, if it were distinct from something, would be naturally posterior to it, is necessarily the same as that something if it is incompossible for it to be without it. Therefore, if it is incompossible for an angel to be without some extrinsic thing (which thing would be the measure of his actual existence), then, since that extrinsic thing, if it were other, would be naturally posterior to the actual existence of the angel, the consequence is that it is not other than his existence; or if it is other, and consequently posterior, the angel’s actual existence will, without contradiction, be able to be without it - and thus there is no necessity to posit it.

92. There is a confirmation of this reason (and it is like the one that mention was made of above at d.1 n.262), that a distinction between things, one of which is properly present in the other, is not deduced save from an actual or potential distinction, or because the things are disposed to each other as those things are of which one is separable from the other.

93. I add this third point, that according to Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.11.1036b22-28 ‘On the parts of Definition’, many have been seduced from the truth by comparison of the younger Socrates who said that ‘if were no circles save bronze ones, bronze would not for this reason fall into the definition of circle’, and inferred by similitude that ‘flesh should not fall into the definition of man, even though there is no man without flesh’ -when it is given, I say, that a separation of these [man and flesh] from each other is impossible. However if these are disposed to each other as are things of which the separation is possible, then the conclusion is that they are separable; for example, if from the proper idea of circle and triangle, of flesh and wood, the conclusion is drawn that circle is disposed to wood as triangle is to flesh, and if separability is proved on the one side, then a distinction will be proved on the other side, and proved that inseparability on that other side is not from its proper idea but from something extrinsic.

94. I take, therefore, that nothing can be proved to be distinct from another thing save because of their actual or potential separation, or because of a proportion of them to some other things of which one is separable from the other. But in the issue at hand [sc. the measure of the existence of angels] none of this holds. For there is not here (for you [sc. those who hold the first or second opinions in the previous question]) any separation, whether actual or potential. Nor are these things [sc. an angel’s existence and the measure of it] disposed to each other as distinct and separable things are, because nothing distinct really from another thing, without which it cannot be without contradiction, is prior to it, but either naturally posterior or simultaneous in nature with it; but this thing which is posited as ‘other’ [sc. the measure of an angel’s existence], if it existed, would be naturally posterior to the angel; therefore etc. [n.91].

C. Instance against the Rejection of the Opinion

95. There is objected against this [sc. that there is no distinction between the existence of an angel and the measure of it], that ‘the now as to substance’ is disposed to the substance of a movable thing as that which is posited to be the measure of the duration of the existence of angels is disposed to that existence - because, just as the existence, measured by this indivisible measure, remains the same, so the like is posited on the side of the ‘now’ and the substance of a movable thing; and yet on this side is found a distinction between the substance of the very movable thing and the substance of the ‘now’; therefore here too.

96. Now that one should posit some such ‘now’ measuring the movable thing, the same as it in substance, seems to follow from the intention of the Philosopher in Physics 4.10.281a8-11; there he seems to solve as it were the question he is moving about the ‘now’, by saying that it is ‘one and the same as to substance, but different as to being’.

D. Response to the Instance

97. I exclude this objection [n.95] as follows:

First I show that what it supposes about ‘the now as to substance’ is false and is against the Philosopher’s intention - because the Philosopher proves [Physics 4.11.219b22-25] that “‘the now’ follows what is being moved” by the fact that “we learn from what is being moved the ‘before’ and ‘after’ in motion,” and that from this ‘now’ we learn the ‘before’ and ‘after’ in time. But this is not true of the movable as to substance, but as it is under different changes, because, if the movable is taken as to substance absolutely, we do not from it learn the ‘before’ and ‘after’ in motion.a

a.a [Interpolation] therefore neither do we from the same ‘now’ according to substance learn the ‘before’ and ‘after’ in time, but we do so from different ‘nows’.

98. Likewise, the Philosopher says [Physics 4.11.219b33-20a4], as to the second property about the ‘now’, that it is not without time nor vice versa, because motion is not without the movable nor vice versa; and as motion is to the movable, so the number of motion is to the number or unity of the movable. But that the movable cannot, as to its substance, be without motion is false, but it is true of the movable precisely as it exists under change; therefore if the latter is a movable in the whole motion, then so is the ‘now’ corresponding to it.

99. Further, how could the ‘indivisible now’ flow according to different existences (which would necessarily be indivisible), without its whole flow being a composite of indivisibles? For the Philosopher proves, from his intention in Physics 6.10.241a6-14, that the indivisible cannot move, because then its motion would be composed of indivisibles, because a lesser or equal part of it would pass by before a greater did; therefore time would be a composite of indivisibles, which is against the Philosopher [Physics 6.9.239b8-9].

100. To prove this [sc. that an indivisible ‘now’ cannot flow according to different existences] there are two reasons from the Philosopher [Physics 4.10.218a21-30],a one of which is of this sort: ‘those things are said to be at once which are in the same indivisible instant etc.’b

a.a [Interpolated note] In the Reportatio, “these reason are left unsolved, though they may apparently be solved.”

b.b [Interpolation] therefore if the instant is the same in substance, all instances are equally present and at once, both those now and those a thousand years from now (Averroes Physics 4 comm.92).

101. The other reason is that ‘of any continuous thing there are two distinct terms etc.’ - which reason I clarify as follows:

Because to ask whether the substance itself of the ‘now as to substance’ is movable is only to dispute about words. But if the ‘now’ is other than the substance (namely, something indivisible in the genus of quantity), I ask of which continuous thing or of which discrete part it is the term - because everything indivisible that is per se in the genus of quantity is either a term of continuous quantity or a part of discrete quantity. If the now is part of discrete quantity then time is discrete, which the Philosopher did not concede [n.99]; if it is a term of continuous quantity, then it must be two (according as it is the term of this and of that part of the continuous), because it is impossible for ‘the same thing as to substance’ to be per se the end and the beginning of one and the same quantity.a

a.a [Interpolation] Again, the Commentator makes the following argument at Physics 4 comm.91: an instant is end and term of something finite; but everything finite has two terms and two ends; therefore it also has two instants.

