II. Whether the Father and the Son inspirit more by the Will insofar as it is One or insofar as it is Concordant.

8. But there is another difficulty. For since the will is single in two supposits, which supposits will concordantly with this will, and concord connotes some distinction of the concordant supposits, the difficulty is whether the Father and the Son per se inspirit more by this will insofar as they are one or insofar as they are concordant.

A. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

9. Here the following is said [by Henry], that the producing supposits are distinct, and because of this distinction they would not in any way be conceded to inspirit insofar as they are plural, - for they have one inspiriting force; but further, this inspiriting force is not wholly under the idea of its unity the proximate fecund principle for inspiriting, but rather under the idea of concordant will, where some distinction is connoted; and, because of this distinction, connoted on the part of the principle ‘by which’, one can concede that they inspirit insofar as they are distinct. - This opinion is given confirmation through Richard [of St. Victor] On the Trinity III ch.16.

10. “SinceScotus here proceeds to quote Henry, though, according to the Vatican editors, his quoting, for whatever reason, is not fully accurate. ³ the intellect, as it exists in one person, can have perfect fecundity for the production of the Word, but the will, unless it exists in a double person, cannot have perfect fecundity for the production of the Holy Spirit, and this because the fecundity of the intellect consists in the fullness of perfect wisdom, which can exist in a single person, as Richard says [ibid.]: ‘Nothing is defined contrary to nature if the fullness of wisdom is said to be able to exist in only one person in the deity, for if there were only one person in the deity he could nevertheless have the fullness of wisdom’; but the fecundity of the will consists in the fullness of true love, which cannot exist save, at a minimum, in two persons, on the saying of the same Richard [ibid. ch.3]: ‘Love cannot be delightful unless it is mutual’, because, since the fecundity of the will cannot exist in essential love unless the love is supremely perfect and delightful, it is necessary that, if the will is fecund, the love be mutual, ‘so that there may be’ - according to him ch.3 - ‘one who bestows love and one who pays it back’, because, as he says in ch.7, ‘there is no satisfaction for a supreme lover if the supreme loved does not pay back supreme love’.

11. And for this reason, so that - as was said above [n.10] - the common will of the Father and the Son may be fecund for inspiriting the Holy Spirit, it is not enough that both have one will and an essential common love in it, whereby both of them love and will together, but it is necessary that both have a mutual and concordant will, such that one of them bestows supreme love on the other and the other in turn always pays supreme love back to the first; when this love exists, the will is fecund so that it produces love from itself, which love is the Holy Spirit, as Richard says (ibid. [n.10] ch.11): ‘in love mutual and most fervent there is nothing more admirable than that by him whom you supremely love, and by whom you are supremely loved, you should wish another to be equally loved’; ‘therefore in that love, as it is mutual, the love of each, in order to be consummate, requires there to be a sharer in the love already possessed’, and this through the inspiriting force, which is concordant will in mutual love, by producing the Holy Spirit, - not only as they are one in that will or love, but as they are plural distinct among themselves, which distinction is connoted by the fact that the will is said to be concordant and the love mutual; this cannot be unless it be of more than one insofar as these plural are inseparable, for the prefix ‘con’ indicates association, which is only of serveral who are distinct (and, for this reason, it is well said that ‘Father and Son and Holy Spirit are three co-eternals’, although it is denied that ‘Father and Son and Holy Spirit are three eternals’).

12. By the fact too that this will is concordant, and although the mutual love of both is one and the same, yet there is not the same idea to it as it is bestowed by the Father on the Son, and as, conversely, it is paid back by the Son to the Father, - since (according to Richard, ibid. ch.19) ‘when the two love themselves mutually and pay each other back the affection of supreme desire, and the affection of the first runs round to the second and of the second round to the first, it tends as it were to things diverse’, because it is in some way diverse in idea; but this diversity is in love and essential will, notwithstanding which, the fecundity is thoroughly one and the same in that concordant will and mutual love, in which fecundity the Father and the Son are one and they uniformly inspirit the Holy Spirit, who ‘is loved concordantly by both, and the affection of the two is melted into one by the fire of the third love’, as the same Richard says.

