I. Clarification of the First Question

10. In the first question [n.1] a distinction should not be made to the effect that God can be known negatively or affirmatively [Alexander of Hales, ST I q.2 n.1 ch.2], because negation cannot be known save through affirmation, On Interpretation 14.24b3-4, Metaphysics 4.4.1008a17-18.

Plain too is that we do not know any negations about God save through the affirmations that we use to remove, from those affirmations, the things incompossible with them.

Also, we do not supremely love negations.

Likewise too, a negation is conceived either precisely as a negation, or as a negation said of something. If a negation is conceived precisely, such as ‘non-stone’, this belongs as much to nothing as to God, because a pure negation is said of being and of non-being. Therefore, God is no more known in this than nothing is or a chimaera. If the negation is understood as a negation said of something then, about the underlying concept that this negation is understood to be true of, I ask the question: will it be an affirmative concept or a negative one? If negative I ask the question as before: is the negation conceived precisely or as said of something? If in the first way this belongs as much to nothing as to God; if said of something, I ask the question as before. And however far one proceeds with negations, either God would not be understood more than nothing is, or a stand will be made at some affirmative concept that is first.

11. Nor, second, should a distinction be made about knowledge what a thing is and knowledge whether it is [Henry of Ghent, Summa a.24 q.3], because in the issue at hand I am asking about a simple concept, the ‘it is’ of which is known by an act of the intellect combining or dividing. For I never know of anything whether it is if I do not have some concept of the term that I know the ‘is’ about; and the question being asked here is about that concept.

12. Nor third should a distinction about ‘whether it is’ be made as this ‘whether it is’ is a question about the truth of a proposition or as it is a question about the being of God [Henry of Ghent, ibid.]. Because if there can be a question about the truth of a proposition in which the ‘is’ serves as predicate of a subject, one must, in order to conceive the truth of the proposition or question, first conceive the terms of the question; and about the simple concept of that subject, whether it is possible, is the question [‘whether it is’] now being asked.

13. Nor, fourth, is it valid to draw a distinction between a natural concept and a supernatural concept [Henry of Ghent, ibid. and q.2], because the question is about the natural concept.

14. Nor, fifth, is it valid to draw a distinction about ‘naturally’ by speaking of nature absolutely or of nature in this present state [Bonaventure, Sent. I d.3 p.1 a.1 q.1; Henry of Ghent, ibid., q.6], because the question is precisely about knowledge in this present state.

15. Nor, sixth, is it of value to draw a distinction about knowledge of God in creatures or knowledge of him in himself [Alexander of Hales, ST I tr. Intro. q.2 m.2 ch.2], because if knowledge be obtained through a creature such that discursive knowledge begin from the creature, I ask in what term does the knowledge come to rest? If in God in himself, I have the intended conclusion, because I am asking for the concept of God in himself. If it does not come to rest in God in himself but in a creature, then the same thing will be the end of the discursive reasoning and the beginning of it, and so no knowledge will be had of God - at any rate the intellect is not in the final term of discursive reasoning as long as it rests in some object that is the beginning of the discourse.

16. About knowledge of ‘whether God is’ and ‘what he is’ (Godfrey of Fontaines in Quodlibet 7.11 rejects Henry of Ghent [ibid., a.22 q.4] on the distinction between ‘whether he is’ and that it is possible for there to be knowledge of ‘what he is’), note: the ‘what’ that is spoken of using the name is the ‘what’ that is the ‘what’ of the thing, and it is inclusive of ‘whether it is’, because Metaphysics 4.7.1012a23-24, “the idea of which the name is the sign is the definition.” However, the ‘what is’ of the name is more common than the ‘is’ and the ‘what’ of the thing, because being signified by the name belongs to more things than ‘is’ does. But where the two go together, they are the same - just as whiteness is not every color, yet the color that whiteness is is the same as whiteness. The example, however, is not altogether similar, because color is taken from some partial perfection. Not so here, but the whole ‘what’ is related to the name as to its sign, because the whole is related to the thing as quiddity to supposit. But I know the first relation about the same ‘what’ before the second. The question ‘what is?’ can be asked about a chimaera, which is not real, or is not an ‘is’, but a fiction. Color and whiteness are similar in that color is said of more things than whiteness is (just as ‘is’ is said of more things than exist, as of chimaeras). But if whiteness is said of the color that whiteness is, ‘whiteness’ and ‘color’ are the same. Of course, whiteness is only part of a white thing, or only a partial perfection or reality of the thing. But the ‘what’ in ‘what is’ is about the whole of that of which the name or word ‘what’ is said, because ‘what’ signifies the quiddity, the ‘whatness’, of whatever it is said of. But to know that the name or word ‘what’ relates to anything whatever, including fictional things (like chimaeras) and partial perfections (like whiteness), precedes knowing that it relates to the whatness of things that are supposits and not qualities (as whiteness) or fictions (as chimaeras). ²