102. And if you say that it is the term ‘according to diverse existences’ - then since those existences are accidents of the ‘now’ the same in substance (because for you it remains the same under diverse existences [n.95], and consequently those existences are accidents of it), and since everything indivisible in the genus of quantity is the per se term of a quantity (or is a part of what is discrete), it follows that that ‘now’ is not an indivisible per se in the genus of quantity, since it is not per se a term.

103. Further, I ask to what genus those ‘existences’ belong. If they are indivisibles of the genus of quantity, then they are sufficient to be the terms of the continuous proper without the ‘now as to substance’, which is unacceptable (the proof of the consequence is that nothing indivisible is per se a term ‘because there is a term of a second indivisible’). But if they belong to another genus, namely of quality - then a quality will be per se the idea of terminating the continuous in the genus of quantity.

104. And further, how would the ‘now as to substance’ not undergo change according to diverse existences? And then one would have to ask about the measure of it and of its changes, and so on ad infinitum.

105. Further, is the ‘now as to substance’ the same in any motion whatever or in a single one precisely?

106. To the Philosopher [n.96] I say that he does not intend the ‘now’ to remain the same in substance, but the opposite follows from what he said; but any ‘single now’, considered in itself, is the same, and this is said to be ‘the same in substance’ - but considered in order to past and future time, since it is the end of the past and the beginning of the future, it is said ‘to be distinguished in being’ [Physics 4.13.222a10-15].

107. And to make this clear, there is the likeness about the movable thing, that it remains the same [n.95]; not indeed the movable thing as it absolutely precedes change (for in that case, the ‘now’ is not the measure of it and it does not belong to time [nn.97-98]), but the movable thing as it is under a change is ‘the same as to substance’ - that is, according to the being of the change considered in itself -, and is ‘different as to being’ -that is, as under the change it is the term of the past and the beginning of the future, and in this respect it is said to be here and to be there. Not indeed actually so, but in one intermediate ‘where’ between the extremes (insofar as this intermediate ‘where’ ends the motion as to the prior ‘where’ and begins the motion as to the later ‘where’) - in this it is said to be here and there, because ‘to change’ is to have something of both extremes; hence the Philosopher in Physics 6.4.234b17-19 maintains that, although something may be in a single intermediate, yet it is ‘other’ according to each extreme.

108. But how will this solve the question of the Philosopher, which he moves in the Physics [n.96], ‘whether the same ‘now’ in substance remains in the whole time or not’?

I say that the Philosopher nowhere expressly solves this other question, about ‘whether time is’, but he does say a few things from which its solution can be collected [Physics 4.10.217b31-18a8] - and so it is in the case of this question: for if any movable thing whatever has sameness precisely as to substance (that is, relative to itself) and difference as to being (that is, in its order to different parts of motion), then things are the same about an instant with respect to the parts of time; and there is not as much sameness to the instant in the whole of time as there is to one instant; therefore the instant in the whole of time is ‘different things’ as to substance.

109. I say then to the objection [n.95], that if any ‘now’ is similarly disposed to the substance of the movable thing as aeviternity is to the substance of an angel, then that ‘now’ is not other than that substance, nor is it an indivisible in the genus of quantity; and if some ‘now’ in the genus of quantity is imagined for measuring the movable thing as to substance, then there is no such thing in an angel actually existing, as was proved before [n.91].

110. But I argue against this [sc. the imagining of a now in the genus of quantity etc., n.109] as follows:

The movable thing can be considered in three ways: either as it exists under the end points of change, or as it exists under the in-between of change, or as it is prior to motion and change (though able to receive them). In the first way there correspond to it diverse ‘nows’ as to being, in the second way there corresponds to it the time between those ‘nows’ - so in the third way there will correspond to it some proper measure, but this measure is only the ‘now as to substance’; therefore etc.

111. I reply.

If time has to differ from motion, and consequently the instant has to differ from change, yet there is not a like reason for positing something different from the existence itself of a uniform angel in order to be measure of it.a For if time differs from motion, the reason for this is that the parts of the same proportion of some motion are not necessarily equal in number and quantity to the parts of the same proportion of time; but no quantity is the same as another quantity unless the parts of the same proportion in it are equal to the parts of the same proportion in the other quantity, and that equal both in number and in magnitude (though, when speaking of the quantity that is in motion, it has this from the part of the magnitude or form by which it is motion). However, parts of a motion, to wit ten parts integrally forming a whole motion, can exist with ten parts of time, and yet they are not the same as the parts of time, because there could exist, along with the same parts of time, a greater number of parts of motion equal in magnitude to the prior parts of the motion, or as many again; for if a double force were to move the same movable thing, and consequently move it twice as quickly, there will be no part in the slower motion that does not exist in the quicker motion (speaking of the parts that the motion has in magnitude, according to the form according to which it is a magnitude), because what moves a movable thing with a quicker motion does not make any parts of the magnitude pass by simultaneously but makes them precisely pass by one after the other; therefore there are as many and as large parts in a quicker motion (speaking of this quantity) as there are in a slower motion. But the same time (possessing the same parts) cannot exist along with the former motion and also with the latter; therefore the parts of time will not be the same as the parts either of the former or of the latter, because the parts of time are not disposed to the whole in the same proportion as, and equal with, those other parts of the whole.

a.a [Interpolation] in the way that is posited on the other side about time and the instant with respect to motion and change as to their measures.

