Question Two. Whether that which is Positive in the Preexisting Charity, and which remains when there is Increase of Charity, is the whole Essence of the Intensified Charity

235. Secondly I aska whether that which is positive in the preexisting charity, and which remains when there is increase of charity, is the whole essence of the intensified charity, such that if an intense charity without a subject were posited, it would have in itself essentially no positive reality other than that which preexisted in the mild charity.

And that the reality of the preexisting charity is in this way the whole essence and reality of the increased charity I prove thus:

Metaphysics 8.3.1043b32-44a11: “forms are like numbers,” - in this respect, that ‘just as any number, when added, changes the number, so any degree in form, when added, changes the species’; therefore nothing can be added to the essence of this sort of form while the species remains the same. But the supposition is being made that the intense form is of the same species as the mild one, and so no degree over and above the reality of the form is there added.

a [Interpolation] The supposition that a prior charity is not corrupted when charity is increased raises a question, because of the other opinion about increase of charity [Rep IA d.17 n.103].

236. Further, in Metaphysics 10.9.1058b1-2 the Philosopher says that “formal differences change the species:” a difference of degrees in the essence of a form, if it existed, would be a formal difference.

237. Further, Porphyry says [The Predicables 3.3a47-48] that a formal difference does not admit of more and less: “The existence,” he says, “of each thing is one and the same, receiving neither increase nor decrease.”

238. Further, the author of the Six Principles [ch.1 n.1] says: “Form consists of a simple and invariable essence.”

239. Further, if any reality is added to a preexisting charity,a then charity when increased will not be in the species, because it will include something that is accidental to the specific nature; or if it is per se in the species,b it does not include anything other than what belongs to the nature of the species - and soc the lesser charity, which does not include that degree, will not be in the species.

a [Interpolation] [if any reality] exists in a charity which arrives de novo, different from what was in the preexisting charity ...

b [Interpolation ] it has whatever is required for the nature of a species, and consequently ...

c [Interpolation] since it has one degree beyond the lesser charity, a degree pertaining per se and precisely to the nature of the species, it follows that...

240. On the contrary:

In that case [sc. if the reality of the preexisting charity were the whole essence of the increased charity, n.235] the charity of any of the blessed would be equal in nature of charity with the charity of Christ; and since according to Augustine On the Trinity VI ch.8 n.9 “in incorporeal things to be better is the same as to be greater,” the charity of any of the blessed would be as good in itself as the charity of Christ and so each one of them would be equally blessed.a

a [Interpolation] [as equally blessed] as Christ, because the essential reward corresponds to the quantity of the charity, which is impossible.

I. Opinion of Others

241. [Exposition of the Opinion] - An opinion that rests on the arguments given for the first part [nn.235-239, the opinion of Godfrey] seems to say that, when one removes the form from a subject, there is not, because of the added reality, a more and a less in the form in itself; and because one must, according to the authorities, preserve there a more and less in some way, one must posit them there according to the existence of the accident in the subject itself (which indeed is to be existent in the subject’s existence), and so a more-ness as to existence is attributed either to a greater disposition of the subject or to a greater removal of the opposite indisposition.

242. [Rejection of the Opinion] - Against this position I argue first as follows: contraries when extreme cannot coexist in the same thing, but they can when in mild degrees.a But this is only because there is something in the intense degree that is not in the mild one; for if the whole reality that is in the mild degree is in the intense one, then there is no repugnance between the mild and intense degree. - But this inability to coexist, or incompossibility, is not a relation to the subject nor is it from any relation to the subject; for the incompossibility of forms in themselves is prior to the incompossibility of forms in some third thing, as in the subject that receives them (for it is because they are incompossible in themselves that they cannot be received in the same subject, - not contrariwise). Therefore that which is the reason for their incompossibility in intense degrees is something in them that is positive in itself and not only in order to a subject.

a [Interpolation] that is, hot and cold when extreme but not when in milder degree (the thing is plain, because when the hot or the movement of the hot or of heat are made mild, the movement of cold is made more intense, and conversely).

