C. Arguments against the Univocity of Being and their Solution

152. Argument is made against this univocity of being [Henry of Ghent, Summa a.28 q.3, a26 q.2, a.21 q.2 ad 2]:

From the Philosopher Metaphysics 3.10.998b22-24, that according to him in that place being is not a genus, because then, according to him, difference would not be a per se being; but if being were a common assertion in the ‘what’ of several things different in species, it would seem to be a genus. A genus is asserted of a species through the difference proper to each species, as the genus ‘animal’ is said of the species ‘man’ through the difference ‘rational’. Accordingly, the difference cannot already be included in the genus, because then the genus would be the genus only of things with that difference. For if ‘animal’ included ‘rational’, then ‘animal’ could only be the genus of man and of no other animal. If ‘being’, therefore, is a genus, and differences are outside the genus, then differences cannot be being, which would mean they could hardly differentiate anything. To avoid this result and to allow differences also to be being, the solution seems to be to deny that being is a genus. But if being is a common term predicated in the ‘what’ of the things that fall under it (as ‘animal’ is a common term predicated in the ‘what’ of the several species of animal), then being does seem to be a genus. Therefore, being cannot be such a common or univocal term. ²⁴

153. The same Aristotle also, in Metaphysics 4.2.1003a23-35, b11-14, maintains that being is said of beings as healthy is said of things healthy, and that metaphysics is one science, not because everything it is about is said according to one thing, but because it is said in relation to one thing, namely not univocally but analogically. Therefore, the subject of metaphysics is not univocal but analogical.

154. The same Aristotle also, Metaphysics 7.1.. .18-20, 4.1030a23-27, b2-3, says that accidents are only beings because they are of being, as logicians say that ‘not-being is’ and ‘the not-knowable is knowable’, and as a vase is said to be ‘healthy’. In all these examples there is no univocity to the term said of many things.

155. And Porphyry, Book of Predicables 3, “If one call all things beings, one will,” he says, “be naming them equivocally.”

156. Again, Physics 1.2.185a20-21 [Henry, Summa a.21 q.2 ad 3], against Parmenides and Melissus, “The beginning is that being is said in many ways.” And he [Aristotle] argues that if all things are one being, then they are either this one being or that one being, which would not follow if being were univocal, just as this does not follow: every man is one man, therefore he is this one man or that one man. If ‘being’ were univocal to all beings, as ‘man’ is univocal to all men, then the statement that being is one would no more be to say that being is this one being or that one being than the statement that man is one would be to say that man is either this one man or that one man. Rather, it would be to say that being is one species as man is one species. ²⁵

157. Again by reason [Henry, Summa a.28 q.3, a.26 q.2]: if being were univocal as to the ten categories, then it would divide into them through differences. So let a and b be two such differences: therefore either these two include being, and then in the concept of any most general genus there would be trifling repetition; or these are not beings, and then non-being would belong to the understanding of being. A genus is divided into species through the addition of a difference, as animal, say, is divided through the differences ‘winged’ and ‘footed’ into winged animals (birds etc.) and footed animal (horses etc.). So if being is a genus divided into the categories of substance and accidents by differences in the same way, and if these differences include being (as the differences ‘in-itself being’ and ‘in-another being’), then substance will have to be defined, say, as ‘in-itself being being’, and accidents as ‘in-another being being’, and so on, which is trifling repetition. Alternatively, if the differences are not beings, then substance and accidents will be defined by differences that are not beings, or by things that do not exist. ²⁶

158. To the first argument [n.152]. It is not necessary that the arguments of Metaphysics 3 assert what they conclude, because the Philosopher is intending there to argue to opposite sides of the questions he is disputing (as he himself says by way of preface in the introduction, 3.1.995a24-b4), yet two opposite conclusions cannot be reached unless one or other argument is sophistical (hence the Commentator on the Metaphysics [Averroes, Metaphysics 3 com.3] says of the first argument there for the first question disputed that it is a fallacy of the consequent: ‘if contraries belong to the same science, then non-contraries do not belong to the same science’ The argument is of the form, ‘if contrary, then same science; but not contrary; therefore not the same science’, which is to infer a denial of the consequent from a denial of the antecedent. The inference is fallacious, as is clear in this example of Rover the dog: if Rover is a cat, Rover is an animal; Rover is not a cat; therefore Rover is not an animal. ²⁷). Also, this argument specifically [n.152] should not be held to be conclusive. For he argues there, “wherefore if ‘one’ or ‘being’ is a genus, no difference will be either ‘one’ or ‘being’,” and my question is: Either he intends to infer that the difference ‘one’ or ‘being’ will not be per se in the first mode, and in this way the conclusion is not unacceptable as far as ‘one’ is concerned. Or he intends to infer the negative absolutely, and then the consequence is not valid; for it is not the case that, if ‘rational’ is a difference with respect to ‘animal’, therefore ‘rational is not animal’ but that ‘it is not per se animal in the first mode’.

