B. About the First Object of the Intellect

137. As to the second article [n.130] I say that it follows from these four reasons [nn.132-135 - with n.136 as a fifth complementing the first] that, since nothing can be more common than being and since being cannot be a common univocal term asserted in the ‘what’ of all per se intelligibles (because not so asserted of ultimate differences, nor of the properties of them) - it follows that nothing is a first object of our intellect on account of its commonness in the ‘what’ as to every per se intelligible. And yet this notwithstanding, I do say that the first object of our intellect is being, for in being there comes together a double primacy, namely of commonness and virtuality; because every per se intelligible either essentially includes the idea of being, or is contained virtually or essentially in something that essentially includes the idea of being. For all genera and species and individuals, and all the essential parts of genera, and uncreated being, include being quidditatively; but all ultimate differences are included in some of these essentially, and all the properties of being are included virtually in being and in what falls under being. Therefore, the things for which being is not a univocal term asserted in their ‘what’ are included in those for which being is thus univocal. And thus is it plain that being has a primacy of commonness in respect of the first intelligibles, that is, in respect of the quidditative concepts of genera and species and individuals, and of the essential parts of all of them, and of uncreated being. And being has a primacy of virtuality in respect of all intelligibles included in the first intelligibles, that is, in respect of the qualitative concepts of ultimate differences and of proper properties.

138. But as to my supposing [n.137] that there is a commonness to being said in the ‘what’ as to all the aforesaid quidditative predicates [n.137] - the proof of it as to all of them is the two arguments set down in the first question of this distinction [nn.27, 35], to prove being’s commonness to created and to uncreated being. To make the point clear I go through them in some fashion:

The first as follows: for, as to any of the aforesaid quidditative concepts [n.137], it is possible for the intellect to be certain that it is being while in doubt as to the differences that contract being to such a concept;a and so the concept of being as it belongs to that concept is other than the concepts under being which the intellect is doubtful of, and other in the way it is included in each of the concepts under it, for the differences that contract them presuppose a same common concept of being that they are contracting. In other words, the intellect is certain that all the stated concepts of being are beings but in doubt as to how or what differentiates or contracts them. So the intellect has a concept of being common to, and undifferentiated from, all the kinds and categories of being whose differences it is doubtful of. So the concept of being it has is, as far as it goes, the same for them all, that is, univocal. ²¹

a.a [Interpolated text] whether it be such a being or not, it is another concept of quidditative being and of the differences that the intellect is doubtful about.

139. The second reason I treat of as follows: just as the argument was also made [n.35] that God is knowable to us naturally only if being is univocal to what is created and what is uncreated, so can the argument be made about substance and accident. For if substance does not immediately move our intellect to an intellection of itself but only the sensible accident does, it follows that we will be able to have no quidditative concept of substance unless some such concept can be abstracted from the concept of an accident; but no such quidditative concept is abstractable from the concept of an accident save the concept of being.

140. And as to the supposition made about substance [n.139], that it does not move our intellect immediately to an act about itself, the proof of this is that whatever by its presence affects the intellect,a the absence of it can naturally be known by the intellect when it is not being affected - as is plain from On the Soul 2.2.425b21, that sight has perception of darkness, namely when light is not present and when therefore the sight is then not being affected. Therefore, if the intellect is naturally moved by substance immediately to an act about that substance, the consequence would be that when substance was not present it could be naturally known not to be present, and so it could naturally be known that the substance of bread is not in the consecrated host on the altar, which is manifestly false.

a.a [Interpolated text] “.. .in its absence it cannot be thus affected:” such is true of the senses, which are not moved in the absence of the object; but what is added ‘it can be known in its absence’ is true indeed of the intellect, which reflects on its own act when the act is present, and on the absence of the act when it is not present; but then the example about sight needs explicating. The first major [“whatever by its presence affects the intellect, its absence can naturally be known by the intellect when it is not being affected”] suffices for the point at issue; the second [ “.in its absence it cannot be thus affected” supra here] is more manifestly probative. It is indeed true, but not proved by the example [of sight].

141. Response [to the above]: the proof [n.140] disproves intuitive knowledge of substance, because of that knowledge is the major true [sc. “the intellect perceives absence when it is not being affected”]; but it does not disprove abstractive knowledge, which does not fail because of a real absence of the object; neither then is its absence perceived.

142. Again, what is assumed about the senses [n.140] is dubious; since the senses do not retain the species of the object in the absence of the object and do not receive the species of darkness, how will they know darkness?

143. Against the first [n.141]: abstractive cognition necessarily presupposes that, at some point, the real presence was obtained of the thing that abstractive cognition, or the species, remains over from - the species being the principle of abstractive cognition. He who has only seen the eucharist never had the real presence of the object that is the cause, intermediately, of the abstractive intellection. Someone else who did see some other bread did have [that real presence]. Therefore, the first will not have abstractive cognition of bread, the second will - which is flatly against experience, because each can have a like act in himself of understanding that he is experiencing bread.

If it be said, in shameless denial, ‘suppose the first one afterwards saw another bread, then he will afterwards be capable of the abstractive knowledge of bread that he was not capable of before’ - he experiences the opposite in himself, for he is disposed now in like way as before. Again, he who can know an absent object abstractively can know it intuitively when it is present in existence; and if you know the substance of something known abstractively, then you know it intuitively when it is present; and then the absence etc. [n.140: “when substance was not present it could be naturally known not to be present, and so it could naturally be known that the substance of bread is not in the consecrated host on the altar, which is manifestly false”].