112. If this is true, the conclusion from it is that an indivisible of one quantity is not the indivisible of another quantity, but the conclusion from this conclusion is not that in anything ‘that remains always uniform in being’ one must posit something else different from it, because there the argument about the magnitudes and their parts does not hold. There is then a fallacy of the consequent involved in arguing affirmatively from the lesser thing: ‘if change and motion have measures other than themselves, then the substance too itself - which is prior to motion and change - has a measure other than itself’ [n.110]; for there seems to be less distinction (or lack of sameness) in a permanent thing than in a thing in flux (or in motion) and its measure.Tr. To argue from a distinction between change and its measure to an equal distinction between a permanent thing and its measure is to argue from a less permanent thing to a more permanent one, which is fallacious here because there is no reason to suppose that a more permanent thing should have the same distinctions as a less permanent one; rather it would seem intuitively to have fewer distinctions. ²⁵

113. But if one is pleased to grant some measure to the movable thing insofar as it is in itself prior to motion and change, then that measure will be aeviternity, as will be plain in the question about the measure of the operations of an angel [nn.167, 171-76].

114. And if you look for another measure of it insofar as it is in itself and insofar as it is susceptive of motion and change, I say that it is not other, because the subject insofar as it is in itself is susceptive of its proper accident - and likewise, if there is any measure, it is the same; hence there is not another measure of a surface insofar as it is a surface and insofar as it is susceptive of whiteness and blackness. So I say that if the substance of the first movable (or of any other movable) is measured by aeviternity, there is no other measure of it insofar as it is naturally prior to motion and change and insofar as it is receptive of motion and change.

115. But if you say that insofar as it is at rest it will have a measure other than aeviternity, this is false as will be clear later [nn.167, 171-76].

II. To the Negative Side of the Question

116. As to the second side of the question wherein is asked ‘whether there should be posited in an existing angel something measuring his existence’ [nn.84, 87], I say that ‘to measure’ is to make an unknown quantity certain through a more known quantity; but making certain can be done by a quantity existing in reality or in imagination.

117. In imagination as when a skilled artisan measures by a quantity that he has in his imagination some quantity that is presented to him.

118. But sometimes the measuring can be done by some real quantity, and that in three ways:

Either by an exceeding quantity, and then the intellect is made certain about a lesser quantity through its approach to or departure from a greater quantity. And in this way is a measure imposed on the quiddities of things, and the measure is more perfect than the measured and must be naturally more known than it - the way whiteness is imposed as the measure in the genus of colors and is called the first measure in everything that is in that genus [Metaphysics 10.2.1053b28-34, 54a9-13].

119. In another way the known quantity is lesser and part of the greater quantity (which is less known), and then the lesser quantity measures the larger whole by reduplication of itself. And in this way a lesser motion can, from the nature of the thing, be the measure of a greater motion.

120. In a third way an unknown quantity is measured by some known quantity that is equal to it, and this is done by applying or superimposing it; and because that which, from the nature of the thing, is the measure first should be naturally more known than the thing measured, so in this way one of the equals is not the measure of the other unless it were, from the nature of the thing, more known. And in this way time, if it is a quantity other than motion and more known than it, can be from the nature of the thing the measure of motion.

121. However, for some intellect what is not the measure by the nature of the thing can be a measure; for example, if the length of the arm is known to someone and the length of a piece of cloth unknown, the length of the arm (because it is known) can be for him the measure of the length of the cloth,a although neither length has, from the nature of the thing, greater certitude than the other.

a.a [Interpolation] About the mensuration of one thing by another by a measure more known simply or more known to us, note Averroes Physics 4 comm.112-114 about time, where he shows how time measures motion by a number of it that is more known, and the whole motion by that part.

122. Applying this then to the issue at hand, I say that in the actual existence of an angel there is no need to look for some intrinsic measure different from the nature of the thing itself that is measured, because - as was already proved [n.91] - nothing is there really other than the nature of the measured thing; but a measure is, from the nature of the thing, other than the thing measured, and plainly, if some measure were posited in an angel, it would not be posited in him save in the third way (for it neither exceeds nor is exceeded but is equal [nn.118-120]). And in addition, the existence of an angel does not seem able to be its own measure the way that in other things a quantity more distinctly known can be the measure of itself as to its own confusedly known parts; it is not so with an angel, since his existence is indivisible and cannot contain parts confusedly in itself, since it has no parts.

123. Likewise therefore, there is no need to posit in an existing angel anything to be the measure of actual existence other than his actual existence. And if plurality is not to be posited without necessity, and here there is no necessity, plurality does not seem it should here be posited; but not only is it not necessary to posit anything absolute as measure, it is also not necessary to posit any relation other than relation to the efficient or conserving cause - and that relation is not different from the foundation (from 2 d.1 q.5 nn.260-71).

III. To the Principal Arguments

124. As to the first principal argument [n.85], it is plain that the consequence about time and motion is not valid when making comparison with the existence of an angel (and the reason was stated before, when replying to an argument [nn.110-112]), because an argument that would prove a difference between motion and time [n.111] does not here prove that there exists anything distinct and different from the actual existence of an angel; so neither that there is any measure distinct and different.

125. As to the second [n.86], it is plain that nothing is conceded to be in the actual existence of an angel that may properly be a quantity or an indivisible in the genus of quantity - because his existence seems able to be known by itself without anything else added.

Question Three. Whether there is one Aeviternity for all Aeviternals

126. Third I ask whether there is one aeviternity for all aeviternals.

127. That there is not:

First, because then aeviternity would be in a subject upon whose destruction or change all the other aeviternals would change, which seems unacceptable; and likewise, when the others were destroyed, aeviternity would seem to be changed, because an aeviternity with respect to others would not be there.

128. On the contrary:

There is one time for all temporal things (Physics 4.10.218b4-5), so there is one aeviternity for all aeviternal things.

