The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus :: Ordinatio. Book 4. Distinctions 14

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Ordinatio. Book 4. Distinctions 14 - 42.

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book four. distinctions 14 - 42

fourteenth distinction

question one. whether penitence is necessarily required for deletion of mortal sin committed after baptism

I. to the question

a. what remains in a sinner after sin has been committed

1. preliminaries

2. opinion of others

a. statement of the opinion

b. rejection of the opinion

3. scotus’ own opinion

b. what remains in the sinner after sin can be deleted by some punishment

C. about voluntary penalty or punishment

1. about the thing of such punishment or penitence

a. the penalty or punishment should be voluntary

b. about the ways in which a penalty can be voluntary

2. about the name of the aforesaid penitence

a. about the word ‘penitence’ equivocally taken

b. about the word ‘penitence’ taken univocally or properly

D. solution of the question

II. to the initial arguments

question two. whether the act of penitence required for deletion of mortal sin is an act of some virtue

I. to the question

a. about ‘to be penitent’ as an act of virtue

1. according to the first signification, which is ‘to avenge sin’

2. according to the remaining three significations, which are: to detest sin, to accept penalty gladly, to suffer penalty patiently

b. whether being penitent as an act of virtue is required for deletion of sin

1. for deletion of sin ‘to be penitent’ is not required as an act of any determinate virtue

2. for the deletion of sin an act as it is first generative of virtue can suffice

3. whether for deletion of sin is required a human act that is unformed or formed

II. to the initial arguments

question three. whether penitence as virtue is inflictive of a single penalty only

I. to the question

II. to the initial arguments

question four. whether guilt is deleted by the sacrament of penitence

I. to the question

a. about the idea of the name ‘sacrament of penitence’

b. something is contained under the idea of the aforesaid name

1. it is possible for something to be contained under the idea of the name

2. it is fitting for something to be contained under the idea of the name

3. something is really contained under the idea of the name

C. solution of the question

II. to the initial arguments

fifteenth distinction

question one. whether to every mortal actual sin there correspond a proper satisfaction

I. to the question

a. about satisfaction taken generally

1. about the idea of the name ‘satisfaction’ taken generally

2. whether this sort of satisfaction for guilt is possible for man

a. anselm’s solution

b. what should be said of anselm’s solution

c. scotus’ own solution

3. what satisfaction consists in

4. solution of the question

5. about the separation of satisfaction from satisfaction taken universally

b. about satisfaction taken properly and strictly

1. about the idea of the name ‘satisfaction’ taken strictly

2. what such satisfaction consists in

3. whether to every sin there correspond its proper satisfaction

4. whether one proper satisfaction is separable from another

a. opinion of others and its refutation

b. scotus’ own response

II. to the initial arguments of both parts

question two. whether anyone who has unjustly taken away or retains another’s property is bound to restore it such that he cannot be truly penitent without such restitution

I. to the question

a. whence it is that there is distinct ownership of things

b. how ownerships, distinct at the beginning, are justly transferred

5. two other conclusions or rules

6. two final conclusions or conditions

C. what unjust taking of another’s things is, or what causing loss to another in matters temporal is

D. how the holder of another’s property is obligated to restitution

II. to the initial arguments

question three. whether he who causes a loss to another in the goods of his person, as body or soul, is bound to make restitution so he can be truly penitent

I. to the question

a. about losses inflicted

1. about losses in goods of the soul

2. about losses in goods of the body

b. about the goods to be restored

1. what could be established by statute

2. what has been established by statute

II. to the initial arguments

question four. whether he who causes someone a loss in the good of reputation is bound so to make restitution that he cannot be truly penitent unless he restore his reputation

I. to the question

a. defaming by charge of a false crime

b. defaming by public revelation of a true but hidden crime

C. defaming by denial of a true but hidden crime publicly charged

II. to the initial arguments

sixteenth distinction

question one. whether these three, contrition, confession, and satisfaction, are the parts of penitence

I. to the question

a. about the many ways of taking the term ‘to be penitent’

b. about these ways of taking the term with respect to penitence as virtue

C. about these ways of taking the term with respect to penitence as sacrament

II. to the initial arguments

question two. whether remission or expulsion of guilt and infusion of grace are one simple change

I. to the question

a. a possible solution

1. first conclusion

2. the second conclusion

b. weighing of the aforesaid possible solution

C. scotus’ own response

1. about a created will

2. about the divine will

3. objections and their solution

II. to the initial arguments of the first side

III. to the reasons adduced for the first conclusion

IV. to the initial arguments for the other side

seventeenth distinction

single question. whether for salvation a sinner needs to confess all his sins to a priest