[Although the above about the argument be true], yet if one holds that this argument [n.152] is valid, it proves rather the opposite than the conclusion intended. For not because of equivocation does it remove from being the idea of genus (on the contrary, if being were equivocal as to the ten genera, there would be ten genera, because the same concept, by whatever name it be signified, has the idea of genus the same); rather does it remove the idea of genus from being because of being’s excessive commonness, The Vatican editors helpfully refer to Topics 4.6.127a28-30: “If then we assign being as a genus, it will plainly be the genus of everything by the fact it is predicated of them; for of nothing is a genus predicated save of its species.” ²⁸ namely because it is predicated of difference in the first mode per se, and from this could it be concluded that being is not a genus.

159. And to see how this is be true [sc. “it removes the idea of genus from being because of being’s excessive commonness”] - although however it was said before [nn.131-133] that being is not predicated of ultimate differences in the first mode per se -I draw a distinction in the case of differences, that some difference can be taken from the ultimate essential part, which is a different thing and a different nature from that from which the concept of genus is taken; it is as if a plurality of forms is posited and genus is said to be taken from the prior essential part and the specific difference from the ultimate form. Then, just as being is said in the ‘what’ of the essential part from which such specific difference is taken, so is it said in the ‘what’ of such difference in the abstract, such that, just as ‘the intellective soul is a being’ is said in the ‘what’ (taking the same concept of being as is said of man or of whiteness), so is ‘rationality is a being’ said in the ‘what’, if ‘rationality’ is such a difference.

But no such difference is ultimate, because contained in such a difference are many realities in some way distinct (with the sort of distinction or non-identity that in the first question of the second distinction I said existed between essence and personal property [Ord. I d.2 nn.388-410] - or a greater distinction, as will be explained elsewhere [Ord. II d.1 q.4 n.25, a.6 n.5, IV d.11 p.1 a.2 q.1 n.54]). And then such a nature can be conceived in a certain respect, that is, in respect of some reality and perfection, and in a certain respect not known - and therefore a concept of such a nature is not simply simple [n.147]. But the ultimate reality or real perfection of such a nature (from which reality the ultimate difference is taken) is simply simple; this reality does not include being quidditatively but has a concept simply simple. Hence if such a reality be a, this statement ‘a is a being’ is not said in the ‘what’, but is per accidens, and this whether a state that reality or state the difference in the abstract that is taken from such reality.

160. Therefore did I say before [nn.133, 150] that no difference simply ultimate includes being quidditatively, because it is simply simple. But some difference, taken from an essential part (which part is the nature in the real thing, different from the nature from which genus is taken) - that difference is not simply simple and it does include being in its ‘what’. And from this fact, that such a difference is being in its ‘what’, it follows that being, because of the excessive commonness of being, is not a genus. For no genus is said in the ‘what’ of any difference under it, neither of the difference that is taken from the form, nor of the difference that is taken from the ultimate reality of the form (as will be plain in Ord. d.8 p.1 q.3 nn.16, 14); for always that from which the concept of genus is taken is in itself potential with respect to the reality from which the concept of the difference is taken - or with respect to the form if the difference is taken from the form.

161. And if you argue against this [Averroes, Metaphysics IV com.3] that, if ‘rational’ includes being quidditatively, and if any like difference does (namely any difference that is taken from an essential part, not from its ultimate reality), then, by adding such difference to the genus, there will be trifling repetition because ‘being’ will be said twice If the difference ‘rational’ includes being in its whatness then ‘rational’ is equivalent to ‘rational-being’, and the genus ‘animal’ (which also includes being in its whatness on this view) is equivalent to ‘animal-being’, and then to say ‘man is a rational animal’ will be equivalent to the trifling repetition, ‘man is a rational-being animalbeing’. Also and incidentally (as in the earlier footnote to n.136), if ‘rational’ means ‘rational-being’, then to say ‘man is a rational animal’ amounts to saying ‘man is a rational-being animal’ and then, by repeated substitution of ‘rational-being’ for ‘rational’, to saying ‘man is a rational-being-being animal’, and so on ad infinitum. ²⁹ - I reply that when two things inferior to a third are so related that one denominates the other [e.g. ‘white animal’], the term common to them in particular [‘being’] denominates itself. Just as ‘whiteness’, which is inferior to being, denominates ‘animal’, which is inferior to being, and therefore, just as this statement ‘the animal is white’ is denominative [‘white’ denominated from ‘whiteness’], so ‘being’, which is superior to ‘white’, can denominate ‘animal’ [sc. as in ‘the animal is beingal’ ‘Beingal’ is a made-up adjective from ‘being’ and the suffix ‘-al’, mimicking Scotus’ own made up adjective ‘ent-ale’ from ‘ens’. ³⁰], or denominate being taken particularly for animal [sc. as in ‘the animal-being is beingal’]. For example, if the denominative were ‘beingal’, this proposition would be true ‘some being is beingal’. And just as I concede an accidental denomination there without trifling repetition - nor yet does the altogether same thing, conceived in the same way, denominate itself [‘being is beingal’ is not trifling repetition nor is ‘being’ altogether the same, or conceived in the same way, as ‘beingal’] - so here with ‘rational animal’. For in ‘animal’ being is included quidditatively [sc. ‘animal-being’] and in ‘rational’ being is included denominatively [sc. ‘rational-beingal’]; and just as rationality is being so rational is denominated by being. There would be trifling repetition here in ‘rationality animal’ [= ‘rational-being animal-being’], not here in ‘rational animal’ [= ‘rational-beingal animalbeing’]; just as there would be here in ‘whiteness animal’ [= ‘white-being animal-being’], not here in ‘white animal’ [‘white-beingal animal-being’].