13. And accordingly, in the inspiriting of the Holy Spirit, a double distinction between Father and Son is to be considered; in one way as they are expressed in eliciting the act, - in another way as they are understood to be concordant in mutual love and will about the act to be elicited. And, by the distinction of inspiriting considered in the first way, they are in no way to be said to inspirit as plural; for although they are plural who inspirit, yet they do not inspirit because of the plurality that is prior in them, but only from the distinction between them considered in the second way; and thus the Father and the Son do not inspirit the Holy Spirit insofar as they are plural in eliciting the act (although they concur in the one idea according to which the act is elicited), but as they are plural in one will, which is the idea of eliciting the act, by being concordant in their love in that mutuality.”

B. Against the Opinion of Henry

14. Against this position.

[First reason] - If the Father and Son produce the Holy Spirit by will as by it loving themselves in concord, then there is another Holy Spirit produced beforehand, -which is a discordant result.

15. Proof of the consequence. First because in whatever moment of nature, or of origin, the productive principle is in itself perfect and is in a supposit suited for the action, in that moment there can, on such a supposition, be a reason for producing; but infinite will, as it is infinite will, understood before all act of will, having an infinite object present to itself, is a sufficient productive principle of infinite love, and the Father and the Son are persons suited for production; therefore the will as it is in the Father and the Son, not understood as that by which they formally will but as it is an infinite will having the divine essence present to it by an act of intelligence, will be for the Father and the Son the productive principle of the Holy Spirit, - and so, if the Holy Spirit is produced by will insofar as it is in act of willing, or insofar as by it the Father and Son love themselves in act, it follows that, before the Holy Spirit has been produced by the will as it is in act of willing, the Holy Spirit has been produced by the will as it is first act, which is discordant.

16. This reasoning about the will [n.15], that it is a principle of inspiriting as it is will, but not as it is in act of willing, is confirmed in two ways: first by the formal idea of the will in being a principle, which is liberty, and it does not in this way belong to the act of will itself; second by a likeness with the intellect.

17. In the first way [n.16] the argument is as follows: the will, as it is first act in us, is free to have an act of willing, but the act itself of willing is not free, or a principle of producing anything freely, because an act of willing is a certain natural quality, - and, if it is a principle of any act, it seems to be a natural principle of it not a free one (in the way that, if a habit of appetite were generated from such an act, the habit would be naturally generated, so that the generation of such a habit is not, as it seems, in the power of the act). Therefore it seems that the free production of the Holy Spirit is more saved if he is produced by will as it is first act than if he is produced by will as it is in act of willing, namely as it is understood to be in second act.

18. In the second way [n.16] the argument is as follows, that the Son is not produced by the paternal intellect as it is in act of understanding, such that actual intellection is the formal idea by which the Father generates the Son, as was shown above in distinction 2 [I d.2 nn.291-296]; therefore, by similarity, the will, as it is in act of willing, will not be the principle of producing the Holy Spirit, but the will as first act will be.

19. Next I prove the principal consequence [n.14] in this way, by taking the same major as before [n.15], ‘in whatever moment of nature or of origin etc.’; then I add this minor, that the divine will - having the first object present to it - is the idea of producing a love adequate to that object more perfectly than when having a secondary object present to it, or at least it is not so less perfectly; therefore, since the divine essence is the first object of the divine will - not the Father as Father, nor the Son as Son, because then the Father would be formally blessed in several distinct objects - then the will that has the divine essence present to it (whether as lovable or as loved, I care not in this second proof [as opposed to the first proof, n.15]) will be more a principle of producing love adequate to the object, at any rate not less than it, and so, since the will has the essence for object before the Father as he is Father, the Holy Spirit will be inspirited by the will as it is of the divine essence as first object before he is inspirited by the will as it is of the Father as of its object, or of the Son as of its object.

