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Annotation Guide:

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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus
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Ordinatio. Book 1. Distinctions 26 to 48.
Book One. Distinctions 26 - 48
Thirty Sixth Distinction
Questions One to Three. Whether the Foundation of an Eternal Relation to God as Knower has truly the Being of Essence from the Fact it is under this Sort of Respect
I. To the Question
B. Scotus’ own Response

B. Scotus’ own Response

26. I concede the conclusion of these reasons [nn.13-18, 25], namely the negative part of the question [n.24].

27. As to which, this result seems specifically to hold, that not only does the being of essence found this sort of relation to God but so also does the being of existence, because according to Augustine On Genesis V ch.18 n.36: “he knows things made no otherwise than he knows things to be made;” he foreknew then the being of existence just as he foreknew the being of essence - and yet not because of this founded relation does someone conclude that the ‘being of existence’ was a true such being, namely true being of existence from eternity; therefore by parity of reason, it should not be conceded of the being of essence.

28. Also all the motives that are adduced about the divine intellect seem able to be adduced about our intellect:

Because if something does not exist, it can be understood by us (and this as to either its essence or its existence), and yet not because of our intellection does one posit that it has true being of essence or of existence; nor is there any difference - as it seems -between the divine intellect and ours in this respect, save that the divine intellect produces those intelligibles in their intelligible being, and ours does not produce them first. But if this being is not of itself such that it requires being simply, then ‘to produce it in such being’ is not to produce it in any being simply; and therefore it seems that if this intelligible being - when comparing it to our intellect - does not require being simply, then when comparing it also to the intellect ‘producing it in this being’ there will not be being simply, because if being white is only qualitative being, then ‘to produce it in being white’ is not to produce in being substance but in that qualitative being.

29. Likewise, our agent intellect produces a thing in intelligible being, although it was produced beforehand - and yet not because of this producing of our agent intellect is the thing ‘so produced’ posited to have being simply.