243. Further, the same thing cannot be produced twice, and consequently some reality cannot be acquired by some change; therefore the reality that is acquired by movement or change in intensity is not the same in positive being as that which existed before, because then that which was before would be really acquired.a

a [Interpolation] I make this supposition [sc. that the same thing cannot be produced twice]: again I make supposition that a real motion or change is impossible without a real term. From this I argue as follows: in the increase of charity the lesser charity is the term ‘from which’ and the greater charity is the term ‘to which’, and this is a real production; therefore it is, in accord with the second supposition, necessarily toward some real term: not to the reality that altogether preceded, because the same thing cannot be produced twice, and the preceding reality was the term of a different production; therefore to another reality.

244. Further, if the form is indivisible it gives indivisible being to the subject and does so indivisibly; for the subject is not of such a sort in form save because the form is of such a sort; therefore if the form is of such a sort in itself, there is no more-ness of perfection to it, and the subject that accords with it will not be said to be more such in accord with it.a

a [Interpolation] for it is because the form is such that what has it is said to be such in accord with it. Therefore if the form is indivisible in itself, it is impossible that the subject could be more or less in accord with it; for it is contradictory that a ‘form in itself’ be indivisible and yet that the subject be divisible in accord with it.

245. Further, against these modes whereby more and less are posited in forms [n.241]. First against the mode about the disposition [sc. of the subject] to more and less:

For if there is the same disposition - that is, same in idea of being one - to more and less, and if that disposition is the form, the result is that there is more and less in some form.a If then in some form there is a disposition to more and less but not according to the idea of being one disposition, as some want to say becauseb humidity in air is a disposition to greater heat and dryness in fire is a disposition to greater heat,c - against this I argue: one species, taken in its totality, seems to have, in what is susceptible to it, the idea of one disposition.d Further,e then there will not be one motion from an intense to a mild degree, nor conversely; for nothing will be moved to a mild degree save what has a disposition agreeing with the reception of that mild degree; but an intense degree does not have the disposition that agrees with a mild degree; therefore, in order for it to be moved to a mild degree, it must be moved to a disposition agreeing with a mild degree -and thus, in order for the mild degree to come to exist from the intense degree, there must first be a motion from the disposition that is to the intense degree to a disposition that is to the mild degree, and sof there will never be one motion from an intense to a mild degree, because they do not have the same immediate susceptive subject agreeing with each disposition.

a [Interpolation] Again, against their mode [sc. Godfrey’s] of positing more and less in the case of a form, and first against the mode about disposition of the subject, on account of which the form will be said to receive more and less; that disposition either is some form or it is not. If it is a form, and the subject is said to be more or less disposed according to it, the proposed conclusion follows, that in some form there is more and less.

b [Interpolation] If the disposition is not a form according to which the subject is said to be more such but it is some other form, then the subject will be said to be more such according to that form because of some preceding disposition, - and then one must ask about that disposition whether it is some form or not, and so there will either be a process to infinity in dispositions or a more and less in some form in itself must be granted. Again, there must first be a disposed subject before it may be moved to the term of the motion, because nothing is moved to anything save what is disposed to receiving that thing; since therefore in every motion, in the term of it, something is acquired that was not there before at the beginning of the motion, the consequence is that something is acquired in the term of the motion other than the sole idea of disposition. - He says [sc. Godfrey] that more and less are in diverse subjects because of diverse dispositions, not dispositions of the same idea but of contrary idea, just as fire is said to be more hot than air, because...

c [Interpolation] and therefore that more-ness is not in any single disposition.

d [Interpolation] hence all individuals of one disposition of accident have a disposition of one idea just as they also have a form of the same idea; therefore, when everything else is taken away that is not the proper disposition, there can be more and less in individuals of the same species and so an intensity and a mildness in the form of that species without any such contrary or opposite dispositions preceding them in the subjects. Then the question is asked, as before, why something is more disposed now than it was before, as was argued [in interpolations a. and b. just above].

e [Interpolation ] if such opposed dispositions precede, to more and to less...

f [Interpolation] and so, in order for the intense degree to become mild, there must first be a movement from the disposition that is in the intense degree to a disposition agreeing with the mild degree before the mild degree may come to be from the intense degree, and conversely, - which is impossible, because then.

246. The other way, which speaks of disposition or of removal of the contrary indisposing factor [n.241], seems to be refuted by the fact that in angels in the state of innocence there was not a greater or lesser disposition toward charity; therefore all would have received an equal charity, which is not what is maintained.a

a [Interpolation] Again, the good angels did not in meriting have any indisposition, and yet they did not have equal charity; hence this does not follow, that ‘any angel in the same species is equally disposed to grace, therefore any angel has grace equally’.