I. To the Question

A. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

129. Here it is said [by Henry of Ghent] that there are as many aeviternities as there are aeviternal things, such that there is in any aeviternal thing some proper indivisible pertaining to the genus of quantity, and from many such one number can be constituted, as was reported before [n.90].

B. Rejection of the Opinion

130. But this opinion seems to posit plurality without necessity. Therefore it seems one should speak against it as was done in the preceding question [n.123]:

That either aeviternity is said to be the actual existence of the aeviternal angel, and in this way there are as many aeviternities as there are angels.

131. Or it is said to be a thing intrinsic to something actually existent and measuring that existence - and in this way it is nothing, as was proved in the preceding question [n.122].

132. Or aeviternity is said to be something extrinsic, different from the actual existence of the aeviternal thing, which extrinsic thing, from the nature of itself, is however of a nature to measure the actual existence of the very aeviternal thing - and then this can be posited in three ways:

Either that one can deny that any such thing is, from the nature of itself, of a nature to measure the existence of the very aeviternal thing, by positing that all aeviternal things have an existence equally invariable, because, although one existence is more perfect than another and, for this reason, can measure it by that sort of quidditative measuring (the way the Philosopher speaks in Metaphysics 10.2.1054a9-11), yet in the case of a measuring of duration - which is in some way reduced to the genus of quantity - no invariable existence seems to be more invariable than another, because a succession of parts within itself is altogether repugnant to any of them; and then one should say that, since aeviternity is posited as the measure of something insofar as this something endures unvaried, and since the extrinsic measure should, from the nature of the thing, be more known in idea of invariability, and since there is no such difference [sc. in idea of invariability] among existences of aeviternal things, then nothing will be thus an aeviternity.

133. Or one can say in another way that any superior existence is simpler than any inferior existence, and is of a nature, from the nature of the thing, to give certainty about that inferior existence, and to this extent any existence of a superior could be called aeviternity in respect of an inferior; and then there will be as many aeviternities as there are aeviternal things, excepting that there is no aeviternity in the last aeviternal thing since its existence does not measure any other invariable existence; and likewise the existence of the highest angel is only an aeviternity with respect to the other inferior angels, because his invariable existence measures all the others and does not have himself any aeviternity in this way, because he has no other existence above him.

134. Or one can say in a third way that, if aeviternity is not said to be any existence simpler than another and to be of a nature to give certainty about it, but is said to be the simplest existence which, by its own formal idea and in itself, is most certain and is first known and of a nature to give certainty about the others - and in this way one can say that there is only one aeviternity, namely the existence of the first angel with respect to all the other aeviternals.

135. Now whichever of these ways [nn.130-34] is posited, there is not in any aeviternal its own aeviternity [n.129]; nor is there in the last aeviternal any aeviternity

[n.133] - nor is the one in which is the first aeviternity measured by any aeviternity [n.133], because it has nothing such in itself (from the preceding question [nn.122-23]) -nor is aeviternity in any other aeviternal from the nature of it, because any other [sc. being inferior to the first] is less certain.

C. Instance

136. Against this [n.135]:

Because then it would follow - if this is so [sc. if the first angel is not measured by any aeviternity] - that the first motion will not be measured by time, just as the first aeviternal is not measured by aeviternity; for the comparison seems to be similar on this side as on that.

137. The consequent [sc. the first motion is not measured by time] is conceded for this reason, that - according to the rule in Physics 4.12.221a26-b5 - everything that is in time ‘is exceeded by time and is corrupted and wastes away in time’; and thus necessary and impossible things are not in time. Therefore the first motion (which is not corrupted in time nor exceeded by it) is not in time nor measured by time.

D. Response to the Instance

138. But this reason is not valid, because ‘something’s being in time is like something’s being in number’ [Physics 4.4.12.221a17-18], but it is not of the idea of a being existing in number that it be exceeded by number - rather, if the first numbered thing is taken (that is, the adequate one), it is equal to number itself; but it is of the idea of the first numbered thing that a part of it is exceeded by number, because the whole is greater than its part and the whole is equal to the number; therefore part of it is exceeded by number.

139. Therefore I say about an entity in time that, from the fact any such entity is of necessity variable according to its varying being, it must be that in accord with something of itself - namely in accord with some discreteness which it has on the part of time - it is exceeded by time, because it will be disposed differently in a different part of time; and for this reason it is that impossible and necessary things ‘are not in time’ [n.137], because there is no difference of disposition in them so that they could be exceeded by time or be differently disposed. But the first motion, although not in its totality exceeded by time, yet is exceeded by time as to some part of itself, and this suffices for it to be truly said to be measured by time; and it seems unacceptable that time, since it is a uniform measure, should not have some first uniform measured thing.

140. And then to the argument [n.136]:

I deny the consequence [sc. if the first angel is not measured by aeviternity, then the first motion is not measured by time], because the reason is not the same here as there. For if the first motion is measured by time, this is either because motion is posited to be something other than time (because of the reason set down above, from the Physics, n.85), or because, by positing time to be the same as motion, that motion can measure itself (not indeed first, but it measures the whole by the part of it that is known, as the Philosopher says in Physics 4.12.220b32-1a4, “Time measures motion itself by determining some motion that will afterwards measure the whole motion, as a cubit measures length by determining some length that will measure the whole”); but neither reason is found in the issue at hand, because there is not anything in the first aeviternal thing other than its existence, nor is its own very existence an extension, or a quantum, that could measure itself by some known part of itself [n.122].

II. To the Principal Arguments

141. To the first principal argument [n.127] I say that, on the destruction of the first aeviternal, it does not follow that the other ones are changed save as to a certain relation in them (namely that then they will not be measured by the first aeviternal as they were before), and it is not unacceptable to posit such a change in something that before had the relation. Likewise, as to the inference that ‘the first aeviternal will be changed when the others are destroyed’ [n.127], I say that this does not hold, because the first aeviternal before did not have a real relation to the others but only a relation of reason, because it is not a measure dependent on the measured thing but exceeding it; and so, upon the destruction of the others, it will not be changed absolutely or according to any real relation, because there was no real relation to them in it before.

