a. Exposition of the Opinion

148. Here it is maintained [by Godfrey of Fontaines] that the specific nature is of itself a ‘this’, and yet it can, through quantity, be the nature common to several singulars, or quantity can be the reason that several singulars can exist in the nature.Godfrey, Quodlibet 7 q.5: “For just as the universal that is genus cannot be divided into several things differing in species save by the addition of something pertaining to the idea of the species...so too it seems that the universal that is species cannot be divided into several individuals unless each individual adds something over and above the idea of the species, which idea of the species - as concerns itself - is one in all individuals. But it does not seem that something can be understood to be added that pertains to the essence and nature of the individual, because the species, which is the whole being of individuals, states the whole of that essence; therefore if something is added, it seems to be something pertaining to accidental nature. For in direct descent under a category, the division stops at the most specific species, in that this species includes the ultimate difference below which one cannot take a more determinate difference whereby the species could be made more determinate in the individual (the way this happens in a species in respect of a genus), unless there is to be a regress to infinity; and so, as Plato says [Politicus Latinus I 596], one must rest at singulars -namely in this way, that one is not to posit in singulars something formal pertaining to essence or quiddity beyond what is included in the idea and quiddity of the species. Therefore, if anything is added whereby a nature universal in itself is to be thus determined and contracted, it must be something pertaining to accidental nature [sc. to the nature of quantity], as was said.” Ibid.: “But since material substance is in itself not divided into several things of the same idea or species.therefore, just as it is a ‘how much’ that comes per accidens, so it is divided per accidens into several things of the same idea, namely divided through quantity. Now that seems to be properly called one ‘according to number’ which is one in number or one by number; but number is properly caused by division according to quantity; therefore that seems to be properly called ‘one in number’ which is undivided first in that nature by which it is distinguished first from another of the same species; but this nature is quantity, and so a ‘one in number’ seems properly to be something undivided in the nature of quantity. Therefore, quantity is the per se principle of a one according to number, just as form.is the principle of individuation; and thus, properly speaking, there is not the same principle for per se individuation in the genus of material substance and for a one according to number, because the principle of a one according to number is quantity, in that according to quantity it is undivided in itself and divided from another of the same idea.; but the principle of per se individuation is the form, by which substance is divided into several things of the same idea. And accordingly it seems one should say that the formal principle (or the formal idea) of this sort of distinction.is each individual’s substantial form undivided in itself and divided from another, and thus do they differ in substantial number. The principle.of ‘distinction according substance’ of several individuals is quantity, since it is the principle of division both of the matter and also of the form in divided matter; for if there were not pre-understood in matter a quantity that would make the matter divisible, the matter could not receive several forms. Hence, because of this, there are several entities according as there are quanta, or according to division of quantity.; for, by the fact that quantity makes the substance to be really extended, it happens that the substance...also has parts really and essentially differing from each other.” ⁵⁹

149. The first point [sc. specific nature is of itself a ‘this’] is made clear thus: the most specific species is of itself an atomic unit; therefore it is indivisible.

150. And there is confirmation from the remark of Porphyry [Book of Predicables ch.2 2b14-16], “When we descend from the most general to the most specific, Plato [Politicus Latinus I 596] bids us come to a rest;” but if it were possible for there to be a further division of this nature, one should not rest at the nature; therefore etc.

151. Likewise Boethius in his book Of Divisions, when he is enumerating all the divisions not only per se but also per accidens, does not enumerate a division of the species into individuals; therefore the specific nature is a not a ‘this’ through something else.

152. Again, if there were some reality in an individual beside the sole reality of the specific nature, the species would not state ‘the whole being of individuals’ - which is against Porphyry [Predicables ch.2 3a5-9].

153. The second point [n.148] is made clear by the fact that quantity, although it is not the formal idea of the division of anything into subjective parts, yet, when a quantitative whole is divided into quantitative parts, it is divided per se into things that are of the same idea; now the principle of a division into something is the same as the principle of distinction of the very dividers; therefore, just as quantity itself is the principle of the division, so it is the principle of the distinction of the dividers. But these dividers are the subjective parts of the common nature; therefore quantity is the principle of the distinction of such parts.

154. Now how these two points [n.148] can stand together can be made plain through an example, because, according to the Philosopher Physics 1.2.185a32-b5, ‘substance is of itself indivisible into parts’, speaking of parts of the same idea - and yet, when quantity is added, substance is divisible into such parts, indeed it then has such parts. In this way, then, can a nature of a species be of itself a ‘this’ and yet, though a nature coming to it from without, be this here and this there.