20. A confirmation of this reason [n.19] is that the divine essence is formally infinite, but paternity as paternity is not formally infinite; therefore the Holy Spirit, who is infinite love, and this not only by reason of infinite will but by reason also of infinite object, as was said in distinction 10 [I d.10 nn.9, 30-31, 47-49], will be inspirited by the will as it is of the divine essence (which is the infinite object) rather than as it is of the Father as Father or of the Son as Son, as of its object.

21. If it be said that the essence is not the first object of the will but the formal idea in the first object is, which is the person, - this is false, because there is one first object of the will, and because the idea of the formal loved is what is first loved; it also concedes the intended proposition, because it will be the formal idea of inspiriting in the way in which the object contributes to the inspiriting.

22. From these two proofs [sc. nn.15, 19, proofs of the principal consequence, n.14] the conclusion is drawn that the Father does not inspirit the Holy Spirit insofar as he loves the Son first, nor the Son insofar as he loves the Father, but the Father and the Son insofar as they have the divine essence present to them as first object of their will, and this because of the second proof of the principal consequence [n.19]; likewise, the conclusion is drawn that they inspirit insofar as they have the essence present to them, not as actually loved, but as lovable, presented in an act of their intelligence, because of the first proof of the consequence [n.15].

23. And if you object to the first proof [n.15], ‘surely the Father and the Son are lovers of the essence in itself before they inspirit the Holy Spirit?’ - one can reply as was said before in distinction 6 [I d.6 n.15] about the production of the Son, how the Father in some way understands first in the origin before the Son is generated, and yet not such that the actual understanding of the Father is the idea of begetting the Son, but the memory in the Father [I d.2 nn.290-296]; one can speak in this way of the love by which the Father and the Son love concordantly and formally, and about the act of inspiriting.

24. [Second reason] - Again, second [n.14]: a principle that is as equally perfect in one supposit as in two is a principle of acting as equally in one supposit as in two, because there seems to be required for action only a perfect principle ‘by which’ and a perfect acting supposit; but the will is as equally perfect in one supposit as in two, and one supposit is as equally perfect - with the perfection requisite for an acting supposit -as two; therefore the will can be as equally a principle of producing in one as in two, such that the mutuality [sc. in concordant love] is not a reason for producing on the part of the productive principle.

25. The proof of the major [n.24] is that the principle ‘by which’ does not receive the perfection belonging to it from the supposit but gives it to the supposit - because by it the supposit is perfect - so that it can act; therefore such a principle is not more perfect in several supposits than in one when there is the same principle in several supposits and in one.

26. And if you say [against the argument of n.24] that the principle is not in one person as it is a productive principle but only as it is in two, and only as residual in the Father after the Son has been generated, - this seems absurd, because all the reality, both relative and absolute, that the Father can have, he has in himself in the first moment of origin; therefore he has, after the Son has been generated, none that he is not preunderstood to have in origin before the Son is generated, - wherefore he has that fecundity [of inspiriting] too, whether the fecundity is posited as a relation or as something absolute [I d.3. n.584].

27. This is confirmed by Augustine On the Trinity IV ch.20 n.29: “The Father is the principle of the whole deity,” and from him - in the authority cited before [n.6] - it is plain that Father and Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, altogether one, as the three persons are one principle of the creature; they do not, however, altogether ‘uniformly’ inspirit if the Son had at once, in the first moment of origin, the fecundity of inspiriting and the Father, in the first moment of origin, have all fecundity, did not but only had it in the second moment, after the Son has been generated.

28. And if an instance is made [against the response to the objection, n.26] about the power of creating, that it is not in the Father before the production of the Son and the Holy Spirit, - the response will be clear partly here in the exposition of Richard’s intention [nn.38-39], and more fully about ‘the order of the intrinsic productions to the extrinsic ones’ [II d.1 q.1].

