II. Scotus’ own Opinion

77. To the question [n.1] I respond that the productions are distinguished formally by themselves. For generation is itself formally generation, and inspiriting is itself formally inspiriting, and from their formal reasons it is impossible for generation to be inspiriting (when everything else is per impossibile removed), such that it is not necessary to ask by what they are distinguished [n.7], because the whole formal reason of one is not the same as the whole formal reason of the other.

78. This is clear through Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.27 n.5, where he says that “thus you will see how or what distance there is between the nativity of the Word and the procession of the Gift;” and a little later that: “the will proceeds from cognition, but it is not the image of cognition; and therefore in this matter he who can sees and discerns a certain intelligible distance between procession and nativity (since to descry a thing by knowledge is not to desire it, nor even to enjoy it by will),” - where from the distinction of the processions he wants to deduce a distinction of persons proceeding.

79. Likewise in ibid. V ch.14 n.5: “Where too this shines forth why the Holy Spirit is also not a son, although he too exits from the Father; and for this reason is he not called a son, because neither is he born; for he exited from the Father not as somehow born but as somehow given.” Therefore he solved there the question about the distinction of persons through their distinct emanations.

80. And if it be objected that ‘the emanations are not from themselves, therefore they are not distinguished by themselves’ (the proof of the consequence is that from what something has entity, from that it also has unity, Metaphysics 2.1.993a30-31), - because being and one are said to be convertible), I reply:

Specific differences are not effectively from themselves and yet they are by themselves formally distinct, but they are effectively distinct by that from which they effectively are. But to be distinguished ‘first formally’ is not to be distinguished by something included in one thing, and agreeing with another thing [sc. as Socrates is distinguished from Plato by socrateity and agrees with Plato in humanity], but to be distinguished itself in its totality formally, even if per impossibile everything other than its idea is excluded; thus I say that if ultimate differences were composite, they would be distinguished themselves in their totality and would be themselves in their totality distinct first formally.

So I say in the proposed case, that if per impossibile these distinct persons could exist without a principle, they would themselves in their totality be formally distinct, such that nothing formally included in one would be formally included in the other; and yet, as they do have principles, so are they in their having principles or in their having an origin distinct from their principles (namely from intellect and will), which are not only distinct by reason, as was argued against the penultimate opinion [nn.31-40]. But the intellect is from the nature of the thing not formally will and, since infinity added to something does not destroy its formal idea, infinite intellect is not formally infinite will; and so, although it would not be necessary for this formal distinction [sc. of emanations] to be reduced to another distinction [sc. of principles] insofar as it is formal, yet because it is formal and is in things that have a principle, it is reduced to this distinction of principles.

81. If it be said that although two things are distinguished from three, yet two infinite things are not distinguished from three infinite things, - on the contrary.Scotus added nothing here but left a blank space. ¹⁰