142. As to the argument for the opposite [n.128], one can say that, when speaking of aeviternity as it states something extrinsic different from the measured existence of the angel [n.132], the first opinion alone denies an aeviternity in this way [sc. one aeviternity for all aeviternals], but the second and third concede that there is one aeviternity, although the second does not concede that there is only one [nn.132-34]. And then if you argue that ‘there is only one time for all temporals, therefore there should be only one aeviternity for aeviternals’ [n.128], the consequence is not valid, because not every superior motion has, from the nature of the thing, the idea of measure with respect to an inferior motion, nor does it, from the nature of the thing, have the conditions of a measure the way any superior existence, speaking of the invariable existences of angels, has with respect to an inferior one; and so the reason here and there is not alike, that just as only one time exists there for all temporals so one aeviternity should exist here for all aeviternals.

Question Four. Whether the Operation of an Angel is Measured by Aeviternity

143. Fourth and last as to this matter [n.1] I ask whether the operation of an angel is measured by aeviternity.

144. That it is not:

From the author of On Causes proposition 31, “Between a thing whose substance and action are measured by time and a thing whose substance and action are measured by eternity there is an intermediate thing whose substance is measured by eternity (or aeviternity) and whose action is measured by time;” now an angel is of this sort; therefore etc.

145. Secondly as follows: the Philosopher in Physics 8.7.261b22-24 says that “nothing is generated in order immediately not to be;” therefore every operation of an angel endures for a time and consequently is not precisely in an instant. But if it is in aeviternity (since it is not eternal) it will be precisely in an instant; wherefore etc.

146. To the opposite:

The operation of an angel is not measured by time or by eternity, therefore by aeviternity. The proof of the consequence is that more than one measure is not posited in an interval of being. The antecedent as to eternity is plain; as to time the proof is that an angel could have an operation when the motion of the heaven does not exist; but when the motion of the heaven does not exist there would be no time; therefore etc.

I. To the Question

A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent

1. Exposition of the Opinion

147. Here it is said [by Henry of Ghent] that the intrinsic operation of an angel is measured by discrete time. And it is posited in the following way:

The measure that is of the duration of a thing is a way in which the thing is measured, and it is proportioned to the thing measured (as the measure of a permanent thing is permanent and of a flowing thing is flowing); therefore such a proportion must be found between the thoughts or operations of an angel and the measures of them. Now these thoughts are transient, because an angel does not have always wholly one intellection that is possible for him but many, and these intellections flow and pass by in a certain order, so that one is after another; and yet this happens without connection, so that an angel does not have one thought after another or from another because he is not discursive; it is also without succession, because none of these operations is in a process of being acquired or lost but is, while it is, whole at once and indivisible. So there will correspond to them a measure having indivisible, ordered, transient parts; but such is discrete time; therefore etc.

148. This reason is confirmed by Augustine Literal Commentary on Genesis 8.22 n.43, where he maintains that ‘God moves the spiritual creature in time’.

149. But if it be asked what this ‘discrete time’ is - the response is that it is a ‘true quantity’, distinct in species from number and speaking; for the parts of number indeed are permanent (so that if they are not permanent this is incidental), but a part of speaking is necessarily not permanent and yet is not continuous with another part. Therefore ‘discrete time’ agrees with speaking in that its parts are not permanent, but differs from speaking in that any part of vowelled speaking is continuous with vowelled speaking and of consonantal with consonantal (and this can be in our time truly and be measured by some part of time), although it is not continuous with another part of speaking; but no thought of an angel can in itself be measured by time (because it is indivisible), nor can it be continuous with another thought.

150. But if it be asked why this ‘discrete quantity’ is not put by Aristotle among the species of quantity, the response is that he posited the intelligences to be certain gods [Metaphysics 12.8.1073a14-b1, 1074a38-b13], and for this reason he did not posit any measure corresponding to such operation of them that was whole at once.

151. And if it be asked how this ‘discrete time’ relates to our time, the answer is that the ‘now’ of discrete time necessarily coexists with some part of our time and consequently with all the parts that exist along with that instant; for if an angel has some thought first along with this instant of ours, he does not at once have another thought in a next instant but he has the previous one in the time following, and in the last instant of the time following he can have another thought in continuity with our time.

152. And in addition, this instant does not have any proportion to our instant, because the same ‘now’ of that discrete time can coexist with any amount of our time, whether a greater or a lesser, according as the angel can continue the same indivisible intellection with a greater or lesser part of our time, without any other new intellection.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

153. Against the conclusion of this position [n.147] I argue as follows:

Things that have a uniform mode of lasting have, while they last, a measure in their duration of the same idea, even though one lasts longer than another; but the thinking of an angel has, while it lasts, the same mode of lasting as the existence of an angel, although it does not have as long a duration as the angel’s existence has; therefore it has a measure of the same idea as the existence does, and so the angel’s thinking is measured by aeviternity and not by time.a

a.a [Interpolated note] In the Reportatio, “The major is plain, both because the subject includes the predicate and because, if a single intellection of an angel were to remain sempiternally like his existence, it would have a measure uniformly; but sempiternal existence is not incidental to the measure, because, if one suppose that the angel will be annihilated tomorrow, his existence now would no less be measured by aeviternity.”