247. Also a third way - which is held by some people - about ‘the rooting down of the form in the subject’ seems to be refuted by the fact that this rooting down is either some absolute form (and the proposed conclusion is obtained, because in such a form there is a more and a less), or not. If not but there is only a respect, then it seems they cannot have a more and a less save by a more and a less in the foundation, just as absolutes do not agree in respect save in their foundation.

248. Then too a more intense form is not properly saved,a because when a form is less rooted in a subject it can in itself be more intense; just as redness from shame can be more intense than a redness that is a quality able to be received in another.

a [Interpolation] Again, this mode does not save the fact that one form is more intense than another.

II. Scotus’ own Response to the Question

249. As to this question [n.235] I concede - especially because of the first three reasons adduced against this opinion [of Godfrey, nn.242-244] - that the positive reality which preexists in the lesser charity is not the whole positive reality which exists in the greater charity. Rather, if there existed a greater and a lesser charity separated from a subject, the greater charity would have in itself the positive reality of the lesser charity and another reality in addition; if per impossibile all relation to a subject were taken away (as with a quantity of bulk, if it were posited as separate from a subject), even if per impossibile it did not have an inclination to a subject, nevertheless one charity would be greater than the other and it would have in itself the whole of the positive reality of the lesser charity and something in addition.

III. To the Principal Arguments

250. To the arguments for the opposite [nn.235-239].

To the first - about numbers [n.235] - I say that it proceeds from a failure in understanding the Philosopher. The Philosopher is there in fact comparing quiddities to numbers, to the extent they are definable, in the way Plato used to speak of quiddities, by positing them as separate [Scotus, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics VIII ch.4 n.22]; substances taken in this way, the quiddities of things, are indeed compared to numbers according to the four properties [ibid. nn.22-25] - one of which is this, that ‘anything added changes the species’; and I understand it thus, that the addition makes another species from the species, or that it makes a species from a non-species. For any difference, when added to the definition, either indicates the quiddity, or it constitutes a species other than the preexisting one, or if the preexisting one was of the nature of a genus it determines it to the nature of a species, which is something that was not had before the addition of the difference.a

a [Interpolation] An example about the intellective soul, when it is added as the difference to the sensitive soul.

251. I say, then, that an addition to the quiddity, when the quiddity is taken according to the idea of quiddity, alters the species in the second of the ways stated [sc. making a species from a species]. But what is not added to a quiddity as it is a quiddity does not change the species; now any individual degree, just as also an individual difference that contracts a thing to being a ‘this’, whether it is an individual unity or an individual plurality, and in short any individual condition whatever added to a specific nature, is not added to it as to its quidditative idea such that it determine it according to that idea, and for this reason it does not change the species of the quiddity to which it is added; for it cannot change what preexists into another species, nor can it change it from a non-species into a species, unless what is added is of the idea of a species, - and no individual condition is of this sort.

252. Next, as to the form of the authority [n.235], I say that if something that was a quidditative part were added to a preexisting quiddity it would change the species, just as if something that was a part of number were added to a preexisting number the species of the number would be changed; but if something be added that is not of a nature to be a part of number (to wit, some accident) or is a material part of number (to wit, if one of the units in a triple were made more intense than before [e.g. made more white]), then the species would not in itself be changed.a So in the proposed case: any individual difference (or degree) that is added to a quiddity is not of the nature to be a part of the quiddity.

a [Interpolation] but in some individual degree.

253. By the same fact [n.252] the response is plain as regard Porphyry [n.237], that he likewise is speaking of difference insofar as it is a per se part of definition. Difference in this way consists in something indivisible, that is, taking it according to the indifference according to which it is abstracted from individuals, which indifference - in its totality - is its degree as it is a specific difference; for thus it does not receive the more and less, because ‘all cases of more and less’ can belong to individuals in this way and these cases are all within this indifference of the difference and do not, in accord with this indifference, add anything to the difference.

254. To the passage from the Metaphysics 10 [n.236] the same response can be made, by calling formal difference ‘quidditative difference’.