162. To the next argument [n.153], which is said about Metaphysics 4, I say that the Philosopher in Metaphysics 10.2.1054a9-11 concedes that there is an essential order between species of the same genus, because he maintains there that in a genus there is one first that is the measure of the others. Now things measured have an essential order to the measure, and yet, notwithstanding such attribution, everyone would concede that the concept of a genus is one, otherwise the genus would not be predicated in the ‘what’ of several things differing in species. For if the genus did not have one concept, different from the concepts of the species, no concept would be said in the ‘what’ of many things, but each concept would only be said of itself, and then nothing would be predicated as genus of species, but as the same of the same.

163. Similarly, the Philosopher in Physics 7.4.249a22-23 says that ‘equivocations are latent in a genus’, because of which there cannot be comparison according to genus. However, there is no equivocation as far as the logician is concerned, who posits diverse concepts, but there is equivocation as far as the philosopher is concerned, because there is no unity of nature there. Thus all the authorities, therefore, that there might be in the Metaphysics and Physics which would be on this subject, could be given an exposition because of the real diversity of the things that there is an attribution in with which, however, there stands a unity of concept abstractable form them - as was plain in the example [n.162]. I concede then that the whole of what accident is has an essential attribution to substance, and yet from this accident and from that a common concept can be abstracted [n.145].

164. To the points made from Metaphysics 7 [n.154] I reply that the text of the final paragraph on that material solves all the authorities from the Philosopher (the text which begins there ‘But clearly that...’, 4.1030b4-12). For the Philosopher says there that “what is first and simply definition and the ‘what it was to be’ belongs to substances; and not only to them but to other things it belongs simply, yet not first.” And he proves it there, that the idea that signifies the ‘what’ of the name is the definition [n.16], if that of which the idea is per se said is per se one. “But ‘one’ is said as being also is said,” and understand ‘per se being’; and “per se being indeed signifies ‘this’, and ‘this something’, and quantity another, quality another,” which is true of per se being, because in Metaphysics 5.7.1017a22-27 he divided ‘being per se’ into the ten categories; so each of them is per se one, and so the idea of them is a definition. And he concludes this there, “For which reason there will be an idea and definition of man, and differently of white and of substance” - because of substance per se and first, of white simply and per se but not first, of white man in a certain respect and per accidens. Hence in that chapter he treats principally of such ‘being per accidens’, of which sort is ‘white man’, because there is of it no definition. ‘Being’, therefore, and ‘what’ or ‘has a definition’, and any of these, is said simply of accident or of attributes, as also of substance, but not equally first. And notwithstanding the ordering, there can well be univocity.

165. As to Porphyry [n.155], he himself alleges someone else, saying “he speaks equivocally.” Who ‘speaks’? Aristotle, of course, about whom Porphyry is speaking. A place where Aristotle said this is not found in the Logic. In the Metaphysics he says it, as has already been alleged and expounded [n.164]. If someone want to treat of Porphyry’s authority, how his argument from the authority of Aristotle is of value for his purpose, it could be given an exposition, but I do not wish to dwell on it.

166. To what is argued about Physics 1 [n.156], I reply: for destroying the opinion of Parmenides and Melissus [sc. the opinion that everything is one] “the beginning” is to accept that being is said ‘in many ways’, not ‘equivocally’, but ‘in many ways’, that is, ‘about many things’. One must inquire which of these things they mean. Just as, if they were to say ‘everything is one animal’, it would be against them to distinguish ‘animal’ and to ask which animal they mean, either all animals or “one man or one horse” [Physics 1.2.185a24]. Again, when you say the argument of the Philosopher would not be valid against them if being were univocal, I reply that the consequence [‘either this one man or that one man’, n.156], when descent is made under a predicate standing for [its instances] only confusedly, does not hold formally, but there is [a fallacy of] figure of speech and a fallacy of the consequent. In other words, the argument of the Philosopher against Parmenides and Melissus fails regardless of any question of the univocity of being, because it fails by taking the predicate ‘one’ determinately when the argument takes it confusedly (which is to take in one figure of speech what is meant in another figure). If however there is no fallacy of figure of speech but ‘one’ is meant determinately not confusedly (as Parmenides and Melissus did seem to mean it), then the Philosopher’s argument does not fail. In either event, the matter of the univocity of being is irrelevant. ³¹ Yet if they did mean, as the Philosopher imputes to them, that ‘all things are one’ not speaking of ‘one’ confusedly but of some determinate one thing, then on the antecedent so understood [‘if all things are one being’] the consequent that everything is this one or that one does indeed follow. No reply is given by Scotus to the objection of Henry in n.157, but the reason is probably that it was effectively answered in the discussion of the first objection [nn.152-161], that there will be no trifling repetition when the thesis about how being is said of things is properly explained. ³²