154. The proof of the minor is that to the formal idea of the existence of an angel - whether uniform or not - there corresponds, in their view [sc. the supporters of this opinion, n.147], a proper idea of measure, because they distinguish and speak ofa three modes of measure for things; and in this way both major and minor are plain. Hence their view maintains that the middle measure corresponds to what has an indivisible duration and is yet defectible (such that of itself it can cease to be), and it posits the measure to be aeviternity. But, just as the existence of an angel is indivisible and yet defectible, so also now, in their view, is the angel’s thinking.

a.a [Interpolated note] In the Reportatio [IIA d.2 q.1], “This doctor [Henry of Ghent] elsewhere says that there are three existences and three measures; existence that is simply independent and invariable, and it is measured by eternity, variable and dependent existence measured by time, invariable and dependent existence measured by aeviternity.”

155. If it be said that an angel’s thinking will not always be but that his existence will always be, and so things are not alike as to his existence and his thinking - this argument does not seem valid, because even if the angel is to be annihilated yet not for this reason would he, while he lasts, not be measured by aeviternity.

156. If it be said that it is in the angel’s power to have or not have the thinking, but not in his power to have or not have his actual existence - this argument does not seem valid, because just as potentiality for being about not to be at some point does not vary the measure of an angel’s existence while he lasts, so will the cause much more by which this potentiality can be reduced to act - namely a created or uncreated cause - not vary the formal idea of his existence or his duration in existing.

157. Further, second and principally, everyone concedes that the beatific act of an angel is measured by aeviternity, as is plain from Augustine [Fulgentius] On the Faith to Peter ch.3 n.20. But that act necessarily includes or presupposes a natural act, and this by positing the angel has some perfection in his beatific act, although he not have power in himself for the total perfection of the beatific act; but it is impossible for an aeviternal thing to include or presuppose something posterior to aeviternity, which would, namely, be measured by a measure posterior to aeviternity; therefore the natural act, which is included in the beatific act, cannot be temporal.

158. Against the way of positing this opinion [n.47]:

For it seems to concede a large quantity of times without necessity; for it has as consequence that any angel possesses his own discrete time, because one angel can continue his thinking along with our day and another continue his thinking along with half our day and a third do so along with an hour of our day - and so one angel will have twenty four instants while another will have a single instant; nay, the opinion has as consequence that in any angel there will be two discrete times, because any angel will be able to continue his thinking while not continuing his volition - and so he will have two instants of intellection and yet one instant of volition.

159. Further, according to this opinion the aeviternal durations in diverse aeviternities will, if the actual existences of aeviternal things are of a different idea, also be of different ideas - and in angels of diverse species the opinion posits aeviternal durations of diverse species; so likewise there will be ‘nows of discrete time’ of different species for intellections of different species.

160. From this I argue as follows: no single quantity is composed of several parts of altogether different ideas, because although sixes can be composed of twos and threes etc. (which however the Philosopher denies, Metaphysics 5.15.1020b7-8, because ‘six things are only once six’, and Avicenna also denies it, Metaphysics 3.5, f 80va), yet no quantity ‘composed however much of parts of distinct ideas’ can be the same quantity, because then six could come from tens and twos and from any number whatever; but during the length of a day of ours an angel could understand distinctly any natural intelligibles whatever, as stone, wood, iron, water, and understand anything else at all after anything else at all - and then his time would be composed of diverse instants and instants of diverse species, corresponding to the intelligibles of diverse species.a He would also be able not to think or understand these but instead to think or understand many more (or as many) other species, and consequently his time could then be composed of others parts, and parts positively disposed in determinate nature to time; therefore it seems etc. [sc. as above: that ‘his time would be composed of diverse instants and instants of diverse species, corresponding to the intelligibles of diverse species’].

a.a [Interpolated note] In the Reportatio [IIA d.2 q.1], “For number is not composed of numbers but of unities, because ‘once six’ etc. Let it however be so, certainly no number can be composed of parts altogether of another idea, however much; but an angel’s intellection of one object and of another is of another idea in its proper genus, because intellection is specified by its object; therefore the times that do the measuring will be diverse and of a different idea.”

161. Further, positing that ‘one now of angelic time necessarily coexists with several instants of our time’ [n.151] seems to be a subterfuge, and to be posited in order not to concede that our time is discrete; and if instants of the former time coexisted precisely with instants of our time, then it would follow that, as the former time is discrete, so our time would be discrete - and by avoiding this result the statement that one instant of the former time must coexist with many parts of our time seems to be posited without reason.

162. But that this is not necessary is proved as follows, because whatever intelligibles I can understand within a certain time (few intelligibles or many), an angel can understand distinctly in the same time, because in a created intellect - which cannot understand everything all at once - it seems a mark of perfection to be able to understand many things without interval, for this is something present more in those more talented; but the human intellect can have an intellection in some one instant and immediately afterwards have another intellection - and in this way it can have many intellections within some given time; therefore there is no necessity that the intellect of an angel should, if it understand a along with an instant of our time, abide in understanding the a for any time and any instants of our time in which my intellect could be having another intellection.

163. But if it be said that my intellect cannot after one instant immediately understand by another intellection but must remain for a time in that thought, otherwise one could not give a first instant for the subsequent thought - if it be posited that ‘the other intellection’ is indifferently measured by time and the instant, the argument would not be conclusive; for then, just as there is no intermediate between instant and time, so neither is there between an intellection of mine that is in an instant and that intellection which is in the immediately possessed time - and then one cannot give a first instant for the second intellection. But if an angel’s intellection is measured by aeviternity (as will be said later [n.167]), then some intellection too of his can be with one instant and some intellection can be with possessed time (and the second has a first instant of its being just as does the first, because the second has an indivisible measure just as also does the first), but yet nothing first in our time coexists with the second intellection; and the way it is with the intellections of an angel is that, if he understand anything along with our time, there is no need for that intellection to persist through a possessed time; but if he at once has another intellection, it coexists with ‘possessed time’ in the instant when the first intellection existed - and then there will be nothing of our time coexisting with the second intellection.

