II. To the Initial Arguments

330. To the first main argument [n.281] I say that that of which there is an image, namely part of the whole, is distinctly investigated through a footprint, but the whole is investigated only indistinctly in the way a whole is known from a part. Thus it is in the issue at hand. Through the creature is that investigated which is appropriated [sc. to the Persons of the Trinity] - not however insofar as it is what is appropriated but as what can be appropriated to each Person; and therefore is the Trinity, the concept of which in the intellect is a sort of total concept, investigated through the likeness as it were of a part [n.301].a

a.a [Interpolated text (in place of “not however insofar as^of a part”)] but not things that are proper to the Persons - and therefore not the Trinity, the concept of which in the intellect is a sort of total concept.

331. To the second [n.282] I say that any created essence, insofar as it is such a created essence, accords with a determinate exemplar, and therefore any of them represents God under the idea of a footprint. But intellectual nature, insofar as it has in itself a single essence and many operations which there is an order of origin between, represents the Trinity by reason of all the things that come together in such nature, so that intellectual nature is not in the same way footprint and image, as will appear more in the question about the image [nn.575-580].

332. To the last argument [n.283] I say that there is not in the essences of creaturesa an idea of representing other than the idea of footprint. But because in some nature many things come together that represent a unity and a trinity, therefore does such nature have the idea of image, as intellectual nature does. But in some nature, a nature inferior to intellectual nature, such a coming together does not exist; and therefore all other inferior natures have the idea precisely of footprint.b

a.a [Interpolated text] because of the order of creatures.

b.b [Interpolated text; cf. Rep. IA d.3 nn.82-83] As to the argument in the lecture [see interpolated note to n.283], it is said that the Trinity is, as it were, a certain whole having parts. A perfection that can be appropriated [to a Person] as a sort of part is a certain unity of this Trinity, and in this regard it has the idea of a part and does not lead to knowledge of another part. Hereby is it plain that the following inference does not hold: ‘a creature leads to knowledge of God insofar as he is one; therefore a creature is not a footprint of the Trinity.’ For a footprint does not lead perfectly to knowledge of what it is a footprint of, but to knowledge of something that can be appropriated to what it is a footprint of.