29. [Third reason] - Again, if there is perfect will in the Father, it is plain it is first in origin there before it is in the Son; but it is not a perfect principle of inspiriting, for you [sc. Henry]. - I ask what is understood to be added to the principle so that it be a perfect principle of inspiriting? Not some supposit, because that adds nothing to the principle ‘by which’, but by a supposit the principle only has that it can act. If it is the mutual love of this person for that, and conversely, then the double relation of reason will be the ultimate reason or actuality of the principle of inspiriting; this is impossible for two reasons: first, that no relation of reason is a prerequisite for divine production (it is proved in distinction 13, against the opinion positing that the intellect and will are only distinguished by reason [I d.13 nn.31-40]), - second, because then there would be two proximate formal principles of inspiriting, and so the two supposits would not inspirit entirely as they are one, which is contrary to Augustine On the Trinity, as cited in the argument to the contrary[n.6].

30. [Fourth reason] - Again, if they had two wills, they could, with such mutuality, be concordant [n.24]; therefore to inspirit insofar as they are concordant is not to inspirit ‘as one principle’, because they do so neither as one supposit nor as one principle ‘by which’, insofar as they are concordant.

31. [Fifth reason] - Again, the Father, by will and volition as they are in him, along with relation to the loved Son, is either the whole principle of inspiriting or he is not. If he is, it follows that the Son does not inspirit insofar as he has a relation, because he does not as such have the idea of the ‘by which’; for he does not inspirit insofar as he loves if, when his loving is removed, the Holy Spirit would no less be inspirited; but, when the relation has been removed, the Holy Spirit would no less be inspirited by the Father as total principle, by his act of will as it tends to the Son. If it is granted instead (in the alternative above) that he is not, it follows that each, insofar as he loves the other, is only a diminished principle, and both together are one principle as it were by aggregation (as two people hauling a ship), but not one principle by identity of perfect principle.

32. [Against the reasons taken from Richard] - Further, against the reasons that Richard gestures to on his behalf [sc. Henry’s], namely that mutual love is most delightful [n.10]; from this it follows that the Father would be formally blessed by such love, because the love by which he is blessed is most delightful, and then the Father would not be formally blessed in himself but in the Son, objectively, which is heretical.

33. Again, second, against that reason [n.32], I argue as follows: in us mutual love is more delightful because by such mutuality a fuller idea of lovability is had in the beloved. For any beloved able to love, if he loves back, makes himself more lovable, because not only is whatever goodness is in him the idea of lovability, but also loving back is another idea of lovability, and for this reason he who has the goodness which is the first idea of lovability, and likewise has loving back, is more lovable. Therefore it will be the opposite in divine reality, where this idea of lovability can in no way be found or posited; for the Son is not more lovable than the Father, or more a lover back of the divine essence (because of which he is first loved back), nor is this loving back another idea of lovability in the Son.

34. Further, mutual love in us is not more delightful unless it is known. For just as goodness is not loved unless it is known, so neither is he who loves back loved insofar as he loves back unless his loving back is known. But if loving back or mutual love must be posited in this way as more delightful in divine reality, and if for this reason the Holy Spirit is by such love inspirited, - then the Father and the Son would inspirit the Holy Spirit, not insofar as they love each other back, but insofar as they love and know they love each other back, such that the knowledge of being loved back would then seem to be a more formal and more immediate principle of inspiriting the Holy Spirit than love, and so the Holy Spirit will be more formally and more immediately produced by the intellect than by the will.

35. [Against the one holding the opinion] - Further, against the one who holds this opinion [sc. Henry], because he holds that the Holy Spirit can be distinguished from the Son even if he did not proceed from the Son, because of his distinct mode of proceeding from the Father. But if the fecundity of the will for inspiriting the Holy Spirit exists only as it is formally the will in two persons, his own mode of proceeding - a mode other than the mode of proceeding of the Son - could not belong to the Holy Spirit unless he was from the Son. Therefore Henry seems to be contradicting himself.

C. Scotus’ own Opinion

36. As to this article [n.8] I concede that the Father and the Son inspirit the Holy Spirit by the will insofar as they are altogether one, because for the idea of principle, precisely as principle, there is only required its perfection in itself and that it be had in the person before it is understood to have an adequate term; but the will is ‘altogether one’ in the Father and the Son, and it exists in them by origin before it is understood to have an adequate term (because both persons are also inspiritive), and therefore the will, as it exists in them, is the same productive principle with respect to the Holy Spirit.