164. Further, it seems that he [Henry] should say as a consequence of his opinion [n.147] that our intellections are measured by discrete time, because our intellections seem to be whole all at once (according to the Philosopher in Ethics 10.6.1176a30-b6, 7.1177a12-8a8), since they are perfect and transient and disposed in a certain order.

166. And if you say (as Henry seems to say) that our intellections have connection because we understand discursively and an angel does not [n.147] - on the contrary, this does not make per se for continuity or non-continuity of intellection with intellection; for the cognition (or intellection) of a conclusion is not more acquired successively because part is acquired after part, and cognition of a conclusion acquired after cognition of the principle, than if knowledge of the conclusion were had precisely after knowledge of the principle and had without it. Likewise, we can have distinct intellections succeeding each other non-discursively; and if the intellections are whole all at once, then they will be non-continuous and in a discrete time - which is against the Philosopher On Memory and Recollection 1.450a7-9, because we understand along with the continuous and with time.

166. Further, as to what is said about the difference of number and of speaking and of a time of this sort [n.149], that ‘the parts of number last and the parts of speaking can be continuous in themselves, but the parts of angelic time neither last nor are continuous in themselves, nor can they be,’ then all these differences seem to be material and not to give a formal distinction to discrete quantity insofar as it is discrete; for they are incidental to the idea of a thing having parts not conjoined to a common term, whether the parts last all at once or are in flux, whether any of them is in itself indivisible or not.a

a.a [Interpolated note] In the Reportatio [IIA d.2 q.1], “To persist or not to persist makes nothing for discrete quantity or continuous quantity, but being conjoined to a common term or not does; and so for no reason in the world should one posit that time is composed of such discrete parts.”

B. Scotus’ own Solution

167. I concede the conclusion of the first two reasons [nn.153, 157], namely that the intellections of an angel are measured by aeviternity - and, in short, so is any actual and invariable existence, that is, an existence to which it is repugnant that there should be in accord with it variation or flux or acquisition of part after part; nor does the lastingness of any of them or the corruption or annihilation or any of them vary the measure formally, provided the existence is of the same idea while it lasts.

C. Instances against Scotus’ own Solution

168. But there is against this that it then seems everything permanent would be measured by aeviternity; for nothing is permanent whose existence does not stay the same while it lasts, and this without succession properly speaking, which is acquisition or loss of part after part.

169. The consequent seems unacceptable, for two reasons:

First, because according to the Philosopher Physics 4.12.221b7-9 rest is measured by time; therefore things where motion is of a nature to be are, when not in motion, measured by time as if they were in motion.

170. Second, because the generation and corruption of all generable and corruptible things are measured by an instant of time; but that which has its first being measured by the ‘now’ of time has its possessed being measured by time; therefore the possessed being of all generable things is, after generation, measured by time.

D. Response to the Instances

1. To the First Instance

171. To the first of these [n.169] I say that the following five things are disposed in beings by a certain order:

Flux of form, form according to which there is actual flux, and form according to which there can be flux of parts; and fourth a permanent thing, in which a flux of parts is not of a nature to be present, yet has a subsequent form in which flux is of a nature to be; fifth, that in which there cannot be flux, nor in anything that naturally follows on it.

172. The first is essentially measured by time, because permanence (or some part of the thing remaining the same) is against its formal idea, but its idea requires that a part of it succeeds to a part of it; the fifth remains invariably the same while it lasts and is therefore in no way measured by time (neither as to its totality nor as to a part of it nor even per accidens); the fourth is not measured by time per se, nor is there properly rest in it, because it is not of a nature to be moved (it rests however per accidens, because rest accords with some form necessarily following on it); the third and second are the same form but as taken according to diverse dispositions - and according as the form is taken in one way there is actually rest, and according as it is taken in another way there is actually motion.

173. About this form [sc. of the second and third in the list] one can say that although it does not have actually varied being (because then there would not be rest according to it), yet it does have variable being - and therefore it is never measured by aeviternity (even though it is not actually varied), because aeviternity requires in what it measures an invariable being that is repugnant to succession of part after part; but if it be said that ‘non-varied being’ is measured by aeviternity, then one can concede that this form - when there is no motion actually in accord with it - is measured by aeviternity.

174. However this last point seems less probable than the one before it, because when the form is actually existing it seems to have the ‘now’ (instant) of time for measure and not the ‘now’ of aeviternity - which however one should posit when positing that, insofar as it is actually under motion, it is measured by the ‘now’ of time and that, insofar as it is actually in rest, it is measured by the ‘now’ of aeviternity.

175. So when the inference is drawn that ‘everything permanent is measured by the now of aeviternity or by aeviternity’ [n.168], this plainly does not follow (as to one way [sc. the first given in n.173]), but it follows only as to things that are truly permanent, namely invariable while they last.

176. And then the first rejection of the consequent, about rest [n.169], is not valid, because rest is not in accord with any such form but in accord precisely with a form in accord with which there is naturally motion.

177. But if someone wants to concede that heat, insofar as it has ‘non-varied being’ is measured by aeviternity [n.173], one can say that its resting is not measured by aeviternity and yet its permanent being is measured by aeviternity, because rest is only a privation of some succession of part after part, according to what the Philosopher maintains in Physics 5.6.229b24-25, where he treats of the opposition of motion and rest, that ‘rest is privation of motion’ - and elsewhere [Physics 5.2.226b15-16, 8.8.264a27-28]; but this privation presupposes the actual existence of the form in which the privation is, such that the privation is not the first reason for the actual existence. So although this privation is measured in this way by time, yet the inference does not, for this reason, hold, that the existence of such a form is measured by time, but rather that it is so by some prior measure.