144. To the objection about the senses [n. 142]. Darkness is known by argument -not by the sight but by the power that argues thus, ‘the eye is looking, and it is not blind, and it is not seeing; so there is darkness’. The fact is plain: if one of the three premises is passed over the conclusion does not follow. None of the three propositions is known to sight as knowing that proposition, or the union [‘is’] or separation [‘is not’] of the extreme terms, because neither is the third one known (which there would more seem to be knowledge of). Because sight does not know its own act when it is present; This act of seeing is known to be sure, but by the interior common sense, not by the exterior sense of the eyes, which see the visible object but not themselves. ²² therefore it does not know the privation when the act is not present.

There is an explanation for Aristotle’s remark that there is sight of darkness [n.140]; because darkness is privation of sight’s object; therefore darkness is cause of sight’s not being affected, and thus is darkness perceived, not by sight but by another power, which takes privation of act in the sight for presence [sc. of privation].

145. No quidditative concept, then, of substance is possessed naturally that is caused by substance immediately, but only one that is first caused by or abstracted from accident; and it is a concept only of being.

146. By the same fact is also proved the proposed thesis [n.139] about the essential parts of substance. For if matter does not move the intellect to an act about matter, and if the substantial form does not either, I ask what simple concept of matter or form will be had in the intellect. If you say that it is some relative concept (as of a part), or a concept per accidens (as of some property or matter or form), I ask what the quidditative concept is to which this per accidens or relative concept is attributed. But no quidditative concept can be had save one that is impressed by or abstracted from what moves the intellect, namely by or from an accident; and it will be a concept of being. And so nothing will be known of the essential parts of substance unless being is something common univocal to them and to accidents.

147. These arguments [nn.27-44, 138-139] do not include the univocity of being that is said in the ‘what’ as to ultimate differences and properties [nn.132-136].

This is shown about the first argument [nn.27, 138], because: Either the intellect is, as to some such [ultimate difference or property], certain that it is a being (doubting whether it is this one or that one), yet not certain that it is a being by quiddity instead of by a sort of predication per accidens. Or in another way, and better, any such concept is simply simple [n.71], and so cannot be conceived in some respect and be unknown in another respect, as is plain from the Philosopher, Metaphysics 10.10.1051b25-28, about concepts simply simple; for it is not possible to be deceived about them as it is about the quiddity of complex ones. But this is not to be understood as if a simple understanding may be formally deceived in intellection of a quiddity, because there is no true or false in simple intellection. But as to a composite quiddity it is possible for a simple understanding to be deceived virtually. For if the idea is in itself false, then it includes a false proposition virtually. But what is simply simple does not include virtually, proximately, or formally a false proposition, and so there is no deception about it; for either it is attained totally, or it is not attained, and then it is altogether unknown. Error or deception is possible in two ways in general. Either terms are combined in a statement in a way they are not combined in fact, as when the cat is said to be in the garden although it is in the house. Or a single but complex term combines in itself what is not or cannot be combined in fact, as a round square or the thirty third day of June. The first kind are actually false or deceptive because they actually state what is not the case. The second kind are virtually false or deceptive because, while they actually state nothing (they are terms, not combinations of terms), they imply a false statement, as that some square is round or that a certain day is the thirty third of June. However, if there are concepts that are simply simple, and do not combine several elements and are not placed with other terms in a statement, then these can in no way be false or deceptive; for they neither state anything nor combine anything. Such concepts are either known fully or not known at all. ²³ About no simply simple concept then can there be certitude as to something of it and doubt as to something else of it.

148. Through this are things plain as to the second argument set down above [n.35], because such a simply simple concept is altogether unknown unless the whole of it in itself be conceived.

149. In a third way can response be made [sc. to objections] as to the first argument [sc. in addition to the two, the ‘Either.. .Or’, in n. 147, about the argument in n.27]. For the concept about which there is certitude is different from those about which there is doubt. And if that certain same concept is preserved with either of two doubtful ones, it is truly univocal in the way it is taken with either of the two of them. But it is not necessary that it be present in the ‘what’ in both of them. But either it is so, or it is univocal to them as a determinable to what determine it [as ‘being’ is determinable by the ‘in itself’ or ‘in another’ that determine it to substance or accident] or as a denominable to what denominate it [sc. as ‘being’ is denominable by the ‘undivided’ or ‘divided’ that denominate it as ‘one’ or ‘many’; cf. n.133].

150. Hence in brief: being is univocal in everything. But it is univocal in non-simply simple concepts when said of them in the ‘what’. In simply simple concepts it is univocal but as determinable or denominable, and not as said of them in the ‘what’, because this includes a contradiction [nn.132-136].

151. From these points [nn.129-150] is apparent how a double primacy comes together in being, namely the primacy of commonness in the ‘what’ as to all non-simply simple concepts, and the primacy of virtuality (in itself or in what is under it) as to all simply simple concepts. And that this double concurrent primacy suffice for being to be the first object of the intellect (though being have neither of the primacies precisely as to all per se intelligibles) - I make this clear through an example: because if sight were per se cognitive of all properties and differences of color in general and of all species and individuals, and yet color were not included quidditatively in the differences and properties of colors, sight would still have the same first object that it now has, because, by running through them all, nothing else would be adequate to it. So the first object would not then be included in all its per se objects, but every per se object would either include it essentially or would be included in something essentially or virtually including it. And thus would a double primacy come together in it, namely primacy of commonness on its own part and primacy of virtuality in itself or in what falls under it. And this double primacy would suffice for the idea of the first object of this power.a

a.a [Cancelled note by Scotus] If good be posited to be the first object of the will, how is truth per se wantable, since truth does not have good for first or for virtual predicable with respect to itself, or even with respect to what has a subordinate concept that contains it essentially or virtually?