Nor in this alone is there an order to these knowings (knowing of the same simple concept one relation before the other), but also in this, that the simple concept is in some way different in several things, namely definitions, because the first [supra: the ‘what’ that is said by the name] is confused, the second [supra: the ‘what’ that is of the thing] distinct. For the first either does not explain the parts of the concept, or if it does, not distinctly under compossibility or non-compossibility; the second does explain the compossiblity, and in this that the idea is true, and that from this ‘what’ it expresses the ‘what it is’ of a possible thing. ‘What’ said of a chimaera is said of an incompossible, because chimaeras are imaginary beings combining incompatible features, and have no real ‘what’ or quiddity. But this fact is not known in knowing merely the name or word ‘what’; it is known when the ‘what’ is referred to supposits that are really possible and have a real quiddity to describe and define. Dinosaurs, for instance, unlike chimaeras, are possible things, and have a real quiddity, even though they do not exist now. ³

17. Second [sc. second to n.16], note that the subject of the first science is at the same time already known. What is said by the name is both ‘if it is’ and ‘what it is’, because no science asks about its first subject ‘if it is’ or ‘what it is’ [Metaphysics 7.1.1028a36-b2]. A science, strictly speaking, proves properties of its subject through the definition of the subject. The science of geometry proves the properties of a triangle through the definition of triangle, and therefore, qua science, it assumes that there are triangles and what they are. So with any science. Knowing that there is such a subject and what it is (say triangle) is prior to science and belongs rather to intellection. ⁴ Therefore either this is not a question at all, or only in a prior science; there is no science prior to the first science; therefore about its first subject in no way is there a question ‘if it is’ or ‘what it is’. Therefore its concept is simply simple, therefore being is [simply simple]. Therefore (to anticipate), ‘being’ as it is the subject proper of the science of metaphysics is not analogical; for if it were it would not be simply simple. That, nevertheless, being is said in many ways is a truth proved in metaphysics, and proved of something that, in its first apprehension, is simply simple, that is, univocal. ⁵

The fact that a being can per se be put into doubt as to the compossibility of the parts of the concept Any concept can be questioned as to ‘if’ it is and ‘what’ it is, including God, because, as Scotus immediately says, the simply simple concept of being, whose ‘if’ and ‘what’ are beyond question, does not distinguish God (or anything) from anything else. So the concept of God too raises, for us, the questions if God is and what God is. God cannot, therefore, be the first subject of metaphysics, since the first subject of metaphysics is beyond all ‘ifs’ and ‘whats’. ⁶ is for this reason too, that ‘being’ is not God, because no idea simply simple is had of God that distinguishes him from other things. Therefore, about any such thing there is a question ‘if it is’ and a demonstration that the idea of it is not in itself false; therefore according to no concept possible for a wayfarer is God the first subject of metaphysics.

Again, whatever is proved of being is contained virtually in the idea of being, because just as a convertible simple property is included first in the subject, so too is a disjunct property; therefore in the subject is first included that some side of a disjunct property belongs to some being. In the idea of being is included, as convertible with it, the simple properties of good, true, one etc., and the disjunctive properties of actual or potential, first or derivative, finite or infinite, uncaused and caused, etc. ⁷ Therefore being first includes virtually this proposition ‘some being is first’, and therefore both the ‘if it is’ and the ‘what it is’ about this idea. The first being is included first in being; therefore also is included whatever is proved of the first being through the idea of this totality, or through the idea of being. Therefore metaphysics is theology finally and principally, because just as it is more principally about substance than about accident, Metaphysics 7.1.1028a18-19, so (by a further analogy) is it more principally about God; because always what is first in the order of perfection is included in the idea of the first subject - particularly the part of a disjunctive property that is simply more perfect. The disjunctive properties of being, as actual and potential, infinite and finite, caused and uncaused, are divided into the more and less perfect, and while being can be without the less perfect disjunct, it cannot be without the more perfect. So if only God existed and no creatures, there would still be uncaused being but no caused being. ⁸

18. On the contrary: no knowledge simply more perfect is included virtually in less perfect knowledge, but conversely; therefore, no knowledge about God that is naturally knowable to the wayfarer is more perfect than the concept of being, therefore than the speculation in which there is happiness [cf. n.5]. If this reasoning is probative, then also is that which the arguments for the first side [nn.1-4] suppose about a nonsimple concept. It is denied according to Henry; rather, a proper and simple concept of God, through movement from effect [to cause is asserted]. But then being is not common but analogous, and so the first science of being will be about the first being to which everything is attributed.

19. The meaning, then, of the question [n.1] is this, whether the intellect of the wayfarer could naturally have any simple concept, in which simple concept God is conceived.