255. One can also reply - as to the form - that not every difference of forms is a formal difference, speaking properly of formal difference, namely insofar as formal difference is a difference according to forms, just as not every difference in men is a difference in the form of humanity. A reason in reality and in logic is assigned for this. In reality as follows: men can possess the form of humanity and be different, though not by humanity - and so they do not differ in humanity; thus pure forms can differ and yet not be different by formality, and so not be formally different, because to differ formally -properly speaking - is the same as to differ in form or according to form.a In logic as follows: because the term of a difference is understood through the negation that is included in the difference, therefore it can be taken confusedly or distributively with respect to that negation; so too, that which is denominated as being the idea of the difference (of which sort is what is construed along with the verb ‘differ’, as that in which or according to which the denomination is made) could be confounded by the negation. But, as it is, the negation of the superior does not follow on the negation of the inferior, but there is denial of the antecedent and a fallacy of the consequent.Vatican editors: “by saying, ‘there is a difference or a non-identity between men, therefore there is a difference or a non-identity between them in the form of humanity or according to the form of humanity’; or, in other words, ‘this man differs from that man or is not that man, therefore they are different or not the same in the form of humanity or according to the form of humanity’. Tr. the denial of a logically inferior difference (e.g. an individual difference that distinguishes this man from that) is not followed by the denial of a logically superior difference (e.g. a specific difference that distinguishes this species, man, from that species, horse). Or, to put it in logical form: while the conditional statement ‘if they are the same individual then they are the same species’ is true, one commits the fallacy of the consequent if one argues from the denial of the antecedent (the denial of the inferior difference) to a denial of the consequent (the denial of a superior difference), as in ‘but they are not the same individual, therefore they are not the same species’. ⁵¹

a [Interpolation] I also say as to the reality that things can differ in species between themselves and yet not cause such a difference in a third thing, - just as white and black differ in species and yet white Socrates and black Plato do not differ in species; so although the individual differences are diverse primarily, yet they do not vary the essence, because they are accidents of the essence and material with respect to it, - and the same as to masculine and feminine, and also as to degrees with respect to the form in itself, which form does not, according to its existence, determine for itself a determinate degree.

256. To the other authority from the Six Principles [n.238]: its conclusion is to be conceded in the way it proves the simplicity of the form. But it proves a simplicity opposite to quantity of bulk, because when a form is added it does not make a greater in bulk (for a form when placed in a subject is not something more than it was before). So let a simplicity of form opposite to quantity of bulk be conceded - but this is nothing against an intensity in amount, which is what pertains to the proposed case.

257. To the reason [n.239] I say that as to the remark ‘something that is accidental to the nature of the species’, it can be understood in two ways: in one way like this, that it is outside the quidditative idea of the species, in the way a difference is said to be accidental to the genus - and in this way an accident is taken in the fallacy of accident for something extraneous that is outside the idea of another thing; in another way an accident is said to be what does not make a ‘per se unity’ together with that of which it is an accident, as white together with body. In the first way I say that an intense whiteness has something which is accidental to the nature of the species (so also does a mild whiteness, nay any individual has something that is accidental to the nature of the species -otherwise the nature of the species would not be contracted to individuals); in the second way I say that an intense whiteness does not have something that is accidental to the nature of the species, because the degree which is understood to be added to the nature in itself makes a ‘per se unity’ with the nature, just as any individual difference added to the nature makes a ‘per se unity’ with the nature. When therefore you say ‘if the intense thing includes something which is accidental to the nature of the species, then the mild thing, which does not include it, is not in the species’ [n.239], the consequence is not valid speaking of accident taken in the first, but the antecedent is true in this first way -and not in the other way.a

a [Interpolation] So the inference ‘therefore such a degree is not in the species’ is not valid, but the inference should be ‘therefore such a degree is not the species’; so it exists in the species as contained under it. Nor does this inference follow, ‘therefore the other degree will not be in the species’; for this does not follow, ‘it does not have whatever pertains to the species, therefore it is not in the species’. - Or one can say that ‘something pertains to the species’ is taken in two ways, either as to quiddity or as to subject. Quidditative parts belong per se to the understanding of the species, though not to the understanding of the subject but are as it were remote parts of it; so things are in the proposed case: no formal degree belongs to the species as a part per se and essential to the species (because the species can be understood without any degree), but it does very well pertain to the species as being contained under the species.

[N.B. A large blank space was left here by Scotus, both for a further question within distinction 17 and for distinction 18, but neither the further question nor the further distinction are contained in the text of the Ordinatio. They have to be supplied from the Reportatio or the Additiones Magnae.]