I. to the question

a. by what precept a christian is bound to make confession to a priest of sin he has committed

1. about natural right and divine or ecclesiastical positive right

2. application to the issue at hand of what has been said

a. in the time of the law of nature and of the mosaic law

b. in the time of the gospel law after lateran council IV

c. in the time of the gospel law before lateran council IV

3. the more reasonable conclusion is to be held

a. solution of others and the weighing of it

b. scotus’ own solution

b. what the precept about confession includes

C. what has been articulated further about the precept of confession by precept of the church

II. to the initial arguments

eighteenth and nineteenth distinctions

question one. whether the power of the keys extends only to temporal penalty

question two. whether the keys of the kingdom of heaven are conferred on every priest in the reception of orders

I. to the second question

a. solution of the question

1. about a priest’s first key

2. about a priest’s second key

3. about the distinction between the aforesaid keys

4. about the double power of the priest in the use of the aforesaid keys

5. about the use of the two keys of the church in the external forum

b. to the initial arguments

II. to the first question

a. solution of the question

1. two conclusions of others

2. refutation of the conclusions

a. against the first conclusion

b. against the second conclusion

3. scotus’ own response

b. to the initial arguments of the first part

C. to the initial arguments for the opposite

twentieth distinction

single question. whether penitence in extremities avails for salvation

I. to the question

a. two conclusions

b. proof of the conclusions

1. proof of the first conclusion

2. proof of the second conclusion

C. two corollaries

II. to the initial arguments

twenty first distinction

question one. whether after this life any sin can be dismissed

I. to the question

a. about the penalty due for sin dismissed in this life the conclusion is certain

b. about the penalty for sin not here dismissed, and about sin itself not here dismissed

1. about mortal sin

2. about venial sin

a. opinion of others

b. rejection of the opinion

C. two corollaries

II. to the initial arguments

question two. whether a confessor is in every case bound to hide a sin uncovered to him in confession

I. to the question

a. statement of five conclusions

b. proof of the conclusions

1. about the first conclusion

a. proof of the first conclusion by others

b. refutation of the aforesaid proof

c. scotus’ own reasons for the first conclusion

2. about the second conclusion

3. about the third conclusion

4. about the fourth conclusion

5. about the fifth conclusion

II. to the initial arguments

twenty second distinction

single question. whether sins dismissed through penitence return the same in number in the recidivist who backslides

I. to the question

a. whether it be possible by the absolute power of god for the same sin in number to return

1. opinion of others

2. rejection of the opinion

3. scotus’ own response

b. whether by the ordained power of god the same sin in number could in any way return

1. response

2. objection and its solution

3. objection to the last statement and its solution

4. a further objection and its solution

5. two corollaries

C. how in fact the same sin in number can be said to return in the recidivist

1. response

2. objections and their solution

3. a first doubt and its solution

4. a second doubt and is solution

II. to the initial arguments

twenty third distinction

single question. whether extreme unction is a sacrament of the new law

I. to the question

a. about the possibility, fittingness, and reality of this sacrament

b. about extreme unction and its total idea

II. to the initial arguments

twenty fourth distinction

single question. whether there are seven orders in the church in the way in which order or ordination is posited to be a sacrament

I. to the question

a. what an order is according as we are now speaking of order

1. opinion of others

a. statement of the opinion

b. rejection of the opinion

2. scotus’ own opinion

a. about order taken generally

b. about order taken specifically

b. how many orders there are in the church in the way that order or ordination is posited to be a sacrament

1. first position of others, understood in two ways

2. another position of others

3. scotus’ own position

C. whether order is a sacrament

D. how the sacrament of order is one

II. to the initial arguments

twenty fifth distinction

question one. whether canonical penalty impedes reception and conferring of orders

I. to the question

a. about canonical penalties

1. about canonical penalty as it is here understood

2. about the six canonical penalties

a. about the first penalty or about deposition

b. about the second penalty or about infamy

c. about the third penalty or about irregularity

d. about the fourth penalty or about excommunication

e. about the fifth penalty or about interdict

f. about the sixth penalty or about suspension

b. how canonical penalties exclude from conferring or receiving orders

II. to the initial arguments

a. to the arguments of the first part

b. to the arguments for the opposite

question two. whether female sex or childhood impede the reception of orders

I. to the question

II. to the initial arguments

twenty sixth distinction

single question. whether matrimony was established immediately by god

I. to the question

a. things worthy of note that need to be set down first

1. five main conclusions

2. proof of the main conclusions

a. double proof of the first main conclusion

b. proof of the second main conclusion

c. proof of the third main conclusion

d. proof of the fourth main conclusion

e. proof of the fifth main conclusion

b. the application of the aforesaid to the question

twenty seventh distinction

question one. whether matrimony is suitably defined as ‘the marital union of man and woman retaining, between legitimate persons, an indissoluble life’

