The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus :: Ordinatio. Book 1. Distinctions 11 to 25. ::

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Ordinatio. Book 1. Distinctions 11 to 25.

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translator's preface

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book one. distinctions 11 - 25

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eleventh distinction

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question 1. whether the holy spirit proceeds from the father and the son

I. to the question

II. to the principal arguments

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question 2. whether, if the holy spirit does not proceed from the son, a real distinction between him and the son could stand.

I. on the question itself

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II. response to the question

a. opinion of others

b. against the opinion

III. to the principal arguments

IV. to the reasons for the opinion of others on the question

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twelfth distinction

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question one. whether the father and the son inspirit the holy spirit insofar as they are altogether one or insofar as they are distinct

I. response to the question

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II. whether the father and the son inspirit more by the will insofar as it is one or insofar as it is concordant.

a. opinion of henry of ghent

b. against the opinion of henry

C. scotus’ own opinion

III. whether the father and the son are one inspiriter or two inspiriters

IV. to the principal arguments

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question two. whether the father and the son uniformly inspirit the holy spirit

I. to the question

II. to the principal arguments

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thirteenth distinction single question

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I. the opinions of others

a. first opinion

b. second opinion

C. third opinion

D. fourth opinion

e. fifth opinion

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f. sixth opinion

1. exposition of the opinion

2. rejection of the opinion

g. seventh opinion

II. scotus’ own opinion

III. to the principal arguments

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fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth distinctions

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single question.

I. opinion of peter lombard

II. to the question

III. to the reasons of peter lombard

IV. how the opinion of lombard might be held

V. to the arguments against the opinion of lombard

VI. to the principal arguments

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seventeenth distinction. first part. on the habit of charity

question one. whether it is necessary to posit a created charity that formally inheres in a nature capable of beatification

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question two. whether it is necessary to posit in a habit the idea of active principle with respect to act

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I. to the second question

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a. five ways of giving a solution are expounded and examined

5. what one should think about the four ways

b. solution of the question by maintaining the third way

C. to the arguments when maintaining the third way

D. to the principal positive arguments while maintaining the fourth way

e. to the arguments for the fifth way

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II. to the first question

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a. the opinion which is attributed to peter lombard

1. arguments for the opinion attributed to peter lombard

2. arguments against the opinion attributed to peter lombard

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b. scotus’ own response

1. whether some supernatural habit needs to be posited that gives grace to a nature capable of being beatified

2. whether a supernatural habit giving it grace has to be posited so that a nature capable of beatification may be beatified

3. about the opinion of peter lombard

C. to the principal arguments

D. to the arguments for the opinion attributed to peter lombard.

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seventeenth distinction. second part. on the manner of increase in charity

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question one. whether the whole of pre-existing charity is corrupted so that no reality the same in number remains in a greater and a lesser charity

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I. opinion of godfrey of fontaines

a. exposition of the opinion

b. rejection of the opinion

II. to the question

III. to the arguments

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question two. whether that which is positive in the preexisting charity, and which remains when there is increase of charity, is the whole essence of the intensified charity

I. opinion of others

II. scotus’ own response to the question

III. to the principal arguments

[eighteenth distinction. about gift and holy spirit as gift lacking in the ordinatio ]

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nineteenth distinction

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question one. whether the divine persons are equal in magnitude

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I. to the question

a. about equality taken properly

b. on equality taken generally

C. how there is equality in the proposed case

D. about equality in the divine persons

II. to the principal arguments

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question two. whether each person is in the other person

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I. to the question

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a. about the mode in which a person is in a person

1. the opinion of henry of ghent

2. scotus’ own opinion

3. to the arguments for the opinion of henry

b. what the idea is of the being in of the divine persons

C. there is no like example in creatures for the being in of the divine persons

II. to the principal arguments

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twentieth distinction

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single question. whether the three persons are equal in power

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I. to the question

a. determination of the question

b. opinion of others

C. scotus’ own opinion

II. to the principal arguments

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twenty first distinction

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single question. whether this proposition is true, ‘only the father is god’

I. to the question

II. to the principal arguments

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twenty second distinction.

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single question. whether god is nameable by us with some name signifying the divine essence in itself, as it is a ‘this’

I. the opinion of others

II. scotus’ own response

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appendix a. twenty second distinction

single question.

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twenty third distinction

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single question. whether person, according as it says something common to the father and the son and the holy spirit, says precisely something of second intention

I. opinion of others

II. scotus’ own response

III. objections against scotus’ own response

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twenty fourth distinction

single question. whether number properly exists in divine reality

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twenty fifth distinction

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single question. whether person in divine reality states substance or relation

I. response to the question

II. the objections of others

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Annotation Guide:

All Collections > The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus > Ordinatio. Book 1. Distinctions 11 to 25. > book one. distinctions 11 - 25 > seventeenth distinction. second part. on the manner of increase in charity > question two. whether that which is positive in the preexisting charity, and which remains when there is increase of charity, is the whole essence of the intensified charity > II. scotus’ own response to the question

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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus

Ordinatio. Book 1. Distinctions 11 to 25.

Book One. Distinctions 11 - 25

Seventeenth Distinction. Second Part. On the Manner of Increase in Charity

Question Two. Whether that which is Positive in the Preexisting Charity, and which remains when there is Increase of Charity, is the whole Essence of the Intensified Charity

II. Scotus’ own Response to the Question

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II. Scotus’ own Response to the Question

249. As to this question [n.235] I concede - especially because of the first three reasons adduced against this opinion [of Godfrey, nn.242-244] - that the positive reality which preexists in the lesser charity is not the whole positive reality which exists in the greater charity. Rather, if there existed a greater and a lesser charity separated from a subject, the greater charity would have in itself the positive reality of the lesser charity and another reality in addition; if per impossibile all relation to a subject were taken away (as with a quantity of bulk, if it were posited as separate from a subject), even if per impossibile it did not have an inclination to a subject, nevertheless one charity would be greater than the other and it would have in itself the whole of the positive reality of the lesser charity and something in addition.

II. Scotus’ own Response to the Question