Question One. Whether ‘Unbegotten’ is Property of the Father Himself
1. About the twenty eighth distinction I ask whether ‘unbegotten’ is property of the Father himself.
That it is not:
No property is formally asserted of the essence, because then it would not distinguish [sc. the persons], just as neither does the essence distinguish, which is not said to be formally begetter or begotten, or inspiriter or inspirited; but the essence, as it seems, is unbegotten; therefore ‘unbegotten’ is not a property of any person. - Also the Holy Spirit, as I will prove, is formally unbegotten; therefore etc.
Proof of the assumption, because the essence is not begotten, therefore it is nonbegotten (the consequence is plain from the Philosopher De Interpretatione 10.2020-21: “On a negative proposition about a finite predicate follows an affirmative about the infinite predicate”), - and further, therefore it is unbegotten (this consequence is proved from Augustine On the Trinity V ch.7 n.8 where he says that ‘unbegotten’ is the same as not-begotten). And the like can be argued about the Holy Spirit: ‘if he is not begotten then he is non-begotten’.
2. Further, every personal property is relative, because whatever is said to itself is common to the three (from ibid. V ch.8 n.9); but unbegotten does not state a relation, as I will prove; therefore etc.
Proof of the minor, because if it does [sc. state a relation], then everything begotten is a related thing. This proposition is true: ‘everything begotten is a related thing’; I convert this by contraposition: ‘therefore every non-related thing is nonbegotten’. Then I argue: every non-begotten is a related thing, every non-related thing is non-begotten, therefore every non-related thing is related. The conclusion is impossible, therefore one of the premises is also impossible; not the one that follows from a true proposition by conversion through contraposition, therefore the other one.
3. Again, if not being able to be born were a property of the Father, then not being able to be inspirited would be a property of the Father and the Son, and so there would be six notions [sc. in divine reality], which is commonly denied.1
4. Further, Ambrose On the Holy Spirit IV [On the Incarnation ch.8 nn.79-80] did not want to use the name ‘unbegotten’, as the Master says in the text [I d.13 ch.4 n.117].
5. The opposite:
Augustine to Orosius [Ps.-Augustine, Dialogue of 65 Questions q.2]: “Sure faith declares that there are not two unbegottens.”