II. To the Question

225. In response, then, to the question [n.195], because of the reasons rejecting this opinion [sc. of Godfrey, nn.202-203, 208, 212-215] and especially the two or three first ones, I hold to the opposite conclusion, namely that the positive reality that was in the lesser charity remains the same really in the greater charity. But how this is the case will be plain in the solutions to the following questions [n.249].a

a [Interpolation, in place of n.225] I concede then the conclusion of these reasons [nn.237, 240, 243-244], and that the positive reality that was in the lesser charity remains the same really in the greater charity. [Followed by this second interpolation] Nor is it corrupted per se, save as to the existence that it had before, and it remains in the other [sc. in the greater charity] as a part in the whole; an example comes from matter per se or form per se, which are not corrupted as they exist in the whole but remain in the whole more perfectly than when they had existence per se; the thing is plain in the case of a how much of bulk when it is increased. - As to the reason for this opinion [nn.198-199] I say that the terms of motion per se, of which sort are privation and form, are incompossibles; but a weakened form and an increased form are not per se these sorts of terms of motion, because a weakened form is not a privation but a certain positive state. Weakened and intense forms are terms of motion not per se but per accidens, namely to the extent that a weakened form is conjoined to a per se term that is a privation; hence although the per se term ‘from which’ of motion is, as a privation, corrupted when the term ‘to which’ is reached, yet the form that per accidens accompanies such a term ‘from which’ need not be per se corrupted. A fallacy of the consequent is therefore committed, because the weakened form is a term ‘from which’ as conjoined to the privation, insofar as it is precisely a being per se, and this does not remain; but as it exists in another it is not conjoined to the privation but to the term ‘to which’, and thus it remains the same in number as before, but more intense and more perfect. - To the first confirmation [see note to n.200] I say that it is to the opposite effect, because the order of species is according to quiddities and essences, and so one species does not contain the essence or quiddity of another; but the order according to degrees of the same form is according to material parts, which can exist at the same time, and the form is so much the more intense and more perfect the more it exists under such several degrees of form. It exists in opposite ways, then, in this case and in that. - To the other confirmation [see note to n.201] I say that it is to the opposite effect, because in the way the Philosopher asserts the more and less in accidents he denies it in substances [Metaphysics 8.3.1043b-44a11]; but he does not deny in substances the more and less by way of the parts of bulk (rather he in this way concedes their existence there), therefore he denies in the accidents the more and less in this way, namely by way of parts of bulk; now he denies in substances the more and less by way of degrees of form, so he concedes them in this way in accidents. Hence, because he lays down that substantial form is in itself indivisible, therefore he does not posit one degree of form along with another; things are the opposite way in accidents, because an accidental form is divisible by way of degrees, - therefore any degree is compatible with another degree and is perfected by it.