37. But, for understanding the words of Richard [nn.11-12], I draw a distinction, that ‘concordant will’ can be understood in many ways; either concordant in some elicited second act, as in loving the same thing, and then loving either the creature or the Holy Spirit; or in loving themselves and in loving back, as that the Father loves thereby the Son and conversely; or ‘concordant’ can be understood habitually, insofar as first act is of a nature to have a second quasi-act. The Father and the Son do not seem to inspirit the Holy Spirit with a concordant will in the first two ways, because (as was proved in the first reason by two proofs [nn.14, 15, 19]) they do not formally inspirit either by love of the essence (as was proved in the first proof [n.15]) or by love of each other (as was touched on in the second proof [n.19]). Therefore the understanding must be taken in the third way: ‘by concordant will’ that is ‘by will insofar as it is first act, in which they are of a nature to be concordant in their act, by concordantly producing love’; by such a will - I say - they inspirit, and more by a single will than by a concordant will, because, as the will is understood to be first act, it is understood to be one will in them and not to have concord save in the following way of speaking, ‘because these persons are understood to be able to be concordant in their quasi-second act by concordantly inspiriting’.

38. Then, by saving the words of Richard in some way, I say that, when in some one and the same thing there are two active principles ‘active in an ordered way’, that one thing is not in proximate power to acting with the second principle unless it is preunderstood in the act of the first principle, - an example is about intellect and will in the soul; therefore the Father is not altogether fecund with a power proximate to inspiriting (which is an act of the will as the principle ‘by which’) unless he is pre-understood in the act of the prior principle (which is the intellect), and consequently the will is not the proximate principle save as it is in the two of them; this follows because, by that prior production - without which this power is not proximate - the will is in the two of them because, by the act of the first fecundity, there is communicated to the produced person the second fecundity, namely the fecundity of the will with respect to the inspiriting of the Holy Spirit; there is however no other fecundity - namely fecundity of will - in the two than in the one, but the same in both the producer and the product.

39. There is in some way an example of this in us. The soul is not fecund ‘with proximate power’ for having an act of willing unless it is in actual intellection, although it does not, by that intellection, formally produce the act of loving but by the will as it is first act, which preexists in the soul before intellection, although not in power altogether proximate to acting. If then the soul, in producing intellection, were to communicate to it the fecundity of volition, the will would not be in proximate power to producing love unless the word was first produced, and so after fecund will had been communicated to it; and thus the will would never be proximately fecund save in the two of them, - not however such that this fecundity should, of its idea, require existence in two because it could not exist in one (nay, it itself would already preexist in the mind itself); but, because of the order of fecundities in producing, there would necessarily have to be a second fecundity - when it is in proximate power - in the two of them.

40. It can therefore be conceded that the Father and the Son inspirit by the one will which is in them, and which is perfectly fecund existing in the two supposits, because it is understood to be communicated to the generated supposit - and so to exist in both supposits - before the Holy Spirit is produced by it.

41. But how is the Holy Spirit inspirited by mutual love [n.11]?

I reply: by love, that is by the will by which the Father and Son as in first act are of a nature to love themselves mutually; by this will - I say - as existing in them, and of a nature to be the sort by which they may love themselves mutually, the Holy Spirit is inspirited, but not by any second act as it were of love actually bestowed and requited. But if this does not suffice for the intention of Richard, let him expound him who can, because his determination does not seem to stand well with the statements of Augustine -who attributes to the Father and the Son the perfect idea of one principle with respect to the Holy Spirit as he does to the Trinity with respect to the creature [n.6] - if his determination contradict what was just said above; but as to how Augustine says that the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit, as if the Holy Spirit is the very mutual love of the Father and the Son (as Augustine seems to say in On the Trinity VI ch.5 n.7), it will be expounded in distinction 32 [I d.32 qq.1-2 nn.1, 11], where the Master

[Lombard] treats of this question ‘Whether the Father and Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit’.