I. to the question

II. to the initial arguments

question two. whether consent expressed in words is the efficient cause of matrimony

I. to the question

II. to the initial arguments

twenty eighth distinction

single question. whether consent alone, expressed in words about the present, is cause of matrimony

I. to the question

twenty ninth distinction

single question. whether coerced consent in one or both of the contracting parties suffice for contracting true matrimony

I. to the question

a. opinion of others

1. exposition of the opinion

2. rejection of the opinion

b. scotus’ own response

1. how consent could be coerced

2. whether coerced consent suffice for contract of matrimony

3. some doubts against the aforesaid

4. solution of the doubts

to the initial arguments

thirtieth distinction

question one. whether for contract of matrimony a consent is required that follows a non-erroneous apprehension

I. to the question

a. solution of the question

b. corollary

C. doubts

II. to the initial arguments

question two. whether between mary and joseph there was true matrimony

I. to the question

a. between mary and joseph there was true matrimony

b. how there could have been a true matrimony between mary and joseph

1. opinion of others

2. scotus’ own opinion

II. to the initial arguments

thirty first distinction

single question. whether the goods of matrimony are the three that the master sets down in the text, namely faith, offspring, and sacrament

I. to the question

a. opinion of others

1. exposition of the opinion

2. rejection of the opinion

b. scotus’ own response

II. to the initial arguments

thirty second distinction

single question. whether in matrimony it is simply necessary to render the conjugal debt to the other when asked

I. to the question

a. about the first circumstance excusing the conjugal debt universally taken

b. about the second circumstance excusing the conjugal debt universally taken

II. to the initial arguments

thirty third distinction

overview of questions

question one. whether bigamy was at some time licit

I. to the question

a. what is required on the side of the contracting parties for strict commutative justice in the matrimonial contract

b. what, in the event, suffices for this justice and how it may become sufficient and completely just

II. to the initial arguments for the first side

III. to the argument for the opposite

question two. whether a bigamist before baptism could after baptism be promoted to holy orders

I. to the question

a. what is to be maintained

b. for what cause it must be maintained

1. about the cause of congruity

2. about the cause of necessity

a. opinion of others

b. scotus’ own response

II. to the initial arguments

question three. whether in the mosaic law it was licit to repudiate a wife

I. to the question

a. first opinion

b. second opinion

1. exposition of the opinion

2. weighing of the opinion

C. to the arguments for the first opinion

II. to the initial arguments that are for the first opinion

III. to the initial arguments that are for the second opinion

thirty fourth distinction

single question. whether impotency for the carnal act impede matrimony simply

I. to the question

a. about the conclusion in general

b. about double impotence in particular

II. to the initial arguments

thirty fifth distinction

single question. whether adultery with someone while the first husband is living impedes matrimony with the same person after the death of the husband

I. to the question

II. to the initial arguments

thirty sixth distinction

question one. whether servitude impedes matrimony

I. to the question

a. certain prefatory remarks about impediments to matrimony

b. solution of the question

1. whence servitude was brought in and whether it was justly brought in

2. application to the issue at hand

a. opinion of others and the weighing of it

b. scotus’ own solution

II. to the initial arguments

question two. whether age of childhood can impede matrimony

I. to the question

II. to the initial argument

thirty seventh distinction

single question. whether the sacrament of orders impede matrimony

I. to the question

a. opinion of others explicating the positive certain conclusion

b. scotus’ own opinion

II. to the initial arguments

thirty eighth distinction

single question. whether a vow of continence impedes matrimony

I. to the question

a. on distinctions of vow

b. solution of the question

II. to the initial argument

thirty ninth distinction

question one. whether disparity of cult impede matrimony

I. to the question

a. how an unbeliever can contract marriage

1. the opinion of some and rejection of it

2. doubts and their solution

b. how a believer could contract a marriage with an unbeliever

II. to the initial arguments

fortieth distinction

single question. whether physical kinship impede matrimony

I. to the question

a. descriptions of certain names

b. solution of the question

II. to the initial arguments

forty first distinction

single question. whether affinity impedes matrimony

I. to the question

a. on notion, degrees, and lines of affinity

b. solution of the question

II. to the initial arguments

forty second distinction

single question. whether spiritual kinship impede matrimony

I. about spiritual and legal kinship

II. about impediments that simply impede matrimony

a. about such impediments from the nature of the contract

b. about such impediments by statute of the church

endmatter

footnotes

Ordinatio. Book 4. Distinctions 43 - 49.

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