178. And if you say ‘how can this privation, as it is distinguished from actual existence, be measured by time?’, I say that just as a vacuum, if it existed, would be measured by the same magnitude as the corresponding plenum would be measured by

(for if this house were a vacuum, there would be a greater distance from me to one wall than to another, just as there would by nature be a greater plenum between me and the one wall than between me and the other wall; for then the vacuum would be said to be as much as the body - were there no vacuum - would be that was cut off by the vacuum, and as much as the plenum would by nature be [n.218]), so in the issue at hand there is as much privation of succession in the parts of the form as there is naturally succession by motion in the same form; for this is the measuring of rest, not positively but privatively, by the motion that could then be present when the privation is present (just as in other things the privation is measured by its non-privation; for blindness is as great an evil in an eye naturally apt for seeing, at a determinate time, as vision is a good). In this way, although Aristotle say that rest is measured per accidens [n.169], it can be said (in this way) that it is measured per se, in the way, that is, in which privation is measured per se -because this belongs to privation per se, because it belongs to it as it is such a nature; but the fact that it is this much or that much belongs to it as it is of this or that much positively.

179. Although, then, it be conceded that heat in its being at rest (or the resting of heat) is measured by time, yet it need not be that ‘the actual existence’ of heat be measured by a time that naturally precedes this idea of rest; for the actual existence does not in itself have a relation to time (as time is time), whether an actual or an aptitudinal relation.

180. If however it be conceded - according to the other way [sc. the first, n.173] -that every such form, while it lasts, has variable existence, and that not only a varied but also a variable existence is measured by time - then one must well posit that some permanence is not measured by aeviternity, namely the permanence according to the forms of things where there can be motion; yet one must well concede that generable and corruptible substances are per se measured by aeviternity, though they are per accidens -that is, according to some natural quality consequent to them - measured by time.

2. To the Second Instance

181. And then to the second instance [sc. the first, n.173], which is about things producible and corruptible:

Taking the change of these substance according as the Philosopher speaks of it [Physics 6.5.236a5-7], that is, as indivisible, change is either of such sort or is an indivisible necessarily concomitant to the indivisible that is the term of the motion - such that ‘to change’ is to be differently disposed now than before, and ‘to be differently disposed’ is taken for an indisivible but ‘before’ is taken for a divisible. The first being of the form, then, per se terminating the flux is per se measured by the first instant, and the change is properly toward it - but toward the first being of the form not per se terminating the flux there is not change properly and first but, as it were, secondarily, insofar as the first being is concomitant to change properly said.

182. I concede therefore that the first being of a generable substance, insofar as it is concomitant to change properly so called, is measured by an instant; but the further consequence does not hold that ‘therefore the being had after that instant is measured by time’ [n.170], because, in the first instant, the being is compared to a particular generating cause, and after that instant it does not have dependence on that particular cause but only on the first conserving cause; and then it has a uniform relation to the conserving cause - just like the being of an angel, which is conserved in perfect sameness without variability.

183. And from this is plain the answer to a certain argument that could be made about succession in aeviternity: the argument is that ‘if there is succession then there is newness, and consequently change’ [nn.33, 37]; and further, ‘change is measured by an instant of time, therefore an aeviternal thing is temporal’ [n.37], because whatever is measured by time or an instant of time is temporal.

I reply that not every form according to which there is newness is measured by time, but only the form according to which the changeable thing had a different disposition successively to the disposition it would now indivisibly have - that is, there is presupposed to the term ‘to which’, possessed divisibly, the term ‘from which’, possessed indivisibly in the term, and this term is either the one according to which the motion was measured by time or the one which was necessarily concomitant to the motion measured by time.

184. Hereby it is also plain that God could create something without any time -given also that creation (or annihilation) was said to be change according as there is a succession in it of the form after negation of the form [d.1 n.294] - because there is no change in the way in which the Philosopher speaks of change [n.181], for there is nothing indivisible that is necessarily the term of the flux in its opposite, either as the opposite is what flows first or as it is necessarily concomitant to the motion measured by time.

II. To the Principal Arguments

185. To the first principal argument [n.144] I say that the doctrine in On Causes accords with the erroneous doctrine of Avicenna [Metaphysics 8 chs.6-7, 9 chs.1-4 f99vb-105rb], as if the author of On Causes understood the intelligences to be gods and their operations to be measured by the ‘now’ of time; not indeed their intrinsic operation (because for this he posited neither potentiality nor succession), but their extrinsic operation - as to bodies - which operation he understood to exist truly in the moment of time. And therefore this authority [sc. of On Causes] is not to be held for an authority because it is delivered according to an error at its root [sc. that God cannot immediately cause anything save the first intelligence alone].

186. To the second [n.145] one can concede that the intellection of an angel is not instantaneous but endures along with some part of our time, and yet not for this reason does it follow that the intellection is in time; for what exists in aeviternity can endure along with our time. Or one can say that some intellection could be in an angel precisely with an instant of our time, and after that instant the angel can have another intellection immediately.

187. And when you say ‘nature produces nothing in order for it immediately not to be’ [n.145] - it is true that nature does not intend that what it produces ‘immediately not be’. Nor either does nature produce anything by generation without there being between generation and generation - which are in instants of continuous time - some intervening time; and therefore generation and corruption cannot be perpetually continuous with each other, according to Aristotle’s intention in that place [n.145]. However there is nothing unacceptable in something’s being in continuous time and immediately not being, as is plain about change and an instant, which only have instantaneous being and at once are not.

III. To the Authority of Augustine adduced for the Opinion of Henry

188. To the remark of Augustine (n.148, ‘God moves the spiritual creature in time’) adduced for the first opinion [sc. Henry’s], one can say that Augustine takes time there for everything that can have being after non-being (as the authorities above were expounded in the first question about aeviternity [n.79]), and in this way anything at all that is other than God is temporal. And so what has one thing succeeding to another (as being after non-being) can be said to be ‘moved in time’, even though what succeeds - or what it succeeds to - is not properly temporal, because ‘non-being’ or ‘nothing’ has no measure. So should one speak in the issue at hand.